THE RESISTANCE
By Van
Nguyen
The North Vietnamese Communists took over Saigon on
April 30, 1975. The Republic of South Vietnam collapsed in an instant. The fall
of the regime drew with it the disintegration of all the institutions of the
suprastructure and the dissolution of the entirety of the infrastrure base. The
new regime instituted in their place intricate systems of political and
economic institutions with ideals and values that were totally foreign to the
people of the South. They reared a new
order destined to destroy the old regime’s centuries-old political systems and
cultural and moral values. Prior to the Communist invasion into the Central
Highlands in Spring 1975, leaders of religions, political parties, social organizations,
and prominent personalities from various walks of life had foreseen that disaster
would prevail if the Communists successfully defeated the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Vietnam. They called for a war of resistance against the
communists. They urged on the then President Nguyen Van Thieu to form a front
uniting all the religious, political, and social forces in the South, preparing
for firm military self-defense, establishing resistance war zones, and making
use of all national potential spiritual and material sources to resist the
invaders, regardless of whether or not the United States abandoned Vietnam. Plans
to form defense lines along the western provinces in the South were in
preparation. All proposals were nevertheless negated by the president himself.
On Aril 30, 1875, General Duong Van Minh, who
assumed power conferred upon by President-designate Tran Van Hong, appealed to
the Armed Forces of the Republican his own initiative to lay arms and surrender
to the invading forces.
The situation throughout the South was in total chaos.
In the western provinces, the reactions of the military authorities were
multifarious. A number of military units deserted their positions; others sought
to leave the country, but the majority of the elite troops resolutely committed
to resistance. The latter elements regrouped and retreated to the Hoa Hao
stronghold at Tay An Co Tu (Tay an Old Temple) where Hoa Hao’s Bao An Security Guards
were reactivated for military service. They and other unflagging military
elements of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam put together forces to determinedly
hold back the North Vietnamese invaders.
It is generally believed that strongholds from Can Tho
to Lomg Xuyen would be like the Maginot fortifications. The communists would not
be able to spread their forces to
occupy all over the territory of the South. The same situation was true with
other military zones in the Central Highlands and the Center, in Da Nang, Nha Trang,
and Phan Rang. The communists could only overwhelm the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Vietnam where the resistance was weak, the leadership was poor, and
the determination was ephemeral. Strategies and plans without support and
cooperation from the central government came to no avail. The resistance
elements fought in vain against the invading forces. The stronghold at Tay An
Co Tu, Long Kieng Village, Kien Giang Province, fell to the communists. The
headquarters of the Hoa Hao Security Forces were under siege and was then
overwhelmed by the invading forces. On May 1, 1975, a congress of military and
political leaders of Hoa Hao was held under the chairmanship of Lt. General Lam
Thanh Nguyen and Honorable Phan Ba Cam, Secretary General of the Social
Democratic Party of Vietnam, discussed war developments. Military leaders from
various regions decided to leave the Holy Site. Armed units were given orders
to retreat to secret war zones in the mountainous region of That Son where they
resisted until the 1980’s.
Witnesses reported that following the defeat
of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam in 1975, separate units of
various army divisions and regional troops retreated to forests and mountainous
regions to resist the aggression of the Northern military might. Lines of
pockets of resistance, in particular, were formed along the provincial route of
Saigon–Vung Tau, in the areas bordering Saigon River from Ngoc Ha to Lam Son in
and around Trinh Mountains where the regional troops under the command of
Captain Giang Van Be resisted recently against the North Vietnamese. Numerous
officers regrouped their troops and engaged the Northern aggressor’s right in
the heart of Saigon and the neighboring districts. The resistance did not last
long due to short of military equipment, provisions, and medical supplies. Upon
disbandment, most of these fighters sought to evade to their home provinces or
neighboring foreign lands. Others committed suicide to keep their honor and
dignity intact, expressing loyalty to the Republic of Vietnam.
Three years
after the collapse of the Saigon government a significant resistance
force--possibly numbering several thousand men--continued to operate in the
Mekong Delta province which was headquarters for the Hoa Hao Buddhism. McArthur
mentioned the fact that the Hanoi radio quoted the district commander, Captain
Dang Huu Trinh, saying that in Cho Moi District, An Giang Province, the
"remnants of the puppet army, here, total tens of thousands, and a fairly
large number of diehard officers have evaded reeducation. Therefore,
maintaining combat readiness is a matter of constant concern to the local armed
forces and militia and self-defense forces..." The troop commander of the
district, identified as Hai Man, said that "there are 23,000 puppet army
and administration personnel, here. Many of them have stubbornly evaded
reeducation. Some have finished reeducation but are unwilling to work honestly
for a living. Reverting to their old ways, they have continued to oppose the
revolution and the people. Therefore, standing ready for combat in Cho Moi
District is one of our permanent tasks."
McArthur further noted: "the emphasis of the broadcast made clear
that the military preparedness was largely directed against 'remnant forces'
and not incursions from Cambodia, although these have taken place."
(George Arthur, Los Angeles Times, January 1978)