A Convention for a New Charter
The normalization is, first of all, a process by
which the Bureau of Religious Affairs sought to manipulate the Evangelical
leadership to gradually submit itself to State authority, to operate within the
orbit of Party-controlled Fatherland Front. The task was so compelling that the
regime had to rely on repressive measures to subject the Churches to its rule.
Constant repression gave rise to discontent and unrest, gradually leading to
non-cooperation, resistance, and opposition. Incidents of repression befell the
Evangelical congregations, and reactions
in various ethnic minorities were tantamount to unrest. Facing nounting
oppostion, on January 22, 2001, the Prime Minister announced in a notice to
various Evangelical congregations that a national convention of the Evangelical
Christian Churches was going to take place at the Evangelical temple located at 155, Tran
Hung Dao Boulevard, Saigon, from February7-9,2001.
The
Convention
Representation
at the Convention
The normalization of Evangelical Christianity of the
State was primarily aimed at stopping mass
conversions to Evangelical Christianity. With some 300 communities before 1975,
the Church sprang up with ever growing domestic churches, although the Church
had not been allowed to hold assembly or
to nominate pastors to congregate the Evangelical laity and perform religious
services at chapels or worship places. It was not until the period that
preceded the historical visit of President Clinton to Vietnam that
the Church gained a humble standing. The administration eased up some
restrictions, courting Church leaders with favors. This maneuvre of the
authorities in this process of normalization was self-evident, notably seen in
the conduct of affairs of some Church leaders who were more interested in secular
power than in the service of the Church. The situation worsened, nevertheness. Non-cooperation and
opposition persisted. To remedy, the authorities wooed pastors in various
congregations with promises, Finally, manypastors came to term with the
authorities. Some demands were granted.
On January
22, 2001, the prime minister
signed an order authorizing the holding of a convention of the Evangelical Christian Churches
of Vietnam located at 155 Tran
Hung Dao Boulevard, Saigon,
from February 7-9. However, it was difficult to know if the congregations would
send delegates to the convention or stay away from it. To proceed the task as
planned, officials and representatives of the Church came, met and worked on a
roadmap, redefinining the Church's legal entity and reedifying its organization.
Four hundred and eighty-two (482) delegates of the Evangelical Christian Churches
met and adopted the Church's Constitution, and elected leaders to the Church's
Central Executive Board. Optimism was felt among Evangelical circles. This
convention would be an opportunity for reunification of the Evangelical Christian
Churches of South Vietnam. Impediments surfaced as the convention was
drawing closer. The time for preparation for the convention was relatively
pressing as most congregations were not ready. A large number of Church members
showed reluctance and expressed negative attitude towards the conduct of affairs
of the officials. The epresentatives had not enough time to prepare themselves
for a big enent like this. Many of them expressed doubts about the sincerity of
the Bureau of Religious Affairs that always imposed predispositions on the
Church, placing it under its control. A
number of pastors even predicted that most participants of this general
convention were mere doll collaborators.
The official journal
Nhan Dan (The
People), on the contrary,
announced that the convention
marked a turning point in the history of
the Evangelical Christian Churches
of the South. It added that one had to talk about the 43rd Assembly and the
42nd Assembly that had taken place before the change of regime in 1975. But,
never could one have imagined thar there
would still be such a grandiose convention.
It even proliferated that there were 1,482 official delegates. both the
leadership and the laity, and 278 unofficial participants. The atmosphere was
ceremonial. The Director of the Bureau of Religious Affairs, Le Quang Vinh, and
other high-ranking officials were in attendance. Representatives of other
religions whose names were not mentioned had been invited.
The Election
he Reverend Pham Xuan Thieu,who received nomination
in Canada,
was elected president of a new executive board of Evangelical Christianity with
2/3 of the votes. He became the new president-elect of the sanctioned Church. Two
vice-presidents were also elected. The first vice-president was the Reverend
Duong Thanh of Evangelical community in Da Nang, Central Vietnam,
and the second, the Reverend Tran Van Hy of an Evangelical community in Ben
Tre, South Vietnam.
The pastor and members in this community had suffered persecution all through
the first years following the change of political regime in 1975. The Bureau of
Religious Affairs assisted by two State-oriented pastors were said to have cooed
the Reverend Tran Van Hy all through the convention.
