THE PERSECUTION

　

The Cao Dai Church

Dispossession of Properties

On August 1, 1990, the authorities in Quang Ngai Province mobilized an armed force of 500 servicemen and a proctor to enforce the law, dispossessing Cam Thanh Temple of the Cao Dai Church on Phan Boi Chau Street. On November 1, 1990, when Cao Dai believers gathered for prayers at Trung Lap Temple, Duc Linh District, Thuan Hai Province, the local authorities rushed in to dissolve the ceremony and imposed a fine of $VN dong 200,000. During January 1992, thousands of the Church's believers were reportedly arrested and detained in unknown prisons and camps without judicial procedures, court proceedings, or trials.

On January 25, 1992, the Reverend Ngoc Sach Thanh, President of the Association for the Propagation of Caodaism Overseas, sent a second letter of protest to Party Secretary-general Nguyen Van Linh. The president asked Nguyen to reconsider a number of issues concerning the deliberate violations of human rights and the repression against the Cao Dai Church committed by the local authorities. The letter specified the facts that "Although the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam explicitly recognizes the right to freedom of religion, the Decree 297, by contrast, prohibits the propagation of religion. In addition to this, there are rules and regulations created by the local authorities, causing extreme difficulties to the religions and hampering the practice of the rights to religious freedom. The decree is truly in violation of the provisions defined for religious freedom and is instrumental in the hands of the local authorities at the province, district, and village levels who haughtily and ruthlessly repress the Cao Dai Church. They execute arrests, impose fines, and, especially, interfere in the Church's internal affairs, to disunite it, to disable it, and to charge its priests and dignitaries with false accusations such as dissidence and crimes of causing social disorder."

The letter stressed the absurdity of the law and the abuses of power of the authorities in the dispossession of the Cao Dai Church’s properties.

"The Communist administration arbitrarily dispossessed:

1. The Cao Dai Church's religious establishments inside the boundaries of the Holy Inner City of the Cao Dai Holy City in Tay Ninh. The local authorities have disfigured the worship places, transforming them into market places or places for entertainment. They still have expelled from the Holy City the priests and dignitaries of the Cao Dai Church;

2. The local authorities have dispossessed the Cao Dai Church's social and cultural establishments, the Trung Hung Printing House, the Center for the Protection for Cao Dai Youths, and the Association for the Propagation of Caodaism on Thong Nhat Boulevard, Da Nang City;

3. The local authorities have dispossessed the Cao Dai Church's Cultural Headquarters and the Ngoc Trac Orphanage on Tran Cao Van Boulevard in Tam Ky City, Quang Nam-Da Nang Province,

4. The local authorities have dispossessed the Cao Dai' Temple in Tam Quan, Binh Dinh Province; and

5. The local authorities have dispossessed the Cao Dai Church's Cultural Headquarters, Hung Dao High School, An Ha Elementary School, the Cao Dai Day Child Care Nursery, and the brick-and-tile kiln in Tu Nghia District, Quang Ngai Province.

Incidents of repression, arrest, and false accusation still continue to occur everywhere in the country. An unusual incident occurred in Hanoi: the dispossession of the Cao Dai Temple at 29 Ly Thuong Kiet Street after 1985. Another unusual incident occurred at the time the State was calling for "coi mo" and "doi moi" (openness and renovation)."

Eradication of the Legitimate Cao Dai Church

　

In 1993, Party Secretary-general Do Muoi visited the Holy See in Tay Ninh. He ascertained that the Party and State would promote religious freedom and return to the Cao Dai Church all its establishments. In May 1994, a delegation from the State Institute for Religious Studies visited the Cao Dai Holy See, the Cao Dai Temple on Tran Hung Dao Street, other offices of diverse Cao Dai Sects, and the Trung Tam Pho Thong Giao Ly (Center for the Propagation of Religious Creeds) on Cong Quynh Street, Saigon. The delegation showed a negative attitude --a signal for a change of position. None of the secretary-general promises was mentioned. A "stick and carrots" approach in mind was supposedly to be executed, instead. While caressing the Church’s leaders with praise, the delegation did not dissimulate their warnings and threats. With a commanding tone, the chief of the delegation, Nguyen Duy Hinh said to the Cao Dai dignitaries in the meeting on May 13, 1994: "Those who conspire to use Caodaism to do things that are not Cao Dai's ... Don't ever regret! I will punish those who use religion for illegitimate purposes." (Ngo Ngoc Dung, 1994: 29).

