Economic Reforms--The Failures

Economic Reforms--The Failures

By Van Nguyen

A major problem that posed toParty Secretary-general Le Duan when he seized fult  power following the Party Congress of December 14,  1976 was how to transform Vietnan  into  a socialist state. There had been until then no ideological theory or model for transition for a country that aspires to advance from a small scale production economy to a fuul scale productions one. A self-confident rhetorician himself, the Secretary-general conceived that the advancement to socialism, first and most, was conditioned by the laws of developments in each country. The economic transformation in South Vietnam should, first and foremost, adapt itself to the models of economic development in the socialist North. The northernization of the South should be preceded in association with the unification of the country; it is, thereby, a necessary imposition.  In the area of agricultural development, for instance, the cooperatives systems should be applied in the South as well as in 500 districts in the whole country so that, within five years, the agriculture in the whole would develop at the same level. Along with the development of economy modeled on the economic systems in the North, the Party Secretary invented a new political principle for the people’s democracy whereby the Party is the leader, the State, the manager, and the people, the master.  Until the present time, quite a few theorists of the party could understand what he really means.

The objectives for economic reforms proved to be plain rhetoric. Programs for heavy industry light industry and agriculture only exist on paper, in the speeches of the Party leadership, and on the slogans of the State propaganda machinery. Plans and measures to build up a centralization economy within the framework of national unified structures, promotion of coordination in the administration systems in association with the forces and means of production remained futile. By the Decision 245 following the Central Party Congress of September 20, 1977, the Politburo incorporated 60 cities and provinces in the whole countries into 29 provinces and 4 cities. Province and city Party Committees were vested with full authority to make decisions on matters of regional economic self-sufficiency, creating units of economic planning to regulate at the highest levels all needs and pushing forward the production. Energetic party members and cadressuch as the ones at Quynh Luu District, Nghe An Province determinedly vied with the Creator in overcoming obstacles to achieve  great works “to make rice out of rock and pebble.” required on   Districts and villages modeled on the Chinese-style communes sprang up transfiguring the economic life of the citizens. Making an individual trade or doing a small business were attributed to as doing business illegally. Whoever has with him or her a kg of meat, 5 kgs of rice, or a couple of bottles of fish sauce is charged with crimes of contraband goods smuggling. He/she has to pay fines; otherwise the contraband goods are confiscated. All along the highway from Saigon to My Thuan Bridge in Can Tho Province, for instance, local tax collection checkpoints mushroomed. Contraband goods confiscated could then be found at some local poem market instead of State customs warehouses. Corruption spread, and the central economy never becomes a reality.   

Meanwhile, the change of currency, trade and industry restructuration along with the on-going agrarian reforms were equally unmanageable. As with the change of currency, the Party’s aim was to seize all the financial resources of the country. Artful tricks nevertheless failed to kick off the economy. It executed the change of money bills. It defined the values of the new money bills on its whims and wishes, regardless of the fact that the new currency had nothing in but the face value. Prices soared. Crises arose. It created problems, upsetting the economy and endangering social disability. The lack of economic objectivity nullified the Party leadership's efforts for economic self-production and self-sufficiency and eroded its prestige severely. The new currency crumpled, and inflation galloped.  After a few years of reform, the development of the new forces of production and the establishment and perfection of new modes of production conceived by it proved to be unreal. The economy in the South collapsed, causing grave damages to the national economy. Cities and townships throughout the country became derelict.  The inhabitants in the Mekong delta, which was known as the granary of Indochina, survived on horse-feeding grains. They could not afford rice for food. They had to survive on rotten rice.

The consequences of the trade and industry restructuration were disastrous. The old cupid petty bourgeois and exploiting classes were eliminated, but the new terrible new oppressive class came into being. Through the strict control of the State, it carried on outrageously vile tricks to pillage the national resources and exploit the people’s labor. Nationalized plants, factories small and large and small private enterprises, handicraft productions turned into State companies fell into pseudo-interests groups. Cooperatives were managed by ruse and gradually degraded and became inoperative. The waste of the means of production was another factor that brought the economy to the dead end. Road and bridge construction materials and equipment were left unused and became ruined in store warehouses due to poor management and lack of expertise. Experts of the old regime were sent to reeducation camps, and “experts” from the North had little or no knowledge of western modern technology. The elimination of the middle class bourgeois and exploiting classes brought in nests results.  After a few years of trade and industry reforms with less productive forces of production and inefficacious modes of production, the economy increasingly deteriorated. State industry plants, and State business enterprises were at a halt.   

As regards the intelligence property, the Party and State was successful in expropriating the entirety of wealth and properties of the landowning bourgeoisie and actually transferred their ownership to the State. The Party never expropriates their expertise in the management of land properties and the experiences in the working operations of the economy. These intelligence properties were really incorporated in their projects, expertise, and experience. The hidden wealth and properties of the "capitalist bourgeoisie" and their expertise and experience which it needed to reconstruct the economy. Worse still, its methods of management were rough, ruthless, and unduly, Along with harsh measure, agrarian reforms pushing the peasantry to the death end that eventually led them to resist and oppose the regime. During the land reform, the Party, in practice, seized the entirety of land and means of production of rich landowners and transferred their rights to ownership to "the People." The Party could in no way expropriate their techniques and methods of management. As for the peasantry, these measures were to them were only a way of deprivation of land property the Party cunningly executed in the name of the "Revolution" and the People." As new methods of management  unfolded, the peasantry came to realize that they were exploited even more mercilessly under the People's Democracy than under imperialism previously, even though they were then "the master" of the country. As a result, they showed resistance. They opposed the State in silence and furthered non-cooperation, carrying out its orders just as a matter of formality.

