Saturday, September 28, 2019

THE PEASANTRY’S LOT


THE PEASANTRY’S LOT

By Van Nguyen




Dinh Phu, a peasant from Mo Duc District, Quang Ngai Province, told how he survived before and after the new agrarian reforms:

“After 1986, the agricultural cooperatives lapsed, the peasant worked on output contract. He was allocated to use a piece of land of one "sao" (80 m2) or two, or more, depending on the number of his family members. At harvest time, the cadre from the agriculture department comes to the village to verify how the production is undertaken. He estimates the season yield of the crop and set the rates of land rent and taxes. Estimates always exceed the amount of gain the peasant could get from the field. Thus, he had to look for other means to support himself and his family. He gathers wood, bakes it into charcoal, and sells it in the black market. Making one’s living that way is illegal since the State prohibits any damage to the forest. But, there is no other way the peasant could do to survive. Cadres know it. They hunt down the lawbreakers, who often get caught but are released. Only are their wood and charcoal confiscated. These "exhibits" are sold in the black market, and money naturally goes to the pockets of the law enforcement officials!    

As regards the fate of the peasantry he exclaimed: "The common people are in the same boat. They are still equally poor and miserable." The absolute majority of the people in his district are peasants. Before 1986, they worked for the agricultural communes but got the least food to support themselves and families. Three-fourths of the crop yield went to the State --practically to the local cadres' and the authorities' offices. After 1986, on the path of market economy, the local authorities allocated 10 “sao”(800  m2)  of land to everyone who is 18 years of age and older. The situation isn’t better than it was before 1986. The peasant usually grows rice. On the average, the yield of rice per season varies from 60 to 80 kgs per 800 square meters. Subtracting the expenses for the care of the land, there was only half of the income from the crop yield left. The expenses are numerous. The peasant has to pay for all kinds of additional "State contributions," from social relief program to military obligation, not to mention the tuition fees for children. In addition, he still "has the right" to pay rent for the land and the taxes he owes to the State. There is virtually nothing left after he has done all his "citizen's obligations."  In order to survive, the peasant must look for other means to support himself and his family. Besides cutting wood and baking it into charcoal, many peasants have sought to smuggle foreign-made articles or commodities--soap, watches, and so on into the black market in the local area for some gain.”

Expressing will and wishes, Din Phu unveiled: “The people know that the Communist Part-y of Vietnam lies to them. It says the people are "the master of the country, but, in reality, they are only the slaves. They are like old and weak water-buffaloes laboring for the benefits of the State cadres and Communist party- members. The people are the master of the country, but the State is the real “organizer” that manages their living conditions and properties. The Communist Party monopolizes the right to the leadership of the people! Every Vietnamese knows it. He is with no voice to express will and wishes.  Every Vietnamese, whether he is a peasant in the countryside or a worker in the city, deep in his heart, wants to get rid that Party. But, how could they do? They could silently fight back local security police and authorities only. They are armed with modern weapons while the peasant possesses nothing but his bare hands!"  (Van Chuong, Interview with Dinh Phu VNHRW (July 1993).

     Discussing the question on agrarian reforms, Nguyen Khac Vien, a veteran communist living in France, had his remarks, referring to the policy of the Communist Party, the roots of problems, the shortcomings in the realization of the policy, and, particularly, the rights and interests benefitting the peasantry. 

First and foremost, “it is true that the comments on the policy in the news may sound inaccurate and unclear. Even those who are most conversant with the question of how the peasantry is unsure about what the policy is about. In addition, the cadres’ embarrassing conduct of affairs at the base only creates confusion. They directly contact with the peasants, but don't really know what the policy really is. Basically, the Resolution No. 10 of the Communist Party of Vietnam on agriculture is a lengthy document that brings up many things at a time. One does not know what the major problem is. Most importantly, it should stress the gravity of the problem: Certain people think that only the peasants of the South fidget. They are mistaken, though. The whole peasantry, from the North to the South, is budging. One should keep in mind that the peasantry represents 80% of the population. Also, it is not a minority of it that claims a renovation, but the entirety of it does. This is the most extended movement. It is the most striking phenomenon that has ever happened since the VI Congress of the Party. It is a positive movement that it sets in motion the great cause for self-renovation in our country. Tens of millions of peasants are conscious of their rights and claim real and positive actions within the mechanisms of Party’s leadership and the laws.

