Sunday, July 26, 2020

OPEN-DOOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT



"OPEN-DOOR" ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By Van Nguyen




In April 1988, the Vietnamese government legalized several aspects of free market trading and private property in such a hope that trade increase along with interaction with the international market. The Party’s “open-door policy” began as soon as Nguyen Van Linh came to power in 1986.  The core leadership Nguyen Van Linh, Pham Hung, Do Muoi, Vo Van Kiet, and Nguyen Co Thach realized the urgent need for more “open-door” was pressing and immediate. In his analysis “Vietnam the new Investment Frontier in Southeast Asia” (1992), Nguyen Xuan Oanh and Phillip Donald noted that there was a rather strong confidence in the economic renovation of the country: “The decades-long command economy is still in the process of being transformed into a market-oriented structure which encourages private initiative for personal gain pragmatic and far-sighted, the new leadership itself to economic renovation, providing its hard-working people with higher incomes, better working and living conditions, increased educational opportunities and more adequate health care and services.”  On the other hand, they pointed our negative reserves according to which” if these aspirations are to be fulfilled further reforms creating major structural changes in the economy will have to be undertaken  and, the longer  this process is delayed, the more difficult and costly it will be to achieve their ambitious their developmental goals.”

 Efforts were made to restructure the administrative autocracy, encouraging entrepreneurial spirit, and looking forward to the eventual lifting of the U.S. decade-long embargo. Along with other actions and aspirations, these efforts had given impetus for the economic reforms for the six years 1986-1992 to gather momentum. During the three years 1990-1992, the authors noted, more than three billion had been invested in the country by foreign enterprises and trading companies, most of which entered into joint ventures with State-owned enterprises and private firms. The country’s economy responded positively to the government’s reform measures. The rate of economic growth rose from three percent per annum in 1986 to almost twenty-five percent in the five following years. Private enterprises were concentrated on various service-type industries. Private firms were developed in the light industry sector. Joint-ventures with foreign partners were established to produce light industry goods for export.

Vietnam sought few markets for its products as well. Asian companies were in the forefront in this investment surge. In the context of the lifting of the trade embargo by the United Sates, the country would well be along on the path toward become the next “tiger” on the block in Asia by the year 2000. Nevertheless, the controversy over the policy within opposing factions in the Communist Party hindered much the progress towards economic renovation. It was not until 1991, the phraseology “market economy” was only used sparingly in the strategy project to stabilize and develop the economy and society. However, along the move from concentration economy to market economy, Vietnam’s GDP growth came up to 6’6% in 1992.

      In practice, during the period of economic development from 1986 to 1992, efforts were made in the process of transition from the concentration economy into a market-oriented structure were noticeable. Plans to restructure the administration was proceeded to create favorable conditions for investment and business transactions ahead of the lifting of the U.S. embargo. Achievements in these efforts by Premier Vo Van Kiet and his deputy Phan Van Khai were encouraging. For five years 1987-1992, some 350,000 small private firms emerged, and about seventy percent of all trade and service industries were in the hands of the private firms. Even more, during the three year 1989-1992, more than three billion dollars, most of which entered into joint ventures with State-owned enterprises and private firms, were invested in the country by foreign enterprises and business companies. The impact of such plans of reforms would create an impetus for competition in a concentration economy and thus a serious danger to the monopoly of power of the Communist Party and State. Ardent “conservatives’ in the Communist Party, right at the outset of “doi moi” (openness), consistently opposed the tendencies of market-oriented reforms, viewing them as “deviations,” and efforts to restructure the economies system of the existing regime a process of “peaceful evolution.” Premier Vo Van Kiet faced an ever growing opposition until 1994 when the rise gathered momentum in 1994. 

