Population Relocation

 

Population Relocation

 By Van Nguyen




Along with security operations for pacification to mete out disorder caused by remnants of the imperialist bourgeoisie, repressive measures were used to stifle any possible political opposition. In Saigon where popular opposition was noticeable, the new regime carried out the policy of population resettlement and labor redistribution. Although the programs were heralded on economic grounds, they turned out to be instrumental in exercising social and political control on the population. They did not come out of economic chaos. Rather, they were social and political measures, aiming to defuse tension in congested cities after the war. Difficulties in the economy in the South were burdensome. The administrated the administration had to face such enormous problems as unemployment, social instability, and particularly, heavy congestion as a result of rural war refugees who waited to be repatriated to their native villages. These conglomerations of refugees had swelled the urban population with 45 per cent of the southern total population in 1975 (up from 33 per cent in 1973). The population relocation was at a deadlock. Bloody battles spread throughout the country from Tay Ninh to Quang Tri following the 1973 Peace Agreements between the United State and North Vietnam.  War refugees inundated Saigon. By the end of the war, the population of the city rose approximately to 5 million.

 Threats of war were another factor. As a result from tension from the invasion of the Khmer Rouge along the Vietnam-Kampuchea borders, the administration speeded up the program for population relocation. Political pressure from the brothering security in the north of the 36^th parallel caused another problem. Facing threat that might result in political instability, the Hanoi administration pushed hard the pacification plan in the South.  In the one hand, it made every effort to eliminate the “remnants of the imperialists and henchmen of the puppet government. On the other, it sought to relieve the economy that was on the verge of collapse. Land repetitions for the poor peasantry accelerated in the countryside, and the working people were integrated in organizations to serve the State.in the cities, Political and economic measures were executed to put into practice political control on the entire population. Parallel to security measures, financial plan to annul the monetary base of the South was carried on. Continual operations for changes of banknotes aiming to depreciate the values of the old currency developed. Campaigns for the “Defeating the Capitalists and Compradors" were activated to uproot the “capitalist economy.”

The new authorities, at first, sought to address the problem of urban congestion by relocating many of the metropolitan jobless population in the new economic zones hastily set up in virgin lands, mostly malaria-infested jungles and water-flooded rush plains of Dong Thap , as part of a broader effort to boost agricultural output. In the densely-populated precincts of Binh Dong Binh Tay, and Tan Binh Saigon, as a case in point, troopers of the municipal military council and opportunists were sent to the households of “puppet” rank and file officials to warn against or even odder with threat their family  members to leave the city.  Obedience to their instructions would be rewarded. Favors would be granted.  Their family members or relatives currently detained at the concentration camps would return home sooner. As a result, between 1975 and 1976 alone, more than 600,000 people were moved from Ho Chi Minh City, formerly Saigon, to new economic zone. Houses and properties of the households at Thanh Da Quarters, for example, were expropriated and, most of them fell to the ownership of the vanquishers from the North and opportunists.

 The report by the economic situation in the South on August 4, 1975 by Nguyen Van Nam indicated that the repartition of the labor force in the whole country was a primary objective to be accomplished in response to the need of the economy, solving the vestiges of false prosperity left by the Americans, pushing forward socialist productions, and building a self-sufficiency economy. Only had the mandarin bourgeoisie in the old regime enjoyed privileges and interests, and the absolute majority of the masses had suffered misery without a future.  By the end of August 1975, the administration had thousands of city-dwellers transported by trucks to the countryside. In October of the same year, about 100,000 people were resettled in the new economic zones in the southwestern provinces. Many settled in Binh Phuoc, Tan Phu, and Tay Ninh; others went to Soc Trang, Kien Tuong, and Vinh Long. Huynh Kim Truong, the director of Land and Housing Services of Ho Chi Minh City, declared that the city would resettle 1.5 million city-dwellers. The journal Tin Sang, on September 16, 1975, reported that the city would still settle more than 300,000 people. On October 28, 1975, The City Party Council officially passed a resolution according to which it decidedly pushed forward an extensive political campaign for labor repartitions to relieve 1.5 million who were out of work from unemployment to go and construct the economy in the new economic zones.    