      As matter of fact, “within the framework of the existing mechanisms of Party’s leaderships, the peasants do not claim a change of regime; they remain faithful to the Party and the State.  In the past years, they have suffered bad effects of an erroneous policy; they now claim a replacement of that policy. In putting into effect the practice of “khoan” (output contract), clandestinely operated  or  operated in hiding in the 1970's and then officiously operated under the Resolutions of No. 100 of 1981 and the Resolution No. 10 of 1988 by the Vietnamese Communist Party in the early years of the 1980’s , to the detriment of the corrupt potentates. That is a measure by which a whole complex process is set in motion. From afar, it is truly difficult for an observer to understand the law in its entirety.

  The peasants claim two criteria as regards agrarian reforms; the one is the rectitude and transparence of the policy, and the other, the safe and sound process of actions, which is less distinctive but which is more fundamental. One should be reminded that the agrarian reforms of the Party have proceeded in two periods. The first period took place in the North during the years 1953-1956. This was the process of confiscation of the lands belonging to the landed proprietors and that of the distribution of these lands to the peasants. Serious errors were committed during this reform, and the Party officially recognized and rectified them. The second stage took place after 1975. It was during latter period that a land distribution adjustment took effect, based on the principle of partial expropriation of land of rich peasants for land redistribution to poor peasants. On this occasion, certain cadres and Party members had unduly appropriated the lands of richest soil or hoarded the fertile lots for themselves or for their relatives, provoking anger of the peasants who then reclaimed justice. If the problem ever persists, it will be a very difficult problem to solve. There are more corrupt cadres or new potentates representing the majority component of the Party there.”

  The root of the problem resides in the policy of collectivism described in the official document which critics often qualify as "subjective and hasty." At least, one could say about the ill-conceived agrarian policies on total land collectivization between 1958 and1960 in the North and the land collectivization in the South between 1975 and 1980. The processes were virtually similar, although the objectives were variously defined. Whatever connotations the terms "subjectivity" or "hastiness," may imply, they do not sufficiently make a ring round the essence of the problem in the appearance. The true major problem is the process of collectivization, as defined in ductal in the document. It discomposes the peasants’ lands by means of political, administrative, and psychological dispositions even during the war of resistance. It suffices to re-read the news and novels that discuss the problem in that period to be convinced. What are the consequences from this collectivization, then?”
    
 In addition, “production stagnation is another problem. The population increases. The personnel increase accordingly. The apparatus of administration is cumbersome with “directions" and "departments" and large contingent of cadres and a string of orbit organisms. They only engender the parasites on it. They sponge on the cooperative, only making it mal functioning.  What, then, is the share for the peasant that practically works for the production? Not a big lot. Impoverishment is certain. More claims for rights rise. The peasant is deprived of his right to mastery of the plot of land he cultivates. What to plant, how to cultivate the soil, and where, when, and how to work are all conditioned. Other people decide for him when it comes to sharing the crop, selling it, deciding to whom it is sold, and how it is priced, and so on.  Other people decide, and not the peasant.

   Is the peasant ever the master of his land?  Yes, but not for a long time.  Collectivization has dispossessed the peasant of it. He finds himself working on his land with miserable salary. This right is transferred to the Party committee. This organ exercises the Party’s monopoly of power, which is manifest in such an authority’s manner that it often hurts the sentiments and the psychology of the peasant.  While the worker could change easily the conditions of work, the peasant ever remains attached sentimentally to his piece of land and his buffalo; he does not easily want to give place and his properties to anyone. The founders of socialism repeatedly said: “One must spare time and moment for reflex ion for the peasant; do not impose on them collectivization before they will really be ready.” Today, it must done in accordance with a priority order, render to the peasant the right to mastery of land, first.

