THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

On January 27, 1973, representatives of the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam signed the Agreements on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam. The Agreements were based on the respect for the Vietnamese people's right to self-determination and the contribution to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world. Article 9b of the Agreements provided self-determination for the South Vietnamese people according to which "the South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic elections under international supervision."

Article 11 of the Agreements, in particular, promised to honor the civil and political rights of the Vietnamese people, with all citizens being equal and free to enjoy authentic democratic freedom. "Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will: -achieve national reconciliation and concord, and hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other; -ensure the democratic liberties of the people, political freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of the meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political parties, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, right to property ownership, and right to free enterprise ..."

Article 5 stipulates that "Within sixty days of the signing of the Agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from the South Vietnam of troops, military advisors, and military personnel including technical military personnel and military personnel with associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war material of the United States and those of the other foreign countries ..." The Agreement nevertheless left the 219,000 North Vietnamese troops with all their armaments, munitions, and war material not only to stay not only in place but also in attack positions in the South Vietnam. No sooner had the cease-fire taken effect than North Vietnam expanded both political and military activities in the South Vietnam.  It consistently made every effort to take it by force. More divisions from the North  went south. The Paris Agreement ended the Vietnam War, but  another  war had already  begun.

At the 21st Plenum of the Workers’ Party, the Communist leadership decided to shift the primary emphasis from political warfare to military offensive. In late October, 1974, field commanders and chief politics commissioners in the battle areas of the B Front, i.e. the South Vietnam, received the Politburo’s new directives on the strategy concepts for 1975-1976. In January 1975, Le Duan gave the Politburo’s directives for the 1975 campaign to the Military Committee of Central Highlands to further attacks towards Ban Me Thuot. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam did little to hold them back. Armaments were affected due to U. S. serious military aids cuts. Heavy weapons such as artillery, tanks, and jet aircraft were largely useless against the North Vietnamese troops equipped with multiple war armaments from the Soviet Union and Communist China. The American Vietnamization of the war came into play. The South Vietnamese defended the South Vietnam on their own.  

By March 1975, the North Vietnamese troops launched a series of attacks throughout the Military Zone I, including Da Nang, the area between Da Nang and Hue, Hue, and Quang Tri. Within days, Quang Tri, the farthest north province of the South fell into the hands of the North Vietnamese army. Both ends, north and south, of Highway I came under heavy fire of North Vietnamese artillery By April 1, North Vietnamese troops held Military Region I, Hue and the adjoining southern provinces Quang Tin and Quang Nam. The North Vietnamese divisions in the Central Highlands met no resistance, advanced toward the coastal provinces, and took Nha Trang. With little resistance against them, they seized the entire Military Region II by mid-April. Defeat after defeat, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam lost the best troops.

General Van Tien Dung, the Commander-in-chief of North Vietnamese Troops in the South, received the Politburo’s directives to take Saigon. On April 30, the North Vietnamese troops from all directions inundated Saigon, dismantling the various units of the Armed Forces of Vietnam that defended it. The Vietnamization of the war came to an end. The red flag of North Vietnam was hoisted over the South’s presidential palace. The Republic of Vietnam  administration crumbled and so did  U. S. military power in the Southeast Asia. The United States of America lost the war!

Before its takeover of Saigon, the Provisional Revolutionary Government gave, in its 10-point declaration, assurances to carry out the national concord and reconciliation policy. Nevertheless, the councils for these purposes never functioned. In his speech delivered during the May 75 victory celebration in Saigon, Party Secretary-general Le Duan promised that the Party would turn the prisons into schools and fostered national reconciliation. Notwithstanding, the Military Administration Committee of Capital Zone Saigon - Gia Dinh, by its communiqué in June 1975, appealed to all superior officers from the rank of captain and above and all officials from the grade of assistant director and vice province chief or above from the former administration to turn themselves in at Gia Long High School for Girls and Taberd High School for reeducation. Officials, officers, members of the Senate and House of Representatives, politicians, and priests and monks of all Churches were to register with the Communist military authorities. Reeducation began in the awe of the South Vietnamese people.