Still, the State’s revision on the legitimacy of the Church posed a serious problem. The Reverend Thuong Thien Thanh expressed deep concern about how the true followers of Cao Dai could remain preserve the orthodox laws of the Church. They could in no way serve their faith with the abrogation of all legitimate institutions. The creation of a new body of administration in replacement of all this is truly a calamity:

"Caodaism came into existence in 1925-1926. The Church has undergone hardships under the rule of foreigners --the French, the Japanese, the Americans-- and, nowadays, socialism. It has resigned itself to submission to foreign rule for survival. The Church leadership, notably, endured excruciating suffering under the French. Caodaism was regarded a political organization. His Holiness Pham Cong Tac and other high dignitaries were arrested and exiled to foreign lands. Under the Viet Minh rule, they were branded as the pro-Japanese, then the pro-French elements. Cao Dai followers became the victims of political persecution. Under the American backed-up regime, many among them were accused of political indifference. The Holy See faced difficulties, and His Holiness Pham Cong Tac had to evade the country and live in exile in Cambodia. Nowadays, the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam shifts offense on the Church. It is attributed to as a political association that disguises itself as a religion to practice politics, and so on. I truth, as one has seen, Caodaism is a religion whose unique goal is to profess Cao Dai Jade Emperor's Love and Justice and promote moral virtues and spiritual standards of faith for its faithful to follow, to believe in benevolence, which are well beyond all worldly political practices. We wish to practice faith according to the religious principles of Caodaism: justice, fraternity, and benevolence. We do not want to become district chiefs, province chiefs..." These aspirations seemed to be voiced to deaf ears. (Thuong Thien Thanh. Ban Tin Dai Dao. 1994: 19)

The Supreme Council of Administration

The Religious Constitution of Caodaism recognizes the power of the Church as vested in the Pope and the dignitaries of the faith founded the beliefs that " ... Since miracles of religion possesses divine regulations just as society has laws to control undue ambitions which exist everywhere and at all times and which would destroy even the beautiful harmony of nature, when founding Dai Dao Tam Ky Pho Do, God established a religious constitution and the new code, in order to maintain truth and justice in the religion (Thien Dao). In addition to the new laws, there were divine messages and religious teachings. ... By establishing the legislation for the religion God establishes the autonomy for the religion. He who is willing to build up the religion naturally honors this autonomy. This autonomy gives the Sacerdotal Council, which is the image of God on earth, the necessary power to function on behalf of God. However, power in religion does differ from secular power because it relies on love, not on force." (Dai Dao Tam Ky Pho Do. The Religious Constitution of Caodaism. Translation by Bui Dac Hum. Toa Thanh Tay Ninh. 1992: 9).

The constitution of the Church clearly stated the nature, role, and function of Church and State. Nevertheless, the Church faced constant persecution for survival and finally suffered dissolution. In 1979, a 12-member Supreme Administrative Council was created subsequent to a decision of the provincial authority of Tay Ninh. It was then disapprovingly filled up with a membership of 35 seats. Right at the outset, most adepts of the Church refuted with discontent the civil authority’s flagrant infringement on the Church’s religious tenets basic to it. The Church has its own constitution, and there is no stipulation whatsoever prescribed in it for such a "supreme administrative council."

To the vast majority of the Church’s faithful, this council was created out of a chaotic circumstance under which the Church’ s very existence was at risk. The Communist administration carried out the order cited by itself to arbitrarily dissolve the legitimate religious institutions of the Cao Dai Church and subsequently dissolved the Church’s legitimate supreme religious body of administration as prescribed in Phap Chanh Truyen, the Constitution of the Church. Notwithstanding, a number of the Church’s institutions were dissolved. The creation of a Supreme Administrative Council was unconstitutional and unlawful. It was in violation of the religious law of the Church. Neither did it carry mandate from the Church’s faithful to take charge of the Church’s religious administration, services and activities.