Next, how could one share the products?  In the actual state of affairs, the “khoan” has already rendered to the peasant the right to mastery of his land.  One does not define that right clearly. One sows confusion, and thus exposes oneself to trouble. What one must say clearly is that one renders to the cultivator the right to mastery of his land. One must affirmatively define the socialist character of our regime cherishes. One reaffirms this principle: "Render the land to those who work on it", his management of the land to him and the right to mastery of the land to those people who till it only.” The trader in the cities, the civil servant of the State, the religious organization0n, and any other people have no right whatsoever to claim that right to ownership of land. That is it.

 Shortcomings are numerous. Collectivization is one. “It is the profound worry to so many cadres, here and there. A French comrade, a specialist on the history of Vietnam, after having listened to a report on the question of peasantry, exclaimed: "Then, one comes back to the rights to ownership of private property? “ What is then the difference in terms of concepts on collectivization from capitalism?"  The confusion is born from the lack of accuracy in the defining of terms in the texts on question issued by the Party. One should have said errors have been committed; and one has to rectify them. One should not come back to the question of the right to total ownership of private property as is institutionalized in the capitalist system, but to go forward toward socialism by another way, instead. That is, one has to follow a new process. It is true that the first step might seem to go a step further back, because one should take the family as a fundamental unit for production, as it was conceived in the ancient regime. The peasant, after having paid taxes to the State, is able to decide with full right for his mode of production, of his fruits of work and the sale prices for his products, without interference from the State.

  Coming back to the "Laissez-faire”?  There could be a "laissez faire" in a socialist state. In the first place, the State protects the peasant. The land is prevented from being given to non-cultivators neither is his right to the land monopolized by anyone. In the second place, the peasant is not bound to dominance by an uncertain economic system. He has the rights to purchase industrial products-- machines, fertilizers, insecticides, and commodities—and agricultural products. In the capitalist economic system, exchanges go with big firms that fix the prices in their favor and to the disfavor of the cultivators. That is one of the reasons for which one can specify this distinctive appearance. Peasants in the capitalist country voice protests against the magnates’ policies of prices and land concentrations. In the socialist regime, industrial products and agricultural products make up a great part of products exchanges between the peasant and State. The problem is to determine on what bases the apparatus of administration of the State. The industrial, scientific, and commercial sectors of the State conduct affairs. It operates the exchanges, executes the measures with which the society is assured a sufficient volume of products and the practices the policy for prices benefitting the cultivators and the whole society. Thus, bereft of a socialist state, private commerce takes the upper hand. And, a small minority monopolizes the ownership to the land of the people, making it individual property.

   As regards the peasant, he still faces serious problems.   Will eternally work on his small pieces of land, individually?  No. That’s impractical. Two problems come into view:  insect’s annihilation and irrigation. It is unwise to spray insecticide over a small piece of rice. It flies in an instant over onto the enamoring piece of land that belongs to someone s else. Still, it is untenable for one family to dig a long canal for irrigation for the whole collective. People club money together to fund the work, join efforts, and work collectively. But, all of that must be done by the peasants themselves. Ten or fifteen families could club fund together to buy a pump; fifty or seventy families could join efforts to dig a canal, elevate a dike, or club  fund to afford a fruits processor, create a credits cooperative, and so on. But, let the people do all of this by themselves, without the interference from the Party committee or the chiefs of villages, districts, or provinces. The people themselves choose the responsible and select the accountants. In another word, they create a collective which is conceived on private and self-generated initiatives and which are totally different from the directed decisions by the existing collectives or cooperatives. It is imperative that everything should be done according to the conditions of the moment and the particular situation and place. The operation of the collective or cooperatives should necessarily be independent and without intervention and pressure from the outsiders.”

  In short, “the new model will be the following: “The family constitutes the unit base. The collective organization operates under various economic forms. These economic institutions are assisted by the socialist State. The process of realization of this model takes many years, depending on the processes of development of the new technology and the progress of the society in general