This massive relocation of the population, blandly called the "state redistribution of the labor force” program,” practically began after the country’s reunification in 1976 and became thereafter an integral impetus of the security effort to control the population overgrowth. At least, 5 million people were uprooted from their home places in this process, known as "breaking the outmoded machine."  While the program was in part economic in its motivation, the main purpose of the relocation was to break up the existing traditional social structure.  By assigning the individuals to new economic zones, for instance, care must be taken when moving them from a single urban or village to separate distant locations. The organization of life of these people in the new settlements w.as unfortunately placed in the hands of and supervised by the Communist Party members, most of whom were without basic education. The economic zones were, in reality, barren land of virgin forests without waterways for irrigation. Because of the barely tolerable living conditions in the new settlements, a considerable number of people escaped or bribed their way back to the city. Without a shelter, they survived miserably from hand to mouth at the mercy of travelers on the Saigon River banks, in public parks, and along street sidewalks. Nevertheless, the new economic zones continued to develop. The program came to be widely perceived as a model of economic development. In fact, the authorities were said to have used it as a form of threat, menacing those who refused to obey party orders or to participate in the activities of the mass opposition.  (Cima, 1989: 111).

Chaos spread. By the time the campaign for population relocation was at its height, small traders and even vendors became penniless. Parallel to these campaigns, resettlement operations forced hundreds of thousands of people to move to the new economic zones. Waves of residents in Saigon were driven out of the city. In the Binh Tay Market in Cho Lon--Saigon Chinatown--, the biggest center of merchandise distribution in the South, almost all merchandise booths disappeared. Private properties--business establishments and houses-- were confiscated, and the owners and their families were harassed with threat and encouraged to go and live in the new economic zones. Almost everywhere in the city, especially in Saigon and large cities, men, women, children, and even elders in their 70's were seen standing in lines at police headquarters to be asked to which economic zone they would like to go (Van Duc, 16 (1993))

In Binh Thanh District, Gia Dinh Province, ward cadres and head cells at each bloc came to mobilize family members of the reeducated to move and settle in the economic zones. The sooner the family goes to the new settlement the better the chance for the reeducated to be back to the family. Some had been told about the vile scheme by relatives from the North and who had been advised not to listen to their propaganda resolutely stayed in the city. Quite a few light-hearted people hesitated in their choice and didn’t know the course to take. Others reluctantly followed their orders out of threats and left to the new settlements.  

The life of the old “comprador bourgeoisie” is deplorable. Having been deprived off their properties, the comprador bourgeois “were encouraged” to leave the city to live and work in the mew economic zones for “socialist production.” The goal of the policy was to help reform the exploiting class to realize the true value of labor, reform thoughts, and adapt themselves to the new modes of life. Family members of officials of reeducated officials and officers of the Republic of Vietnam were equally motivated to settle in the economic zones. If they themselves obeyed the new administration and willingly adapted themselves to socialist production, the reeducated would return home sooner.  Authorities said that this measure came out from the policy of leniency of the "Revolutions" and the working class, and the people. It is an act of pardon particularly to those who owed blood debts to the people and nation.

The propaganda machinery of the State proliferated that the revolutionary administration had not killed, arrested, maltreated, or brought all “enemies of the people” to stand trials, although it had had all evidences of their crimes. They were only coerced to end their evil activities. The bourgeoisie had only to change drastically their modes of doing things, ceasing doing mercantile business and performing socialist production.in accordance with the rules and regulations of the revolutionary administration. To free the capitalist bourgeois from their ancient modes of doing things is to help them to mend their ways, therefore learning know how to best serve Man! The deadline for leaving the city was June10, 1978. “To show mercy and national reconciliation, the authorities invited certain Progressive bourgeois” were to visit the Socialist North and see the great achievements of the “Revolution.” Returning home, some abandoned trades, offered remaining properties, and applied for jobs with the administration. Others sought to evade the county in boats across the sea. Authorities at the new economic zones kept strict control on the settlers, and escape from the new settlements was a desperate attempt. Settlers in the distant areas of Dong Thap or in the Central Highlands were restricted to socialist production. Rarely did they have time to go outside agricultural camps or make contacts with the outsiders.

Much more tragic is the fate of the personnel of the old Republic of Vietnam. Thinking back of the days of misery she endured at the economic zone, Mai A, a WAAC Major had this to say:

“I myself totally lost and desperate since I did not know to start my life again after the release from reeducation... Being a former WAAC lieutenant in the Air Force, Ms. Y. who had been a student for four years at the United States, committed suicide by drinking soda mixed with “optalidon” pills.  She died in her sleep when she was noly25 years old.  The reason for her death is understandable.  Having been released from camp after two years under detention, she came to ask the Ho Chi Minh City Department of Health for a job.  The Communists assigned her to work at the rain forest of Xuan Moc. Seeing there was little chance to survive there, she decided to kill herself.    