Among 22 members elected to the executive board,
there were only two members representing the congregations of ethnic
minorities, which constitutes ¾ of the totality of the Evangelical Christian
Churches. This underrepresentation
was self-evident. A majority of ethnic congregations were excluded from the process
of the actual unification. Yet, stragely enough, in the list of members of the
council, there were additionally two pastors of the Vietnamese ethnc, who were
considered as doll collaborators close to the authorities Their role was
nominal as they had not been assigned to any responsibility.
Impediments surfaced. The new executive board laid
out an ambitious nine-point program as though they wanted to test the reality,
to be given enough freedom to do its task, which attitude would displease the
authorities. Division remained in sight, adding weight to existing problems. As
it was previously foreseen by the authorities, this process of normalization
should bring the Church back to normalcy, elimnating "abnormal activities" that might reappear.
To step up preventive measures, the authorities sought to execute a “constructive
effort,” which was implied in their verbal promises Local Churches would be
allowed to build chapels and places for cult.
Other measures would be taken to help the Church develop. These
prerogatives remained inconvencing. As always, the administration had all
intents to place the Church in the orbit
of the Fatherland Front. Repairs for chapels and places of cult were
conditional on rules and regulations, and assemblies for prayers were only
permitted with approvals from the authorities.
Stil, old and new rules and regulations as regards religious
policy remained in force for 25 years, weighing on the Church. Major obstacles
had not been debarred. Requests for seminaries and classes of Bible studies,
the ordination of new ministers, the publication of Bibles and religious books,
the displacement of pastors, and the religious services and activities for
normal worship of the Church were still
denied. Pastors and the laity were subdued under control. The “Normalization”
of the Evangelical Churches of the State provoked, in rality, a flurry of
anguish
among the Christian laity.
The New Charter
To ease off the compilation of a new charter, the
State authorized certain accredited members of the Church work on a
constitution. It promised to create favorable conditions for them to get better
results. The primary task was laying out groundwork for the compilation process.
An ad-hoc committee would be created to elaborate basic procedures. State
supervision over the committee was flexible. The committee enjoyed some degree
of independence and worked in a state of mind quasi-liberal and without
interference from the officials of the Bureau of Religious Affairs. They were only counselors, Members of the
committee were praised as diligent and creative. The final draft was later
described as much more “deliberate” than the one previously prepared. However,
members in the presidium were blamed for being frilous and “extremely close” to
the authorities. They had not performed the task following their own chief’s initiatives.
The authorities, in most cases, exercised their authority, revisrsing the draft
content under the pretext that they wanted to make it clearer, more precise,
and more acceptable to the State. The final draft was thus drastically altered
when it came to the Bureau of Religious Affairs which, in its turn, added to it
a number of changes at its will. This draft was sent back to the Committee for
Compilation and then to local church congregations for further discussion. As a
matter of fact, this new version was radically different from the original
text. Members in the Committee, feeling
that they were duped, sent it back to the authorities and asked the original
version they had adopted be restored.
Curiously enough, pastors and the laity had received
the original text a little time before the arrival of the official altered
text. They then had time to compare the two versions, picking up the hidden
scheme. Their reactions were vigorous and unanimous. Protests took place at the
meetings organized by State local sections of religious affairs. Requests for
resignation of some members in the drafting committee as signs of protest were
sent to the Committee of Compilation of the Charter. One of them was signed by 46 pastors of Khanh Hoa
Province. Writings denouncing
the negative attitude towards some leaders were put into circulation. Certain
leaders were given such nicknames as “The Crow of a Rooster,” referring to the disavowal of faith of Saint
Peter, or “Our Brothers Will Cry,” intending to describe the subdued attitude of
some leaders in face of State intervention in the Church's internal affairs.
Other texts circulating clandestinely put into question nine docile pastors’
attitude, charging them with being content to serve as henchmen for the regime
or of being more naive and impermeable to the lessons of humiliation from the Evangelical
Churches of North Vietnam. Criticisns of the lack of resoluteness of these
leaders before the intervention of the Bureau of Religious Affairs showed an
act of cowardice of the committee and shamefully shocked various circles of the
Evangelical Christian Churches
throughout the country.
