FACING THE DILEMMA

FACING THE DILEMMA

By Van Nguyen

The integration of the market economy of the South into the concentration economy system of the North created serious mistakes in the operation of the economy in the South. Opposing views over the orientation of the country’s economy surged, cleaving the Party’s theorists and party members into two camps.  The one claimed radical change; the other resisted without a solution. Contenders for came up with measures favoring the approach to market-oriented economy. Hardliners addressed conservation of the established model of concentration economy.  Even  the Party Secretary Le Duan was at a loss. There is really no model for a transition from a self-esuriency economy to an encompassing advanced socialist economy. One should do whatever necessary to save the economy unless one always precedes it in lines with the principles of Marxism-Leninism

To the distress of the depression, penuries in foods, commodities, and necessities of life aggravated the situation. Shortage of rice in the cities was alarming. Miscalculations in the management, circulation, and distribution of goods unpredictably complicated the operations of the economy, resulting in an irreversible ailing economy. Rotten sweet potatoes and moth-eaten rice became the main staple of most families of cadres and city-dwellers. In addition, the frontier wars with Kampuchea and China increasingly brought about bad effects on every aspects of the life of the people. Vietnam was on the brink of a crisis, economically and politically.

At the end of 1978, the national economy deteriorated alarmingly. Reports on the economy of the South in early1979 by the central inspection pointed out those certain economic measures were inefficacious. The Central Party Congress, in August 1979, acknowledged the economic failure was partly created by the vain hopes and the hilarious atmosphere subsequent to the glorious victory over the American imperialists and henchmen in April 1975. Difficulties accumulated as a result of subjectivity and miscalculated shortcomings. Notably, the monopoly of power incorporated in the absolute supremacy of the Party leadership in the decision making process. I he inflexibility resulting from it stifles individuals’’ initiatives and creativity which are vital for the operation of the economy. The inaptitude of the nomenclature, the malfunctioning mechanisms of the State system of subsidies added weight to paralyzing the lop-sided operations of the economy. There should be a rapid action to put an end to the impotent practices that hampered the circulation of products, ameliorate the economic system of production, give impetus to  broader  initiative in all trades and at all localities and  places of business to  help boost production for the society

In 1979, plans for rectifications were put into action amid the controversy over the orientation for the economy between the contenders for radical change and the conformists. The moderate faction urged the leadership on accelerating rapid transition to the market-oriented economy. The hard liners preached conservation of the concentration economy system, out of fear of ideological deviationism. The trend towards change prevailed, and for a period of time, the Communist Party leadership agreed with reluctance to precede this transition following the example of China and adapt to the economy to the global economic development. It stressed, in particular, the revision of economic reforms programs and the reevaluation of the State strict control over the economic sectors.  

In August 1979 the Party Central Committee Congress admitted failures in the economic reforms in the South in the past years. The glorious victory over the American imperialists and henchmen had not satisfactorily contributed to the economic development of the country. The insurmountable impediment to the development of the country had not only resulted from the sabotage of the enemy. Rather, the natural causes mainly originated from the shortcomings of a subjective character. Impractical and ill-conceived plans and measures in solving problems left by the old political regime and errors sand mistakes by the new administration as well created difficulties to the economic development of the country. 

Pessimism was pervasive, and worries about the existence of the regime were ever expanding. A sound and safe economy was a real matter of life and death. Vo Van Kiet, the then Ho Chi Minh City Party Secretary faced up the increasingly pressing economic difficulties, looking for a way to break the deadlock. He achieved measures on his own initiatives in solving the problem other than merely following directives, decisions, and resolutions through overlapping lines of authority. He made plans by himself to overturn managerial complications coming from the dispute over authority between various factions, the mismanagement of public affairs of the authorities, and the corrupt practices that paralyzed the administration and the economy as well.

Saigon suffered severe scarcities of foods and commodities. The purchase of rice, in particular, met with utmost difficulties. Rice in stock at State granaries was sufficient enough for several days. The peasants in neighboring provinces refused to sell their product on the official prices. They were often coerced to sell it under force. In many places, the military was mobilized to control the situation. The alternate member of the Politburo Vo Van Kiet acted on his own initiatives. The Chief Department of Provisions of Ho Chi Minh City was given the green light in dealing with the rice-growers.  The product was purchased on the market prices. The new mode of purchase relived the market and retrieved the city-dwellers from severe shortage of foods. Strict orders on circulation of merchandise from one province to another, which was conditional on local authorities ‘permission, were unbound. The conduct of affairs at State trades and industry establishments, companies, and cooperatives became comparatively flexible. In his capacity as an alternate member of the Politburo, he sought to facilitate the operation of the economy at the base.        

On October 14, 1980, at the Party Central Committee Congress under the chairmanship of Party Secretary-general Le Duan,  Vo Van Kiet justified his case, pointing out the shortcomings in the realization of  trade and industry reforms policy in the South, which, in his opinions, would lead to the danger of destroying the legitimacy of the People’s Democracy. Other participants contributed to the analysis of the country’s ailing economy calling for rectifications and implementations for economic recovery. The erroneous conduct of affairs of the nomenclature should be of primary concern. They nevertheless came up with no solution and plan; neither did the Politburo produce a resolution.