As for me, I graduated from the French School of Special Services, Centre Caritas, 38 Tu Xuong Street, and Saigon. I also asked the Ho Chi Minh City Department of Health for a job.  The reply was the department did not know of any job to which I could be assigned.  They then sent me to work at an ago-farm. The job would practically help me to convert myself into a member of the working class.  Moreover, I had been freshly “reeducated.” With no other choice, I accepted the job.  I had to do this so that my four children would not be forced to go and live in a new economic zone as were many families of the reeducated. Mai A believed that, in the negotiations with U. S. delegates to allow veteran political prisoners to leave the country on the Orderly Departures Programs, the Vietnamese Communists aimed to achieve a two-fold purpose.  One, they want to prove that, like the Americans, they themselves are humane.  Two, by allowing the political prisoner to leave the country, they will probably clean out an overlaying dangerous political opposition.  So long as a great number of officials and officers of the old regime still stay in Vietnam, they will likely either boost a revolt against the regime or work in collaboration with overseas hostile elements towards overthrowing it. (Trung Tan Interview with Mai A.  (August ,12, 1992).

State Trade and Industry

State Trades Systems

In a conference with the cadres of Ho Chi Minh City when he arrived in Saigon, Do Muoi declared that the trade and industry reforms consisted not only in incorporating all private trades and industry enterprises into the State trades industry systems but also in seizing firm control on the economy, preventing capitalist competition and production surplus, and averting speculation and labor exploitation to secure economic sanity in response to the needs of the people. As regards farm products, the State would have enough stations and stocks all along the routes from the provinces to the city, felicitating the transportation and distribution of goods, and so on. A system of foods distribution modeled on the system of State trade and industry administration applied after the trade and industry reforms in Hanoi and major cities in 1958 was established to carry out the objectives set for economic reforms in the South. Do Muoi’s decorations proved to be vain hopes, however. To the distress of the new regime, food shortages increasingly damaged the economy. They not only created sufferings to the common people and city-dwellers but also fomented hardship in the economic life of the contingents of Party cadres and State employees in the interior of the administration itself.

In 1960, two years after the appropriation of private trade and industry properties, the population in the North had endured a multitude of sufferings as a result of socialist administration of foods.  Members of the Politburo were supplied without reimbursement all necessities and served with means of living of high standards without reimbursement. .High-level rank and file officials and cadres were supplied with necessities of high quality at the State Department Store on Ton Dan Dan Street.  Middle-level rank and file officials and cadres and State employees were admitted to the membership of moderate State Foods stores for provisions at the streets on such streets as Pho Nha Chung, Dang Dung, and Van Ho. In addition, they were entitled to privileges, and interests. Middle- and   lower rank and file State employees, cadres, workers, and common citizens were allocated provisions at various common State foods stores on their streets. They had to pay everything although their salaries and wages could not afford them live from hand to mouth.

 State trades systems were somehow different in the South.  Right in the beginning of the trade and industry reforms, lines of services for foods supplies were extensively   established in Saigon where overpopulation was major problem. The Ministry for Foods sent more than 3,000 cadres to Saigon to operate a network of distribution of rice on State subsidies. Thousands of foods stores were in action in on the streets and alleys of the Saigon, Cho Lon, and Gia Dinh Are.as State foods stores were a typical economic feature of socialism. Disorder marks a new socialist way of life. Lines of people of all ages, including teenagers and children, crowded in front of the State provisions stores from the early morning for rice and cereals at lower prices. Rice at state stores was mostly of very poor quality; it floats when soaked in water. Authorities explained that the State sold the same kind of rice it collected directly from the growers. The fault was not theirs. .Dishonest people mixed damp rice with grains of clay for better gains. Poor conservation of rice added to the mismanagement of business of the cadres in charge makes the State trade a nuisance. By 1978 when the food shortage was at its height, yam and horse-feeding grains were substituted for rice, city dwellers had to stay on delayed yam and hard- to- digest horse-feeding grains. On the other hand, cheating and lying by corrupt cadres, poor transportation of products from the rural areas to the cities, inadequate conservation of rice at storage house made foods shortages increasingly severe. Still, rice growers were reluctant to sell their products to the State due to threats from local authorities and the cadres in charge who only cared for personal interests. In many areas, rice plants was heaped up in the fields and decayed while city-dwellers were starving for foods.