The legitimacy of the Supreme Administrative Council has ever been brought into question. Those Cao Dai followers who are interested in the Church’s legitimacy and religious constitutional status still contest the legitimacy of the State-created Cao Dai Supreme Administrative Council. In matters of principle, the creation of this organ is founded at least on two false premises; it is in the first place unconstitutional according to the constitution of the Cao Dai Church and, and it is a breach of law relative to the laws of Vietnam at the time. As a result of the violation of the constitution of the Church and the breach of the current law, this local authorities’ action proved to be illegally coercive and legally inappropriate.

By dint of fairness, equality, and justice, the "Verdict on Caodaism" by the Fatherland Front of the province of Tay Ninh (1979) must be equally reexamined. According to Article 97 of the 1959 Constitution promulgated by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which is effective until 1980, only "the Supreme People’s Court of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the local People’s courts, and the military courts are the courts of justice of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In special cases, the National Assembly could establish special courts of justice." The Father Front of Tay Ninh Province, which is an orbit organization of the Communist Party of Vietnam, has no jurisdiction whatsoever to issue a verdict on the Cao Dai Church.

Under no circumstance could the Fatherland be entitled to the judiciary authority to exercise this jurisdiction. It therefore unlawfully pronounced a verdict on the Cao Dai Church. Second, also according to Article 87 of the said Constitution, "the administrative councils at all levels are the State executive organs in the local areas." Similarly, the People’s Council of Tay Ninh is not a judiciary body, and thus has no legal authority whatsoever to give a judgment on this matter. Article 89 of the 1959 Constitution also stipulates that "the administrative councils at all levels administer the public services of the local areas, execute the decisions of the council of the local area and the resolutions and orders of the State administrative organs at the upper levels." Referring to the preceding articles only, the People’s Council of Tay Ninh Province is not entitled to any legal authority to exercise jurisprudence to issue decision on religious matters as was the case of the Cao Dai Church, a religious faith with a faithful living beyond the Tay Ninh Province boundaries. The execution of such a decision is blatantly a breach of national law.

Furthermore, viewed in the light of Phap Chanh Truyen, the procedures of the creation of the Supreme Administrative Council as proceeded are illegitimate in two aspects. It disregards the laws and rules of the Church’s constitution and the respect for the observance of the faith as required by the by-laws of the Cao Dai Church. Any legitimate act should be performed in conformity with these requirements: The Communist administration commits many grave errors. In the first lace, the Church belongs to the faithful, in the second, the Church’s authority resides with the leadership of the Church and the consensus among the highest dignitaries of the Church, and, in the third, the consent of the whole body of dignitaries from the rank of "giao huu" up to "chanh phoi su." Every decision is executed within the power of the Sacerdotal Council and made effective by the Ho Phap (Pope). None of these prescriptions is observed.

The breach of the laws of the Church is also analyzed in one of the remarks by a Church’s dignitary, Sy Tai Huynh Van Phan. The religious justified on the basis of the Church’s religious characteristics of the laws prescribed in the Constitution of the Church, a body of laws comprising 12 chapters with 27 articles established by the Church and founded on the Tan Luat, the New Laws, and the Church’s religious orders. This constitution bears no political nuances. It is purely religious and is complacent. It is salubrious to the constitution of any country and commits no violation of the laws of any political regime. Article 25 of this constitution, in particular, stipulates that, the New Laws and Phap Chanh Truyen, the Church’s religious laws and orders are the prescriptions of internal rules and regulations and the by-laws Cao Dai followers practice within the Church’s religious established order. To follow the path of Caodaism is to observe the laws and rules prescribed in the Tan Luat and Phap Chanh Truyen.

Caodaism in essence symbolizes the ideals of democracy, thus seeking to prevent the monopoly of powers. The division of powers is incorporated in the bicameral organization of the Church, the Hiep Thien Dai and the Cuu Trung Dai. The two systems coexist, each with its particular functions of its own and operate in conformity with the stipulations prescribed in the Phap Chanh Truyen. The Hiep Thien Dai (The Heavenly Union Palace) is headed by the Chief of the Palace, who is vested with the responsibilities to enlighten the faithful’ s minds in their service of religious faith and direct religious services. The Cuu Trung Dai (The Nine Sphere Palace), which is headed by the Pope, on the other hand, takes charge of the administration of the Church.

