FACING THE DILEMMA

FACING THE DILEMMA

By Van Nguyen

The integration of the market economy of the South into the concentration economy system of the North created serious mistakes in the operation of the economy in the South. Opposing views over the orientation of the country’s economy surged, cleaving the Party’s theorists and party members into two camps.  The one claimed radical change; the other resisted without a solution. Contenders for came up with measures favoring the approach to market-oriented economy. Hardliners addressed conservation of the established model of concentration economy.  Even  the Party Secretary Le Duan was at a loss. There is really no model for a transition from a self-esuriency economy to an encompassing advanced socialist economy. One should do whatever necessary to save the economy unless one always precedes it in lines with the principles of Marxism-Leninism

To the distress of the depression, penuries in foods, commodities, and necessities of life aggravated the situation. Shortage of rice in the cities was alarming. Miscalculations in the management, circulation, and distribution of goods unpredictably complicated the operations of the economy, resulting in an irreversible ailing economy. Rotten sweet potatoes and moth-eaten rice became the main staple of most families of cadres and city-dwellers. In addition, the frontier wars with Kampuchea and China increasingly brought about bad effects on every aspects of the life of the people. Vietnam was on the brink of a crisis, economically and politically.

At the end of 1978, the national economy deteriorated alarmingly. Reports on the economy of the South in early1979 by the central inspection pointed out those certain economic measures were inefficacious. The Central Party Congress, in August 1979, acknowledged the economic failure was partly created by the vain hopes and the hilarious atmosphere subsequent to the glorious victory over the American imperialists and henchmen in April 1975. Difficulties accumulated as a result of subjectivity and miscalculated shortcomings. Notably, the monopoly of power incorporated in the absolute supremacy of the Party leadership in the decision making process. I he inflexibility resulting from it stifles individuals’’ initiatives and creativity which are vital for the operation of the economy. The inaptitude of the nomenclature, the malfunctioning mechanisms of the State system of subsidies added weight to paralyzing the lop-sided operations of the economy. There should be a rapid action to put an end to the impotent practices that hampered the circulation of products, ameliorate the economic system of production, give impetus to  broader  initiative in all trades and at all localities and  places of business to  help boost production for the society

In 1979, plans for rectifications were put into action amid the controversy over the orientation for the economy between the contenders for radical change and the conformists. The moderate faction urged the leadership on accelerating rapid transition to the market-oriented economy. The hard liners preached conservation of the concentration economy system, out of fear of ideological deviationism. The trend towards change prevailed, and for a period of time, the Communist Party leadership agreed with reluctance to precede this transition following the example of China and adapt to the economy to the global economic development. It stressed, in particular, the revision of economic reforms programs and the reevaluation of the State strict control over the economic sectors.  

In August 1979 the Party Central Committee Congress admitted failures in the economic reforms in the South in the past years. The glorious victory over the American imperialists and henchmen had not satisfactorily contributed to the economic development of the country. The insurmountable impediment to the development of the country had not only resulted from the sabotage of the enemy. Rather, the natural causes mainly originated from the shortcomings of a subjective character. Impractical and ill-conceived plans and measures in solving problems left by the old political regime and errors sand mistakes by the new administration as well created difficulties to the economic development of the country. 

Pessimism was pervasive, and worries about the existence of the regime were ever expanding. A sound and safe economy was a real matter of life and death. Vo Van Kiet, the then Ho Chi Minh City Party Secretary faced up the increasingly pressing economic difficulties, looking for a way to break the deadlock. He achieved measures on his own initiatives in solving the problem other than merely following directives, decisions, and resolutions through overlapping lines of authority. He made plans by himself to overturn managerial complications coming from the dispute over authority between various factions, the mismanagement of public affairs of the authorities, and the corrupt practices that paralyzed the administration and the economy as well.

Saigon suffered severe scarcities of foods and commodities. The purchase of rice, in particular, met with utmost difficulties. Rice in stock at State granaries was sufficient enough for several days. The peasants in neighboring provinces refused to sell their product on the official prices. They were often coerced to sell it under force. In many places, the military was mobilized to control the situation. The alternate member of the Politburo Vo Van Kiet acted on his own initiatives. The Chief Department of Provisions of Ho Chi Minh City was given the green light in dealing with the rice-growers.  The product was purchased on the market prices. The new mode of purchase relived the market and retrieved the city-dwellers from severe shortage of foods. Strict orders on circulation of merchandise from one province to another, which was conditional on local authorities ‘permission, were unbound. The conduct of affairs at State trades and industry establishments, companies, and cooperatives became comparatively flexible. In his capacity as an alternate member of the Politburo, he sought to facilitate the operation of the economy at the base.        

On October 14, 1980, at the Party Central Committee Congress under the chairmanship of Party Secretary-general Le Duan,  Vo Van Kiet justified his case, pointing out the shortcomings in the realization of  trade and industry reforms policy in the South, which, in his opinions, would lead to the danger of destroying the legitimacy of the People’s Democracy. Other participants contributed to the analysis of the country’s ailing economy calling for rectifications and implementations for economic recovery. The erroneous conduct of affairs of the nomenclature should be of primary concern. They nevertheless came up with no solution and plan; neither did the Politburo produce a resolution.

The Fifth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party affirmed that the Party’s policies “are absolutely correct, only the measures are at fault. The instantaneous economic difficulties, in the views of the Party, are the inevitable consequences of the nine years of war and the destructive plots of the imperialists and their henchmen. In that regard, the Party devises a number of “undoing measures “in the form of the Soviet NEP (New Economic Programs) under Lenin. The Party called on the capitalists to participate in the joint business ventures to develop state capitalism. Nevertheless, the zeal proves to be ineffective. The economy slides down, and it goes quickly into the abyss.” (Do Trung Hieu, 1995:60-61) 

Scarcities of foods and necessities of daily life, the mismanagement in trade and industry, bureaucracy, and unemployment were critical in the provinces and cities of the South, and Saigon as well. The economic system patterned after the concentration economy in the North collapsed. The economic situation in Saigon was increasingly critical. Authorities in the State industry enterprises and trade corporations in Saigon were running businesses mostly on whims and wishes. To disentangle difficulties, Vo Van Kiet made frequent visit tours at local offices and central departments in Saigon to redress the balance and solve problems. He discussed problems with the authorities in charge, finding out errors and rectifying wrongdoings. This conduct of affairs is an anomaly in a totalitarian regime. It is a deviation from ideological precepts in the concentration democracy. It is a breach on the principles and mechanisms of the Party supremacy in the conduct of public affairs and the management of the economy. The question became a matter in dispute among theorists and party members: “the Party secretary of Ho Chi Minh Party Committee has committed a foul.”