In the months that followed the liberation when the wounds of the war were yet to heal, political hatred, economic oppression, social injustice, and corruption spread everywhere. While hundreds of thousands of high-level officials and officers of the Republic of Vietnam were sent to reeducation camps, civil servants and the military personnel of the lower ranks were to attend reeducation sessions in place at the local wards. To begin with, in the summer of 1975, the Communist government carried out a general administrative measure. This measure nevertheless evolved into a policy following the reunification of the country.

The Law on Counterrevolutionary Crimes and Punishment, promulgated in North Vietnam on November 10, 1967, came into effect in the South on July 2, 1976. Article 15 of the law, in particular, stipulates that "those who, for counterrevolutionary purposes, commit the following crimes: 1) Carrying out propaganda and agitating against the people's democratic administration and distorting socialism; 2) Propagating enemy psychological warfare themes, distorting the war of resistance against the U.S. aggressors for national salvation, independence, democracy and national reunification, and spreading baseless rumors to cause confusion among the people; 3) Propagandizing the enslavement policy and depraved culture of imperialism; and 4) Writing, printing, circulating or concealing books, periodicals, pictures, photographs or any other documents with counterrevolutionary contents and purpose... will be punished by imprisonment from 2 to 12 years (Aurora Foundation, 1989: 76). Anyone who showed negative attitude toward and non-cooperation with the new regime were likely subject to arrest and detentuon.

Intolerance against freedoms of expression and of the press was noticeable in the press policy of the Vietnamese Communist administration. Through the medium of the Front of Fatherland, it executed control on all means of public expression. Besides the daily Nhan Dan (The People), which was published in Hanoi, only the Tin Sang (Morning News) and the Saigon Giai Phong (Saigon Liberated) were circulated in Saigon. The ideological control laid hand on the printing and publication of books. The control of associations throughout the South was also of prime target. Associations could only exist under the control or supervision of the Fatherland Front. Along with the administration of the old regime, all political parties and economic, social, cultural, and religious associations in the South Vietnam were dissolved.

THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM

by Van Nguyen and Associates

Copyright by Vietnam Human Rights Watch

　

The Ideological Premises

Vietnam under communism is a one-party state. The Vietnamese Communist Party shows all of its ambitions to monopolize the power to govern the entire Vietnamese people, shaping the development of society in all domains of life and the fate of the individuals that constitute it. It considers itself the savior and leader of the nation. This party empowers itself with the rights to the leadership of the people. By Article 4 of the 1992 Constitution, it vests itself with the mission to bring into play what it calls the socialist transformation of the nation. None of the sectors of the political and civil life could escape from it.

Despite the 1992 Constitution stipulates the division of powers, the functioning of the actual nomenklatura exhibits identical entreaties of the Party and the State. The distinction in viewpoints and the interpretation of the laws and policies are virtually nominal. The Vietnamese Communist Party decides everything. The practices of the official ideology --communism-- are the legitimate way of life. It forms the backbone of all other social institutions. It institutes the history of the Vietnamese people, elaborates all values it holds dear, and establishes the norms for the supra- and infra- structures of the country.

On his seventieth birthday, President Ho Chi Minh, the founder of the Indochina Communist Party, explained how he became a Communist. At first, in his words, "Patriotism, not yet communism, led him to have confidence in Lenin, in the Third International. Step by step, in the course of struggle for his cause, by studying Marxism-Leninism parallel with participation in practical activities, he gradually came to realize that only socialism and communism can emancipate the oppressed nations and the working class throughout the world." For him, communism is a Book of Miracles. Anyone faced with difficulties could simply open it and find a ready solution. "Marxism-Leninism is not only a miraculous book but also a radiant sun illuminating the path to final victory, to socialism and to communism (Ho Chi Minh, 1960-1962: 448)."