The Holy See was in complete disorder with the creation of the Supreme Administrative Council. The power of the Supreme Administrative Council is in the hands of one person, who is entrusted to take charge of the Church’s religious politics and exercise the laws of the Church. This contention of the civili authorities is arbitrary and thus is in flagrant violation against the inscriptions in the Phap Chanh Truyen, which fundamentally refute any form of coercion and monopoly of power. In addition, the stipulation regarding the power of the Pope mentions none of such thing as seizure or exercise of power. The Supreme Administrative Council, by contrast, holds the reins on the services and activities in all areas, thus contradicting the Church’s religious laws and rules and radically upsetting the faithful’ s hearts and minds.

There dispute over the creation of the Supreme Administrative Council between the adepts loyal to the legitimate Cao Dai Church, on the one side, and the groups that support the Supreme Administrative Council on the other is noticeable. It is not a conflict; but it is a fight between opposing factions of adepts of the same faith, the contenders who seek to preserve the legitimacy of their Church and those who take side with the political regime. This internal division dragged both sides of to an endless fight." (Thien Chuong. On the Legitimacy of the Cao Dai Churvh. A Report. October 1992).

　

The Reform

In April 1997, a assembly of 800 delegates of the Cao Dai Church in Tay Ninh met an official congress at the Holy See. This congress adopted a charter for a new association. and voted on a collective board of the Supreme Administrative Council of Caodaism. The association gained State recognition immediately. In September of the same year, the Cao Dai branch in Ben Tre. which calls itself Caodaism Reformed and has its siege in Ben Tre, a province 80 kilometers south of Saigon, was placed under the supervision of the State. Two hundred twenty-nine delegates convened and elected a central administrative board in the presence of the representatives of the cadres of the local Fatherland Front and civil authorities. The sect had distanced itself from the Cao Dai Church in Tay Ninh for 28 years.

Until the last decade of the twentieth century, there were separate Cao Dai sects operating throughout the South. Besides the Cao Dai Reformed (Chinh Dao), four other branches of Caodaism were recognized by the State. They were Caodaism in Tay Ninh, Cao Dai Minh Chon Dao, Cao Dai Chieu Minh Long Chau, and Cao Dai Missionaries. Still, there were other branches of the faith that professed themselves the members of the legitimate Cao Dai Church, honoring Cao Dai’ s religious tenets as prescribed in the Tan Luat (New Codes) and the Phap Chanh Truyen (Religious Constitution of Caodaism).

RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION UNDER RENOVATION

　

　

Overview

The Almanac of the Christian World, the 1993-1994 edition, noted that the number of followers of religions in Vietnam was as follows: not to follow any religion or atheistic: 22,5%; Buddhists: 54%; Caodaism and Hoa Hao Buddhism: 11% -- Hoa Hao Buddhists: 1,800,00 and Caodaists: 3,600,000; and Catholics: 11%). The theistic population evidently exceeds the atheist faction. Religious beliefs and the believers are nevertheless treated with inequality, disrespect, and violence. The laws in replacement of audacious abductions, killings, and executions of the old days are used to control the religious life. Religions and the believers of all faiths, therefore, suffer all consequences of a religious policy of a totalitarian regime that always declares that the rights to religious freedom are respected under its rule.

The Laws

In 1990, having completed with success the dispossession of physical properties of all Churches, the Communist administration proceeded with plans to transform or outlaw the Churches it considered the vestiges of feudalism and imperialism. To begin with, it promulgated a series of decrees, circulars, and resolutions with all strict regulations to bring all religious faiths under State control. Tran Bach Dang, a long-standing Communist agent in the South during the Vietnam War, in his report at the Seventh Congress of the Central Party Committee in March 1990, emphasized the complicated relations between the State and the religions of the time and came up with general guidelines for a new religious policy. The initiatives were officially adopted by the said Congress on June 27, 1990. This Congress also confirmed its new attitude toward the religions and defined the task of religions in the life of society. That was the first time, the Party showed particular sensitivity to the political aspect of the issue.