The Fifth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party affirmed that the Party’s policies “are absolutely correct, only the measures are at fault. The instantaneous economic difficulties, in the views of the Party, are the inevitable consequences of the nine years of war and the destructive plots of the imperialists and their henchmen. In that regard, the Party devises a number of “undoing measures “in the form of the Soviet NEP (New Economic Programs) under Lenin. The Party called on the capitalists to participate in the joint business ventures to develop state capitalism. Nevertheless, the zeal proves to be ineffective. The economy slides down, and it goes quickly into the abyss.” (Do Trung Hieu, 1995:60-61) 

Scarcities of foods and necessities of daily life, the mismanagement in trade and industry, bureaucracy, and unemployment were critical in the provinces and cities of the South, and Saigon as well. The economic system patterned after the concentration economy in the North collapsed. The economic situation in Saigon was increasingly critical. Authorities in the State industry enterprises and trade corporations in Saigon were running businesses mostly on whims and wishes. To disentangle difficulties, Vo Van Kiet made frequent visit tours at local offices and central departments in Saigon to redress the balance and solve problems. He discussed problems with the authorities in charge, finding out errors and rectifying wrongdoings. This conduct of affairs is an anomaly in a totalitarian regime. It is a deviation from ideological precepts in the concentration democracy. It is a breach on the principles and mechanisms of the Party supremacy in the conduct of public affairs and the management of the economy. The question became a matter in dispute among theorists and party members: “the Party secretary of Ho Chi Minh Party Committee has committed a foul.”

CRISIS AND RENOVATION

CRISIS AND RENOVATION

By Van Nguyen

   On September23, 1976, Vice-Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh, in the declaration on the policy on the trade and industry in the South, maintained that the government set forth a strategy to found  a socialist economy for the whole country, erasing step-by-step the differences of each region, promoting economic bases for a self-sufficiency economy, redistributing the labor forces, creating a fair distribution that guarantees the welfare of the people, especially the working class, and eliminating all forms of injustice and dishonest and illegal practices. In the following years, the economy was nevertheless increasingly stagnant. Shortages of agricultural products and industrial productions of daily commodities remained major problems.  Until the end of the 1970’s, an inhabitant in Hanoi would dream if he could be in possession of a radio on permission. Trade and Industry reforms in the South were without predicament.

   In 1980, two decades on the path of socialism, the population in Hanoi still survived on State ration tickets operated by general goods stores and regulated by the State subsidies system. People had to sit in line in front the store from early morning for food rations. It was real joy if one could get some portions of rice of quality. Worm-eaten rice was sold to ordinary people at State rice stores, and rice of good quality was provided for cadres at special stores. Goods and commodities were scarce. Superior cadres and party leaders were supplied with large portions, goods, and commodities of best qualities by the super State trading stores on Ton Dan Street.  State trading stores flourished but the economy deteriorated.  By 1970, the ideal dream of the inhabitants in Hanoi was to be in possession of a bicycle, a ventilator, and a pair of plastic sandals.

Agricultural productions were staggering after consecutive programs of agrarian reforms. Means of production were still rudimentary, and the methods were far behind the times. Modes of management were rigidly carried out with the new laws, rules, and regulations that mostly were impractical, unpopular, and unreasonable. During the early stages of Land Reform (1953), attempts were made to requisition the lands and properties of landlords. Article 4, Chapter II of Decree No. 197 SL of Dec. 10, 1953 stipulated that “only lands, livestock, and agricultural implements will be liable for requisition, and other property will be exempt.”  Nevertheless, the landlord and his family were forced to leave their house without possessions. Different forms of confiscation were applied to landlords of all categories, French colonialists, traitors, reactionaries, and non-reactionaries. Confiscation was total for the first category, might be total or partial for the second, and with redemption for the third. Application of the third form of confiscation nevertheless existed on paper. 

The results published in a communiqué relating to the Hanoi suburban area by the Land Reform Committee announced that the oppressed peasants had confiscated or requisitioned from the landowning class 20,482 mau (18,220 acres) of rice-fields, 511 animals, 6,150 agricultural implements, 1,032 houses, and 346,903 kgs of foodstuffs.  They had also compelled landlords to pay back as excesses of land-rent 155,o69 kgs of paddy, and 6,429,950 $VN dong. All these had been shared between 24,690 landless peasants and poor worker families, comprising 98,113 people. On the average each landless peasant received 2 sao 9 thuoc (0.205 acres).  However it was small, the gift of more than 2 sao was a treasure to a landless peasant or poor worker.

The moment of joy soon dissipated. The agrarian reforms failed “to satisfy the need for land for those whose benefit of the allegedly had undertaken. It was able to give 15 million landless and poor peasant’s family’s slightly more than one acre each. Welcome as these gifts were, they were not enough to turn the poor peasants into enthusiastic supporters of the regime. On the contrary, the injustices and atrocities produced widespread resentment, on rest and openly rebellion (Butteinger, 1968:424).