  At the present time, the conditions are favorable to the regime. The members of the Party who have unduly appropriated the land of the people are bound to the law to render it back to the people.  The redistribution is done through redistribution operations under the “land funds.” There should be four land funds categories: The first one is assigned to help with the administration of the land surface reserved for the economic growth of the base products, regulated by output contract (khoan) under which the collective cedes the land  surface to the cultivator in accordance with his work ability. The second category is assigned to help with the administration of fertile land surface nearest to the village habitations. This land surface is given first priority to the invalids and wards of the State.  Other communal land properties such as ponds and handicraft facilities are put up for auction. Those who win the auctions assure themselves of the exploitation, pay the taxes and tip over a fixed percentage of their production to the commune. Likewise, other properties belonging to the previous cooperative, namely, cattle, agrarian implements, and other particulars are administered through similar processes. The immediate resultant effect is reflected in the number of non-negligible commune properties, namely, the reduction of 50% of the number of the "encased" instances in all categories, for instance. The personnel that stay to work with the commune collective assure of the farming techniques or serve as liaison between the peasant and the State services. A small number of them assure of the administration of the remaining collective means of production, in view of the possibility for establishment of a new form of more elaborate peasant cooperation in the future.” (Nguyen Khac Vien, Doan Ket. April 1989 (No. 42:pp. 36-38)

Monday, September 9, 2019

RECTIFYING ERRORS




RECTIFYING ERRORS

By Van Nguyen




To begin a new economic plan, in 1980, Truong  Chinh and his colleague theorists, first, decided to devote themselves to study in depth the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. This body of precepts provides, in principle, the perfect system of socialism on which other socialist countries are bound to model. While trying to resist growing political pressure from China’s Deng Xiao-ping, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam sought support from the USSR. It was then a propitious time for the country to start change after years of economic hard times. The Soviet Union and Vietnam signed a comprehensive cooperation agreement. The treaty not only brought with it into the country a billion rupees but also large groups of experts to help develop the country’s economy following the Soviet “NEP” model.

NEP is the abbreviation for the Soviet leader Lenin’s New Economic Policy of the USSR during 1921-1929. Instead of requisitioning all agricultural produce above a stated subsistence allowance, the State actuates a fixed proportion of the surplus; the rest could be traded freely by the peasant. The NEP thus reinstated a limited form of free-market trading, although the State retained complete control of major industries.  The NEP was introduced in March 1921 after a series of peasant revolts and the Kroonstad uprising. Aimed at reestablishing an alliance with the peasantry, it began an agricultural measure to act as an incentive for peasants to produce more food.  The policy was ended in 1928 by Stalin’s first Five-Year Plan, which began the collectivization of agriculture.

 Lenin was cited as the supporter of a multi-component economy, including individual and foreign enterprises, The NEP was thus promoted, regardless of possible deviations from orthodox socialism. Nevertheless, the party leadership, Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Truong Chinh agreed to accept the new theory, believing it was necessary for a by-passing period to socialism. Collectivization resumes as soon as the economy revives, and private ownership should be exterminated as Marx conceived. Truong Chinh, the Party’s leading theorist made study tours in person to major cities to evaluate the situation to renew measures to disentangle the country’s ailing economy. In July 1981, amid turbulent economic crisis, the Chairman of National Assembly Truong Chinh was appointed Chairman of the State Council. He started his job by revising the economic policy, notably the agrarian reforms programs. By this time, Deng Xiao-ping was keenly interested in dismantling the constraints of economic centralism, using other means to save China from a stagnant economy. Vietnam had better opportunity than ever to help itself out of the critical economic situation

The major problem was how to redress the operation of the agrarian communal system directed by the strict operation of chain cooperatives and the control of communal councils.  Ever since its establishment after the agrarian reforms (1956-1960), the system had rigorously governed the life of the peasantry, depriving their means of production, conditioning their modes of production, and regulating their behavior, economically and politically. The system is mandatory as it is conceived as the preliminary step towards building a socialist State. Every peasant household ought to be a member in it. It is both a duty and an obligation. Only a reactionary is outside of it. Cooperatives are instrumental in operating the system. To the distress of the peasant, the system is incompatible in practice with the needs of the real economic life. It fails to develop the country’s economy; neither did it carry out its function as backbone of collective economy; instead, the system consolidates monopoly of authority and lends a hand to exploitation of labor and corruption.