In the previous Congresses, it had never approached a religious policy but parroted the rhetoric "freedom of belief and religion’ instead. The aim was to appeal to the believers of all faiths to serve the Party --to guard against the use of religion of bad elements for reactionary schemes. A change in attitude and a tone of reconciliation were apparent: "Beliefs and religions truly constitute a great part in the spiritual need of the people, a need that would subsist for a long time. Any act that causes harm to the freedom of belief or any act that makes use of religion to sabotage national independence, to oppose socialism, and to prevent the followers from accomplishing their public duties is definitely prohibited."

After the collapse of the Communist regime in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Hanoi pressingly looked for a solution, secure trade relations with Western democracies, and promote diplomatic normalization with the United States. Following the model of economic development of Communist China, it developed the so-called "market economy in the direction of socialism," abandoning the socialist subsidy system and opening way to State joint-venture and private businesses. While widening certain areas of the economy, it tightened control over all areas of politics and all domains of activities of the civil life. It particularly persevered with a closer watch on the religions which it considered the most serious threat to the existence of its regime. They were therefore placed under stricter control for fear that they would play a role in a possible popular uprising. The overthrow of the Ngo Dinh Diem government in the South in 1963 led by the Buddhist Church had certainly preyed on the mind of the Communist leadership. Precautions were taken against opposition and revolt.

　

The Decree 69/HDBT

of March 21, 1991

On March 21, 1991, the Council of Ministers promulgated the Decree 69/HDBT defining the rules and regulations on beliefs and religions. The legislation consists of three chapters with 25 articles regulating the religious practices and activities. Under the new law, all religions have to abide by the new law and performed religious services and activities in accordance with the provisions of the law. Apart from fulfilling the civic and clerical duties, the clergy need to attend to such regulatory services as to register all religious events and activities and seek grants prior to approval by the Council of Ministers and the local authorities. The law also provides the lines of religious conduct, namely, the guarantee of the rights to religious freedom, the concepts of impartiality and equality before the law, and the observance of the law. The Council of Ministers declared that it " advocates a policy of religious freedom. It promotes the guarantee of legitimate and legal religious activities, encourages the activities that benefit national interests and prohibits all forms of superstitions and abuses of religion."

Public opinion showed nevertheless a negative attitude towards the new law. "The religions are now under total control of the State. They have to observe the laws and regulations under such extreme circumstances that they could only survive under the patronage of the State. In reality, they are stripped off the rights to religious freedom. They could neither promote the preaching of their faiths nor practice religious services and perform activities suitably and properly. Any religious act of the priest and any performance of religious activity of the believer is equally subject to State rules and regulations. The law constitutes an impediment to the religious life. Furthermore, it creates serious problems from religious education to ordination of priests and a meddling obstruction to the practices of religious faith of the believer.

The law is, in truth, riddled with restrictions and ambiguities. The provisions for the rules and regulations of the law are prescribed primarily each with directives and authorizations. For instance, the worship place is "protected" by the State; religious practices at the worship place and at a private domicile are to be registered with the authorities; and annual religious events are to be reported with the local authorities. As regards religious propagation, the printing of Bibles and materials of religious matter and religious education is subject to authorization. The education, ordination, appointment, displacement, and title conferment of priests, monks, or dignitaries are regulated by State approval. Permission for participation in religious events overseas are only granted subsequent to authorization. Foreign aids are to be administered through State agencies. Article 25 of the new decree, in particular, specifies that foreign aids of purely religious matter can be obtained only with the approval from the Council of Ministers. (Trung Tan, Interview with Pham Hai, VHRW 3 (October 1001).

Commenting on Article 25 only, a Catholic bishop of Vietnam said that the Vietnamese Communist Party "has discouraged international religious associations and world humanitarian organizations from promoting charitable aids to the poor people of Vietnam." To a lesser degree of resentment, the State-affiliated Committee of Union of Catholics expressed reluctance. For a long time, it waited in expectation of a legislative code on religions. One of its members, the deputy priest Phan Khac Tu repeatedly filed his project to the office of the National Assembly but received no answer. His expectations fell into oblivion. At the conference of the Fatherland Front on May 25, 1991, the deputy-priest expressed regret that the Decree 89/HDBT did not reflect the Church’s appreciation expressed at the Seventh Congress. He vowed to continue to work for a new legislative code for religions, integrating in it a number of amendments to the Constitution. He also hoped that he could promote implementation on the current regulations on religions.