The State imposed new progressive agricultural taxes on the lands the peasants received from the State. They were two and three times higher than the taxes they had previously paid. Other measures gradually conditioned them to adapt themselves to a pattern of life they had never experienced.  

  Following the repression of the peasants in Nghe An Province and the oppression against the intellectuals in Hanoi, the Vietnamese Workers’ Party carried out its policy of collectivization.  Agricultural communes were established in the countryside to appropriate and redistribute land of the “landlords” and “rich peasants” categories of the population.  The peasants were organized to work in collective farms for the State, from farming to building roads. After harvest, the peasant was given only one fourth of the crop. The other three fourths went to tax payment, the Trade Office, the National Bank and other State agencies. Every cooperative member was not starving but undernourished. He remained miserable as he had ever been. Having no incentive and individual profit, the peasant grew reluctant and careless in their work. The production decreased. As a result, the Communists were successful in destroying the class of exploiting landlords but were faced with serious economic problems. Of most significance, they could only condition with force the peasants to adapt to the Communist pattern of life.  

    In the early 1960’s, this system of agricultural communes “was modified to adapt to the one which is destined in the long run, to establish cooperatives. This system would, in turn, be amalgamated into full scale agricultural collectives. At the same time, the government implemented the neo-Stalinist development policy at the macro-economic level, emphasizing the rapid development of heavy industry and, of course, waging increasingly costly war against the American-backed government in the South. Only massive aid from other CMEA countries allowed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to continue these policies, to the point where their armies could invade the South and inflict a humiliating defeat on the American and South Vietnamese Armies, By any objective standard, the economy of North Vietnam in 1975 was at a very low level of economic level (Adam FForde, 1989:14).  

    Hard times persisted subsequent to the “liberation of South. Slow but steady waves of migration of miserable inhabitants from the provinces of the Tonkin Delta moved to the South. Stories about a prosperous South exited the classless peasants in a rush for the land of dream. Supporters of the regime, individuals, families, and small and large groups of people sought to settle in the “royal territories” in the Central Highland under the Bao Dai government (1940-1954), the aggrovilles under the Ngo Dinh Diem government (1954-1963), the lower lands in the eastern provinces, and the southernmost fertile basin of the Bassac River. New settlements were seen in Tung Nghia (Da Lat), Blao, Dzi Linh, Pleiku, Dak Lak, and Ban Me Thuot. Excessive land exploitations of the newcomers pressed hard the indigenous ethnic minorities to move their ancestral habitations farther into the remote uncultivated areas. Giia Kiem (Long Khanh Province), Ho Nai (Bien Hoa Province), and Go Vap (Gia Dinhh Province) whose inhabitants were largely Catholic refugees from the North after the country’s partition in 1954 attracted  Catholics from various parishes in the North. The one time Cai San aggrovile in Long Xuyen was the land of dream of quite a few immigrants from Bui Chu and Nam Dinh parishes. Uncountable immigrants from large provinces and cities such as Thanh Hoa, Thai Binh, and Haiphong sought to make a living in Saigon where they could practice all kinds of trades. Without skills, many of them lived from mouth to hand. It was not a surprise to see bands of beggars trailing visitors for almonds on Tu Do Street and along Dong Khanh Boulevard.    

Bad effects as a result of the economy reforms following the takeover of Saigon led to gradual economic crisis in the South.  In 1978, Do Muoi, in his determination to sweep off the “remnants of imperialist bourgeoisie at their refuge,” established the lop-sided economic system patterned after the system of State trading and manufacturing corporations in the North, upturning the established economic life. The economy of the South soon collapsed following the confiscation of private properties. In the late 1970's and the early 1980's, foods, medicines, and consumer goods were chronically scarce as agriculture, and manufacturing industry steadily came to a standstill. The effects of prolonged war disruptions, corrupt and inept management, and the cost of the military occupation of Cambodia added weight to the crisis The administration was also under pressure to face social ills and problems such as urban unemployment, vocational training, homelessness, the care of orphans, war veterans, and the disabled, the control of epidemics, and the rehabilitation of drug addicts and prostitutes

Hundreds of thousands of families in the cities were forced to resettle in the new barren economic zones. People had to eat horse-feeding grain as the main, instead of rice. Thousands of families of rank and file officials of the old regime, fearful of political suspicion and persecution, left the country in search for security in distant places. Wealthier families sought to leave the country for freedom, risking their lives in small boats floating onto the sea in the hope to be saved by foreign merchant ships. Vietnam, under the eyes of the world, was no longer an enjoyable place to live. It even ceased to be a military power when the uneven battles ended on the China-Vietnam frontiers in 1979.  It truly slid down pitilessly when the war in Kampuchea began to come to a close later on in 1989, the communist rule truly faced serious difficulties and problems economically and politically.