Having offered the State all their means of production, the peasant became empty-handed. From then on, from irrigation work to crop cultivation, every activity is conditioned by rules and regulations set by the communal cooperatives. Labor production is fixed on labor standards and total revenues of the cooperatives. Payments are fixed by marks of days of work. The system of accountancy is primary, mostly practiced by rules of thumb and actuated on whims and wishes. In practice, a variety of works requires a variety of standards, and thus a variety of payments. Harrowing and sloughing the fields cannot be equated with husking or pounding rice, or spending hours for leisure at the cooperatives’ desks. Worse still, corruption and bureaucracy reign due to abuses of authority. Laborers labor hard and gain the least; the authorities sit for enjoyment but gain the most. At the root of the problem, labor exploitation and dishonesty of communal authorities ruin the system.           

     Output Contracts System

Output contract first appeared to be a predicament in collective farming. On July 27, 1980, The Standing Party Committee decided to apply 100% output contracts for agricultural lands. In the beginning of August 1980, a conference on held in the presence of Party Secretarial Le Duan keenly evaluated the actual practices of cooperatives. Observations revealed the fact that the authority vested in the cooperatives is really “all-powerful.” There should be therefore an alternative system that is effective enough to adapt to the actual conditions of the country’s economy as well as to ameliorate the level of expertise of the cadres to accommodate the cadres. Output contracts are made to profit the labor groups and the labor workers. On 14, 1980, Le Thanh Nghi, Secretary of the Party Central Committee, in a circular, announced new agrarian production rectifications according to which output contracts were made a due practice in the operation of  communal agrarian  cooperatives system. The Party leadership—Party Secretary-general Le Duan, Chairman of State Truong Chinh, and Premier Pham Van Dong- gave consent, officiously.

The reform process was extended over the next few years. Most importantly, from January 1981, a new contract system in agriculture was adopted as a new mode of agrarian reform implementation throughout North Vietnam. This contract system did not become widespread in the South until 1982. It was known as “khoan san pham,” the appellation for product contract system, which had been in operation with success in the pilot collective farms at Tien Lang District, Haiphong. The adoption of this system characterizes a renovation in collective agriculture. Under the new system, productions works, based on specialized tasks, were specified and individual households (or in special cases, work teams) were allocated plots of land by the collective. On these plots, each household or work team is responsible for all works, from sowing, transplanting, and cultivation to harvesting of the crop. Cooperatives remain responsible for recommendation for those areas of works and productions operating under the system’s supervision, especially the works and productions involving the use of collectively owned means of production or advanced techniques--ploughing, insecticide spraying, irrigation, seed propagation and selection of and supply of chemical fertilizer. Collective households sign directly individual contracts with the collective.  Individual households who do farming on private lands as is the case of individual farming in the South sign contracts indirectly with the State. The latter households are not entitled to receive any inputs and services from the collective farm.  Collective farm member receive a fixed quantity of grain, pork, and so on. The prices at which those goods exchange are determined by the State (some examples: 1 kg. of urea--3kgs paddy; 1 liter of diesel fuel--0.8 kg. paddy.)  

Plans for establishment of Russian-type “kolkhois” in Long an, Haiphong, and Vinh Phu, for example, were executed with Soviet financial aids and expertise training, but the expansion found no good soil for development in many other localities. Modes of production remain largely traditional and rudimentary. Collective members are generally doubtful about the State policy. They reluctantly adapt themelves to the new mode of production and  way of living. Silent non-cooperation is pervasive. The cadres are mostly  ili-educated. The same old villain is appointed to the new job. Conditions of work vary from one locality to another. Supplies of necessities are irregular and momentary. Needs for implementation of work are not met. The management is still primary. Most lamentably, abuse of authority, bureaucracy, and corruption persist.

The agricultural measures, contracts on goods system, and expansion of cooperatives farms did not bring good results in the rural areas, at last. The failures of the two waves of forced collectivization in 1978-1979 and 1983-1985 remained the impediments to economic reforms. There were still no effective measures to alleviate the peasantry from slaving for the land production without due compensation. The agrarian economy was again in a shambles. Repeated failures in agrarian economy development led to a police reshuffle. The leadership of the Party, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Le Duc Tho forced To Huu, Vice Prime Minister in charge of agricultural reforms, and eight cabinet ministers to resign from office. To dissimulate the embarrassment, the Party leadership sought for alternative measures, again, to pave the way for openness and renovation and consolidate the Party’s prestige.