Distributions and allocations of necessities in the city were equally lamentable. A network of distribution of goods was organized to supply the city dwellers with the necessities. The business operated according to time. Petrol was once in a while allocated tithe households, each with few liters. People could find other necessities in the open markets anywhere and at any time in the “free market.” Interestingly enough, distribution of goods in Saigon, mainly foods, equally took place at public services departments, offices, schools, and hospitals. By 1960, distribution of goods in Hanoi was decided on classification of categories and standards. Supplies for members of the Politburo the Party Central Party, and level officials and cadres were not limited. Supplies for other categories were regulated by standards.  Households in the category of A1, belonging to the category of State employees of the lowest rank was allocated some 3 ounces of meat each monthly. Households of low-level State employees and common workers was allocated  5 meters of fabric yearly, from 3 to 5 ounces of neat monthly, and 4 liters of petrol monthly. In 1978, dis allocation of foods in Saigon was somewhat different. Except for “very important persons,” everyone is equal, and thus every portion of meat, for instance, is equal, each State employee with several ounces of meat now and then. An office, a classroom, or a chamber for operations in a hospital was likely to be market places where the servants of the people vied for a larger portion of meat or a larger bundle or vegetables.

State Industry Administration

Private industrial establishments and facilities were all confiscated, nationalized or transferred to the State following the campaigns for appropriation of private trade and industry properties in September 1975. Owners and staff members of both large and small mills, factories, and companies in Saigon became State employees, and the workers, the State union members. Everyone was mobilized to double efforts to work for socialist production. Private trade and industry properties persisted. It was not until March 1978 that private facilities of smaller shops were dispossessed.  Elsewhere in the country, trade and industry proprietors of the old political regime were mobilized or simply coerced to incorporate their businesses into State corporations or joint ventures under the management of the State. Individual proprietors of small shops were encouraged to incorporate theirs into small companies working under State supervision. In every city, ward cooperatives of all crafts were formed to incorporate individual crafts hands into groups to work on contract with the State.

Programs for State industry production development, nevertheless, were increasingly stagnating due lack of expertise, poor management, and bureaucracy.  Mediocre administrators from the North were assigned to key positions in administrative boards of services. They preferred doing their jobs on orders from the superiors and directives from higher authorities to developing initiatives to improve methods and techniques in response to the actual situation. Still, factionalism and corruption were pervasive. Unproductive relatives of cadres were recruited to work in replacement of capable employees of the old regime. Facilities and means of production were misused or even distributed among the authorities or exchanged for personal profits. Sixty trucks at the VISO Company were transferred to the Ministry of Transportation and Communications for use without specified reason. Tractors, trolleys, rollers, and factories equipment and other means of agricultural and industrial predictions were left abandoned in the sun or ruined hangars and storage houses.

In addition poor management, State experts, technicians, and administrators from the socialist North were in a quandary about how to make use of Western modern machinery. Students at all departments of the Faculty of Agriculture at Thu Duc were given handrails, picks, and hoes to learn and transform farm soil. Students at the Polytechnics University were instructed machinery technics with primary tools and implements mainly at transformers, rail mills, cutters, and lathers. While the country was in want of modern technology ‘most experts of foreign nationality were expelled from service, and engines of the old regime were sent to reeducation; others were sent to Hanoi to get knowledge of the workings of the industry systems of the socialist North. It is worth Contrariness often happened in the interior of the machinery of administration of the new regime in the South. Engineers from the North’ were not familiar with the operations of machinery from Western countries and methods of working in lines at chain work. They were content to adapt themselves to the laissez-faire. The MSG VISO Company, the Thanh Cong Textile Mill, and the ESSO were left paralyzed due to lack of expertise. Equipment and materials penury created a major problem.

 Contrariness basically originated from ideological concepts. According to rhetoricians of the regime at the time, socialist production, first and foremost, consists in the achievement of economic independence and self-efficiency. Reliance on rice production is of primary concern. At the time when severe foods shortages were severe, efforts were doubled to push forward provisions security programs. The circular 306 Togo November 18-1980 issued by the Prime Minister specifically provided strict measures.  Factories and companies throughout the country had to organize workers and employees into teams to take turns to go to the countryside to help increase rice production. Workers at factories and companies throughout the country were mobilized to do agricultural works to increase production. In Saigon, workers at factories and plants were moved to Long An to gather rice.

Materials shortages particularly created a serious problem in the handicrafts productions.  Members of groups of the handicrafts were out of work due to materials penury. Cooperatives were disassociated due to capital shortness. Trades groups and cooperatives members were largely hands without experience in their trades. Most of them were mostly relatives or family members of rank-and file officials under reeducation and low-level civil servants of the old regime. They registered at some trades wards offices for socialist production out of fear resisting taking part in socialist production. Again, peculations and exchanges of contrabands thrived. Open markets mushroomed. The administration faced multiple difficulties. The Board of   the Party Committee of Saigon conducted intermittent daily affair sessions, hoping to mete out foods shortages. The concentration economy with State subsidies