The Catholic clergy in Saigon expressed a mixture of feelings with discontent. The Reverend Nguyen Huy Lich, a member of the Committee said that he was only half-joyful. "Religious congregations are officially recognized by the new decree, but the rules and regulation are even stricter. Modifications for some regulations in the texts of several articles such as the list of requirements for being a priest, namely, the level of education, the residence status, the conditions for retirement, and so on, are necessary."

The Decree ^9/HDBT was, in reality, a further step toward leveling the government's control on the religions, especially Buddhism. It was also a preventive measure, creating pressure on the Buddhists and placing the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam under State control. The press had a role to play in this effort. The official journal Saigon Giai Phong, August 15, 1991, ran an article entitled "Bring into Play Befittingly the Ideology and the Politics of the Party Concerning the Religions" by Chau Quoc Tuan of the Bureau of Religious Affairs of Ho Chi Minh City. In his conclusion, the official showed anxiety about the Unified Buddhist Church’s negative attitude towards the Party's politics. He gave the impression that the leadership of this Church was fomenting opposition to the regime. He urged on the State to act with caution. The Party should heighten vigilance against such a hostile behavior. Necessary steps must be taken to neutralize ill-intentioned actions to use religion as a shield to sabotage national independence, oppose socialism, and prevent the believers from attending to civic duties. The Party, in his views, genuinely guarantees the freedom of belief of the people but, it has at the same time to secure, first and foremost, the political stability and the economic development of the country.

The Decree-law of November 1991

The new State Council led by Chairman Do Muoi, who succeeded to power after three years on the path of "renovation" of Party Secretary-general Nguyen Van Linh, demonstrated even harsher anti-religion stance. To subvert opposition coming from the believers, particularly from the Buddhists, the Chairman Do Muoi, at the time the movement of opposition of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam was at its climax in November 1991, promulgated a decree-law to implement the orders and laws on religions that had previously been in effect. The politically-motivated law, in fact, aimed to deal with the current situation --to suppress the "counterrevolutionary elements" and tighten control on the Churches. The law foresees crimes of and punishments on offense against national security consisting of such crimes as unlawful possession of or leaking out State secrets. It further specifies the three major categories of State secrets. They are defined by the law in general terms all news and information about the services, facts, materials, localities, things, and words with important contents in the areas of politics, defense, security, economy, sciences, industry, and other matters that the State has not made public or does not make public and that, if disclosed, will be detrimental to the State. Violations of State secrets are classified according to three levels of secrecy: the absolute secret consisting of all secrets in the areas of national defense and military strategy, kinds of arms, anything that is related to foreign and international policies; the top secret, consisting of the contents of all materials relating to national foreign policy, defense and security, economy, industry and the sciences; and the secret, all that is related to news and information considered to be detrimental to state security, in general.

In chiming with the Party leadership and State authorities, the Ho Chi Minh City Committee for Religious Affairs, in its press release to the public, brought to the attention of the local authorities and Communist party members at the district level a list of guidelines interpreting the provisions of the new decree. The emphases focused on the enforcement of the new law. On the one hand, it stressed the State policy, which aims to secure national solidarity and religious freedom, which is one of the rights to democracy of the people. It stressed the necessity of obedience of the people to the rules and regulations and of observance of religions practices and activities. Still, it highlighted several provisions, focusing on the prevention of all forms of exploitation of religion and the use of it as an illicit means for self-interest as previously practiced by the colonialists and imperialists.

"The Vietnamese Permanent Mission to the United Nations (1992) cited Article 70 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which, it said, expressly recognizes the right of the citizen to practice or not to practice a religion. However, it forgot to cite a more important clause of the same article according to which "no one is allowed to violate freedom of belief, religion, or take advantage of belief, religion to violate the law and the policy of the State." This additional clause is the very double-edged sword that is used to suppress the rights to freedom of religion. Rather, it denotes a preventive measure, and not a provision of a piece of legislative law; it needs to be revised.