History has recorded that Ho Chi Minh is the father and soul of the Communist Party of Vietnam. In February 1930, he founded the Communist Party of Indochina. In the same year, as Comintern representative, he drafted a program of action for it. This program aimed at carrying out such slogans as: overthrow French imperialism, feudalism, and the reactionary Vietnamese capitalist class; establish a worker-peasant and soldier government; confiscate the banks and other enterprises belonging to the imperialists, and put them under the control of the worker-peasant and soldier government. The program was later adopted at a Conference of Communists from Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina held in Hong Kong, where he served as a Comintern agent. At this conference, Ho Chi Minh declared that "the Communist Party of Indochina "is the Party of the working class. It will help the proletarian class lead the revolution to struggle for all the oppressed and exploited people (Ho Chi Minh, 1960-62: 145-48)."

Ever since its foundation, the Communist Party of Indochina, has never changed its ideological goals.On November  11, 1945, faced with strong opposition from the national parties, Ho Chi Minh used the delaying tactics, wooing their leaders to join him in the national union front to fight against the French. He declared to dissolve the Communist Party of Indochina but created the Hoi Nghien Cuu Chu Nghia Mac-xit (Association for the Study of Marxism) to operate in its place. Upon achieving his hidden scheme, he made volte face, decimating their leadership and eliminating their parties one by one. On March 3, 1951, with political and military support of the People’s Republic of China, the Communist Party of Indochina officially reappeared under its new name, the Vietnamese Workers’ Party. The party was placed under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. He reaffirmed on this occasion that the task of the Party was to lead the entire Vietnamese people and to bring the resistance to victory and revolution, i.e. communism, to success. (Ho Chi Minh on Revolution, p.228).

Ho Chi Minh and his successors have relentlessly striven to achieve Marx' and Lenin's, and later, Mao’s ideological axioms and teachings. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the basic principle. It dictates the goals and aims for a Communist revolution not only in Vietnam but also throughout the Indochina peninsula. At the Third Congress of the Vietnamese Workers' Party (1960), Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly Truong Chinh categorically contended that "The aim of the actual revolution is that the entire people and, particularly, the working people should thoroughly absorb the socialist ideology, that they should abandon their previous outlook on life and on the world and replace it with the Marxist viewpoint. Thus, Marxism - Leninism will assume the leading role in guiding the moral life of the country and will be the framework within which the thoughts of the whole nation are formed. It will serve as the foundation upon which the ethics of our people will be built."

After the takeover of the administration in South Vietnam, Party Secretary-general Le Duan at the 1976 Vietnamese Communist Party Congress interpreted in the same terms the ideological axioms as Truong chinh had. "The important task of ideological and cultural work is to combat bourgeois ideology and other non-proletarian ideologies; to sweep away the influence of the neocolonialist ideology and culture in the South; to spread thoroughgoing propaganda and education about Marxism - Leninism ideology and the lines and policies of the Party in order to give absolute predominance to Marxism - Leninism in the political and spiritual life of the entire people."

Party Secretary-general Nguyen Van Linh, who embraced openness and renovation, in his address on the 60th anniversary of the Communist Party of Indochina, on February 2, 1990, solemnly confirmed the mission of the Communist Party of Vietnam: "The party determinedly follows the path of dictatorship of the proletariat and resumes its supreme leadership of the people." He advocated that no other political parties but the Vietnamese Communist Party could shoulder the role of leadership of the people and country." He particularly stressed, on March 6, 1990, that "the Communist Party and people of Vietnam, now as before, unceasingly strive to consolidate the lasting and close friendship and all-around cooperation with the Soviet Union, the land of Lenin and the Great October Revolution. This is the principle line of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the internationalist sentiments of all Vietnamese."