The same decadence is true with the agrarian reforms.  The Party seized the entirety of land and means of production of rich landowners and transferred their ownership to the Party. However, it failed to expropriate their techniques and methods of management. As for the peasantry, these measures were to them only a change of hands. The exploitation of the peasantry under communism was even crueler, although they were "masters of the community" and worked for the "building of the Socialist Fatherland."  As a result, the peasants were indignant at the Party; and they either opposed the Party or carried out its orders just as a matter of formality. They were grouped and worked udder rules and regulations for agricultural cooperatives. Those who refused to join were considered anti-revolutionaries. This mode of agricultural collective production really began in April 1959 following the grain reforms in the North (1956-1958) and was applied in the South following the takeover of the South in terms of the 1976-1980 economic plans. “Cooperation’” was, in reality was “coercion.” Having transferred their ownership of properties to the State---land, cattle, and implements-- the peasants became barehanded.  Everything is under control of the agricultural cooperatives and the commune, from irrigation works to daily activities.               

Upon the completion of the land distribution, the State seized all modes of agricultural productions in the South, but failed to promote a central economy as promised. Mismanagement of labor forces was among the grave major errors. The peasantry resisted to join all forms of cooperatives and stood on their own in cultivating, managing traditional modes of production, and preserving rights to ownership of their lands. The State failed to establish agricultural communes and cooperatives as it had in the North the 1960’s. In Vinh Loi District, Bac Lieu Province, for instance, the peasants refused to register with the agricultural commune and to do business with agricultural cooperatives. Village and district agricultural cadres failed to control all modes of production. They had to go from one village to another to negotiate in business with the peasants; they even had to make deals in exchanging goods and commodities for rice from individual peasants.

There were stories about the masses' punishments on the cadres who reported to Party authorities about the masses' resistance to the Party's policy. For instance, the Party's policy stipulated that to achieve the state five-year economic plan (1975-1980), the growing of rice was compulsory, and the peasants could only grow rice. Those who grew crops other than rice would suffer heavy taxes. The Communist authorities usually squeezed out even the last penny, and the peasants would be exploited to the point they could hardly survive. Nevertheless, the peasants in many areas decided to grow tobacco since the crop often brought them good interests and thus helped them make ends meet. A vile cadre would be punished if he ventured to report the situation to higher authorities. A secret hand would hide his crop, and he authorities would never find out who the culprit was. That was the will of the masses. The Vietnamese Communist Party's monopoly of power, in the long run, could not stand. It would only cause political opposition and economic disorder.

In the following years, being aware of popular discontent, it has loosened its control on the peasantry's modes of production and eased the people's economic life by allowing a form of market economy.  However, it still holds on to its political monopoly of power, using it as leverage for political difficulties. The Democratic Party and the Social Party that were created by the Vietnamese Communist Party and that existed nominally were disbanded. The leaders of the Vietnamese Communist Party were afraid that the other two parties would grow up and eventually replace the Communist Party in the leadership.  As the world movement progressed rapidly towards democracy, the Vietnamese Communist Party increasingly worried about an unpredictable change. It found enemies everywhere. Anyone could be its enemy. It was the fear of a man who rides on a tiger's back.

With the motto’ “Glory is Labor,” the Vanguard Youths Forces came into force under the sponsorship of Party deputy-secretary of Ho Chi Minh City Vo Van Kiet. Tens of thousands of youths including elements whose parents were “pirates” were mobilized to engage in “socialist production.”  The Vanguard Youths were vested with the mission set up a “pilot program “for clearance of waste lands. The Party deputy-secretary said approvingly that the City “is in need of a vanguard force.”  The Vanguards Youths of Ho Chi Minh City was officially entitled to organization and was supported in all intents by the Party City Committee.  He further explained that “there is a need to create an environment where all youths to participate in labor production so that they will be able to think actively and be truly being proud of them.” Thousands of vanguard youths with  picks and shovrls marched throughout the streets of Saigon in the parade of show of force on March 28 1976.   

The development of agriculture along the path of farming proved to be futile “Kolkhoz” failed to take shape, however, Plans to expand farm lands with agricultural farms in flooded areas of Gia Dinh, Dinh Tuong, the Plain of Rush in Dong Thap, in the lower land along the plains of the Bassac River were all aborted due to lack of practical knowledge of irrigation methods and techniques. Groups after groups of the “Vanguard Youth” were equipped with hand rails and picks were sent to labor on irrigation works all the year round but brought no results. Intellectuals, workers, and city-dwellers were picked in teams to waddle flooded areas in Thai My, Cu Chi, and Nguyen Van Coi swamps to dig canals, to drain the lands with only their bare hands. They had to go across the flooded areas for hours to come to designated place. Without training and practice works, they could only look at the sky, at the water, and at themselves and waddle back to the city. They were nevertheless recognized as “progressive elements” that had participated in “socialist productions. Some intellectuals were recruited to be State employees. Common city-dwellers and family members of the “puppet government” were exempted from resettling in the economic zones.