Flaws of the same nature are also found in the compilation of executive laws. Regulatory laws --resolutions, decrees, or circulars-- are the instrument that the Party or government creates to serve political purposes. They are directives and orders. They are not the derived from the legislative laws, and thus they are unconstitutional. Furthermore, the provisions in these decrees or resolutions institute postulations, prohibitions, and restrictions in all areas of religious practices and activities. The Conference of Catholic Bishops of Vietnam, for instance, pointed out the bias of one of the provisions in its letter of opinions addressed to the Government of Socialist Republic of Vietnam on April 14, 1991: ‘... is allowed but requires permission.’ Paradox is unveiled. While the citizen must observe the law, the State must not. Obviously, the provisions of these decrees and resolutions vest the authorities at every level of the administration, with the interpretation and application of the law on their own whims and wishes." (Thien Chuong. Interview with Tran Hau. October 3, 1992)

The Decree of July 27, 1993

As the conflict between the State and the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam in Hue began to spiral, Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet enacted a law requiring all religious organizations to report their activities to the Communist authorities annually. The decree, which took effect on July 27, 1993. particularly stresses the observance the provisions prescribed in the Resolution 297 of November 1977 and the Decree 69/HDBT of March 21, 1991. However, to implement the previous laws, the new decree made additional provisions according to which the State permits the practices of religion, but the believers ought not take advantage of this privilege to oppose the authorities or jeopardize national solidarity. Any religious or believer will be punished like any other citizen if he or she infringes on the rules and regulations. Similarly, the relations between the religion inside the country and the religious organizations in the foreign countries as well as their activities must follow the rules and regulations as provided by the law. Religious activities must be conducted in conformity with the guidelines of the State. The school run by the religion ought to provide the students with programs of studies of Marxism - Leninism. The printing and the import of books of religious teachings, and the maintenance of the worship place, the formation of priests including the overseas on-service training of priests are all allowed, but the permission can be given only if the authorities find it pressingly necessary.

Remarks on the Laws and Practices

In 1982, Vietnam acceded to the International Covenent on Civil and Political Rights whose Article 18 guarantees the rights to religious freedom. It nevertheless continued to oppress dignitaries and followers of all faiths "Perestroika" followed by the collapse of the Communist Bloc of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1991. To avoid a similar situation, fhe administration decided to execute harsh measures to mete out opposition from all Churches, especially the outlawed the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam. On the legal plane, to tighten control on all Churches’ religious services and activities, the government promulgated successive decrees to implement its religious policy. Of most importance, the Decree of 69/ HDBT of March 21, 1991 provided strict regulations such as, each year, the responsible for a religion has to report all projected religious events and activities to the cicivil authorities concerned for approval. Emphases on observance of rules and regulation in religious services and activities were also repeated. As far as charitable work is concerned, the State recognizes the need of charity in such a poor country as is Vietnam. Nevertheless, activities in this area should be regulated in conformity with the law and in agreement with the State religious policy.

Statements by the authorities were nevertheless unconvincing. Complaints about restrictions on religious services and activities were self-evident. Misuse and dispossession of international aid by the State are heard among religious circles. Distrust of civil authorities is common. A medical doctor , who was on mission to in a UN health team to Vietnam, related in a conference that international aid has not come to poor people. No sooner had the team left than the police came to confiscate the donation. Furthermore, religious organizations are not entitled by the law to perform charity. and priests and monks are hampered with all kinds of problems caused by the local civil authorities. The Vietnamese Communist Party and the State monopolize even charitable work. Five Buddhist monks and followers of the Buddhist Committee of Food Relief Mission were summoned to the Saigon police headquarters for interrogation on charges that the took part in the program without State permission. They were warned with threat and forbidden to go on with their program. In January 1995, the Most Venerable Thich Quang Do, as a case in point, was arrested and detained for condemning the arrest of these kindhearted people.

Remarks on the Policy

Professor Carl Theyer of the Royal University of Australia said that the main difference between the member countries of the ASEAN and Vietnam is that, in the latter country, the government lacks popular mandate. In Vietnam, members of the administration are not elected by the people though democratic processes. The Vietnamese Communist Party reserves the right to the leadership of the people, regardless of the people’s mandate. The problem lies with the authorities in that they cannot differentiate the humanitarian activities from those activities carried out for political purposes. Consequently, the authorities have become discredited, and the Vietnamese Communist Party’s control over the population has drained away .