CHANGING THE COURSE

CHANGING THE COURSE

By Van Nguyen

   In his observations on communism in Asia, Peter Gareth noted:  “The profound contradiction of contemporary communism in which it occurred is surely recognized by Chinese, Vietnamese, and other Communist leaders in Asia. They were still in power in such that it would not be at all surprising if the same kind and level of identity and systemic crises were to become evident in China in the 1980’s as in the USSR and Eastern Europe experienced. Given the unrest that has sometimes followed the death of a leader in the People’s Republic of China will trigger a process that result in China moving into post-communism. Vietnam may already have altered that phase by then; if not, and if its leaders manage to hold on to power partly by orienting their country from the Soviet Union and more towards their traditional enemy, China, the collapse of the latter, too, as a role-model would almost certainly an irreversible move in Vietnam in the direction of post-communism. The disintegration of the USSR raises new questions about the relationship of the domestic affairs, foreign policy, and political culture of the whole Southeast Asia region. It likewise calls for approaches to political language, international relations and foreign policy that might lead to a better understanding of the important developments taking place in this part of the world.”  (Porter Gareth. Vietnam: The Politics of Bureaucratic Socialism, 215).

Ecro Panujoki pointed out: “Ostensibly, the Marxist-Leninist doctrine persisted in Vietnam during the period of upheavals in the international system between 1975 and 1993. Vietnam’s commitment to the Marxist-Leninist vocabulary after the spring victory of 1975 was understandable, for the Vietnamese Communists proved the superiority of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The Sino-Soviet rift soon made evident the limits and world’s socialist system formally placed into doubt the justification of the Marxist-Leninist theory of internationalism relations. However, the fact that the political doctrine has survived the radical changes in both the international systems and Vietnamese society indicates that the Vietnamese Communists have managed, so far, to combine different elements in their doctrine without totally abandoning Marxism-Leninism.” (Ecro Panujoki, Vietnam and the World, Mc. Millan Press LMT.Houndhills Basintoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London. 1997:209).                            

The normalization of relations between Vietnam and China and the finding of a solution to the war in Kampuchea became a major issue raised by the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam in its Resolution 32/BCT21 of July 6, 1986. On July 28, 1986, Gorbachev announced at Vladivostok a new foreign policy according to which the Soviet Union would move closer to China to dismantle international conflicts among which were the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the ending of dispute at the Soviet-China borders, and the ending of the war in Kampuchea. Gorbachev asserted that a solution to the war in Kampuchea could not be reached at distant countries, including the United Nations but must be solved by China and Vietnam, which are both the two neighboring socialist countries. Nevertheless, it was not until May 1988, by the Resolution 13, that the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam affirmed that the normalization of relations with China was a difficult and complicated process that required time. Only after relentless efforts of diplomatic corps from various channels-- Vietnam and China, and other countries including Japan, Kampuchea, and Lao, could the deadlock be broken. On June 5, 1990, Party Secretary Nguyen Van Linh expressed his wish at the reception of the secretary party of the Communist Party of China to Hanoi that he was ready, together with genuine communists, to discuss about the supremacy of socialism. He was willing to meet with the highest leadership of the People’s Republic of China to restore the good friendship and relations between the two countries.   

     On August 29, 1990, Beijing invited Party Secretary-general Nguyen Vam Linh, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Do Muoi, and State Advisor Pham Van Dong to come to a summit conference on Kampuchea and the China-Vietnam diplomatic normalization at Zanto, the capital of Tse Zchuan Province scheduled on September 3, 1990. There was no joint communiqué after the close of the conference, but the two parties came up with a major principles according to which the two socialist countries unanimously intently flattened out difficulties and made void the imperialist’ vile schemes  aiming at erasing socialism.

The Zanto Conference played the key role in reopening the process of China-Vietnam post-war political normalization. It was the foundation on which peace between Kampuchea and Vietnam was restored and the friendship between China and Vietnam resumed, making the China-Vietnam borders the market boundaries. Beginning on September 3-4, 1990, it is noted, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam changed its course, gradually distancing itself from the Soviet Union and increasingly implemented close alliance with China. Do Muoi, Chairman of the Ministers Council and the key signatory to the Zanto Agreement, replaced Nguyen Van Linh and became Party Secretary-general, and General Le Duc Anh, another signatory to the agreement, was chosen to be the President of the State. The selection of the former defense minister, who had reportedly given the People’s Army battleships the order not to exchange fire against the Chinese warships when they launched fierce attacks, gunned down the Vietnamese battleships, and seized Vietnam’s Garma Island in the Spratly Islands in the East Sea in 1988, imperceptibly indicates a political subordination to an “all-powerful China” in the eyes of patriotic Vietnamese.

    The leaders of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam after the Zanto conference, for a time, showed perplexity as the Soviet ceased to be a mighty ally on whom they leaned on for support, both politically and economically. They then looked to China, again, for support as Ho Chi Minh had in the years of the Resistance War against the French. With all efforts that translate their will for change, they had not hesitated to coax the brother socialist country with praises and compliments on the “centuries-old Vietnam-China friendship.” The People’s Republic of China was no longer a threat to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and became, again, the mightiest stronghold country, taking the lead in the protection and preservation of socialism.

   Other striking changes mark this period of transition. In September 1992, the National Assembly adopted a new constitution, particularly transposing anti-Chinese sentiments of the Vietnamese people. Part of the statement in the preface of the 1980 Constriction that eulogized “the glorious victory in the two wars to protect the country against the invasion of the reactionary Kampuchea in the northwestern border and the transgression of Chinese hegemony in the northern frontiers” was suppressed. China was, again, a cause of glorious socialism, tangible friendship, and genuine alliance which Vietnam would ever cherish.  The Soviet Union and several other socialist countries were still mentioned in the preface of the new constitution, although they were no longer socialist. “In a way, Socialism still exits and it still develops,” as Lt. General Nguyen Minh Chau suggested.

Modeling on the USSR Constitution, the new constitution provides Article 4, reserving the right to the leadership of the people for the Communist Party. The single-party State rule is unified under the leadership of the Communist Party. The constitution professes no rule of law, and thus no separation of powers. The supremacy of leadership of the Communist Party is absolute. The legalization of the right to the leadership of the people the Communist Party practically manifests the monopoly of power of the Communist Party. The then National Assembly Chairman Le Quang Dao, in his address to the representatives at the People’s Assembly on February 1992, had admitted that in many places party organs “have established for themselves a State, even a “super State.”

 The  1992 Constitution, in addition, codifies many free market reforms, but significantly lacks progress in the area of civil and political rights, negating the rights to which the Vietnamese people are entitled as provided by the  1945 Constitution, namely, civic rights, universal suffrage, democratic freedoms (freedom of creed, freedom of opinion, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement), equal rights for the nationalities, and equal rights for men and women.

 The China-Vietnam friendship in the years following the Zanto Conference became increasingly attached. Hanoi had achieved full relations with the United State and sought diplomatic normalization. Nevertheless, until the present day, it still clings to the repressive policies of its one-party system in the civil and political spheres. Nowhere is the persistent intolerance of political rights more evident than in the repression of religion and conscience. Like Beijing, Hanoi has made market reforms, allowing the rights to start and own businesses, to enter into joint ventures, and to own property. Nonetheless, with its monopoly of political power and pervasive police apparatus intact,  it continues  to ban or restrict independent thought, speech, the press, association, union organizing, and civil society.