General Le Kha Phieu, the successor to Nguyen Van Linh to head the Politburo, declared in the review Quoc Phong Toan Dan (National Defense Review) in September 1991 that "the Party's new platform would be carried out in the light of the Seventh Party Congress, that it would persistently follow the socialist line and other fundamental principles of socialism, and that it would ascertain the leadership role of the Communist Party, remain loyal to and apply creatively Marxism - Leninism and Ho Chi Minh's thoughts, and help cadres and soldiers heighten their love for the country and socialism. He asserted that constant efforts must be made to renovate and enhance the efficiency of party leadership. Resolute measures must be taken to reject the concepts of political pluralism and opposition by a multiparty system as well as to criticize attempts to diminish the party's leading role or to prevent the party from renovating its leadership." Le Kha Phieu also advocated that "it is necessary to closely combine Marxism - Leninism with Ho Chi Minh's thought in Vietnam, regarding them as the main ideological system to be applied to the revolution in the country because they can play a leading role in shaping the spiritual life of the socialist Vietnamese society (Le Kha Phieu, 1991).

Vu Oanh, a member of the Politburo, in the daily Nhan Dan (The People) on September 9, 199 further asserted that "to make the renovation of the country a success the people must be armed with a vanguard theory that is Marxism - Leninism and Ho Chi Minh's thoughts and be placed under the leadership of the working class party that must work out correct lines and strategies and effectively organize their implementation. He further stressed that the people want party leadership but demand that the party be composed of the people who are truly devoted to the common cause and have wisdom and ability. Particularly at this historical juncture when our economy is still backward, the enemy has devised many plots to oppose and attack us from both inside and outside. As a result, the people badly need party leadership. The Party must raise its capacity and strengthen its determination and arm itself with the new thinking to meet the needs of our time and the people's admiration." (Vu Oanh, 1991: 3).

　

The Realization

Opposition to Marxism - Leninism, thus, has never been tolerated in Vietnam. In February 1976, the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam made an official announcement clarifying its position: "It would absolutely not admit political speculators or counterrevolutionaries of any kind. This principle must be strictly applied to all activities in the course of the campaign and the elections for the National Assembly. The old exploiting classes in the South were seeking ways to conduct a distorted propaganda movement against the socialists by fostering opposition to the Socialist North, sowing division between the North and the South and advancing viewpoints on bourgeois democracy and freedom in order to create illusions in an attempt to sabotage the general elections, including the authorized existence of opposition elements under the capitalist system and the past U.S. puppet regime. Those schemes were only deceitful tricks to consolidate the yoke of the hostile exploiting and ruling class. The socialist transformation of the South, more than ever, is necessarily realized through the victory of the class struggle and of the revolution. It eradicates with vigilance the deep-rooted decayed imperial and bourgeois ideologies. It destroys without concession the hostile, class of oppressors. Ultimately, it uproots all its deep-seated vestiges of cultural, political, social, and economic decadence in the light of the unshakable Marxism - Leninism."

To the Readership and Friends

                      

　

Over the years, personalities, organizations, and governments have voiced concerns over the degrading freedom, democracy, and human rights situations in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The advocacy for these rights of man have won response from the masses in the country and compassion of public opinion worldwide. Nevertheless, the violations of these rights of man have ever persisted. The repression of the underprivileged, the oppression of the depraved, and the persecution of advocates for rights are still very much with us. We are witnessing the alienation of spiritual, and moral values, the debasement of human decency and the human person, and thus the deprivation of man his unalienable human and civil rights.

This home page, within its scope and capacity, is designed to assess and present information and opinions reflecting the rights conditions in Vietnam. The editors wish that their presentation be shared by the readership and friends, particularly the Vietnamese youth overseas. They welcome contribution from every concerned reader. They also appreciate every exchange of opinions on the issues of rights that face Vietnam. Above all, they wish to express their gratitude to the authors of researches, writings, and articles and the media for the information they use as documentation in this home page. They owe them the greatest debt for the failure to obtain from them permission due to poor access to their destinations.

　

The Editors,

Van Nguyen and Associates