    Impediments were numerous. The laws on Investment, for example, were a hazardous hindrance. Melanie Beresford pointed out: “The passage of the 1987 law constitutes Vietnam's second attempt to attract foreign investors. The earlier law of 1977 failed to attract significant amounts of investment, mainly due to the poor state of the Vietnamese economy and official discouragement of Western investors by their governments as well as the law's more restrictive provisions. Despite more liberal conditions for foreign investors, however, I doubt that the law itself is primarily responsible for the rapid increase in investment over the last five years. In the first place, the expanding body of regulations is reportedly somewhat confusing, and, secondly, the authorities have been rather "flexible" in its application. The flow of investment was small due to uncertainty about moving into uncharted territory, poor infrastructure, and the generally low level economic activity. The main areas of interest were in oil exploration, tourism, and services, only the first of which was an area of priority identified by the Vietnamese government.  Moreover, foreign investment figures were artificially inflated since they referred to the value of projects rather than the amount actually spent in the country. In the case of oil, the majority of funds were spent in other countries; for other types of investment, there was a disappointingly low rate of project competition.

  ... As for private Vietnamese capital, it remains small. The problem here is not so much the scarcity favored in the explanations of orthodox development economists but the difficulty in mobilizing it. Vietnamese households do have a lot of savings, but they tend to be hoarded as gold or invested in private housing or in more speculative, short-term ventures (smuggling, for example).

  ... There is still a large state enterprise in Vietnam. It currently absorbs about 85 percent of the state investment and produces around one-third of the GDP. Most of the SOE stat remained in operation after the shakeout beginning in 1989 continued to receive support from the state in one form or another, even though direct subsidies were abolished. Between 1990 and 1992, subsidies were continued through the credit system, and the soft-budget constraints characteristic of the shortage economy were thus revived. While positive interest rates were restored in 1992, the social costs of closing non-performing enterprises could prove to be unacceptable in the medium term (Melanie Beresford, The Vietnamese Economy. 1993: 42-44)

   Corrupt practices were pervasive. Since 1986, the government had begun the market oriented economic reforms. Goods and services are more widely available in the cities. However, only the privileged groups of entrepreneurs who had connections with influential officials are free to engage in the industry and business enterprise. Investment fraud is extensively practiced. The party-run daily Nhan Dan (The People) carried, on its front page, an article by Nguyen Tien Pruco analyzing why investment projects in Ho Chi Minh City cannot be implemented. According to Nguyen, since the beginning of May 1986, there have been 171 projects approved by the State Committee for Cooperation and Investment. The Law on Investment came into existence. However, the number of projects put into practice is only 57 or 33.33 percent of the approved projects. There are 24 other projects that are facing difficulties. Nineteen (19) projects cannot be started. Twenty (20) projects forfeited their operating licenses. All of these projects account for 46 percent of the total projects. This situation is not a trivial matter. The cause of the situation is that many self-proclaimed investors are only high-class intermediaries when they apply for investment licenses. They apply for the license then sell it to other companies for a sumptuous commission. They do not care whether or not the projects are viable. The intermediaries exploit the lack of information, research, and dialogue in Vietnam and pretend to be big investors. Worse still, they also use licenses as fronts for illegal trading activities. They do not invest any money in production or business as stated in the licenses. They bring in tax-free commodities and then sell in the market instead of for foreign currencies as stipulated in their projects. An example of such commodities is Voice of Vietnam, Network in Vietnamese, June 22, 1992.

    Commenting on the economic situation of the "thoi mo cua" -the period of openness), the Thoi Bao Kinh Te (Economic Times) published in Saigon, in its issue of December 23-29, 1993, had this to say:          

 “At the time of First Secretary-general Le Duan, there was anxiety about the interest loans the Socialist Republic of Vietnam owed to the Soviet Union. As far as the interests are concerned, our comrades do not demand for interests. As for the term for reimbursement, we will only begin to reimburse the loans in 15 years, and during these 15 years, we will have already been in retirement, and our children and grandchildren will pay our debts.”
 
   According to the newspaper, the capitalist countries agreed, in principle, on a loan of U.S. $1.8 billion for Vietnam. Tran Bach Dang, a high dignitary of the regime, in a round table discussion organized by the said magazine said that the State accepted these loans, but it had to create beforehand conditions to receive them and administer them in such a way that the future generations would not be crushed with debts someday. Unfortunately, with preconditions, the entrepreneurs seemed to be beset with doubt. There were strictly economic preconditions such as the capability to administer with efficacy the loan on contract, to mobilize corresponding domestic savings, to consolidate and ameliorate the national monetary system. According to Huynh Buu Son, an economist, the money in the cities is the American dollar, and the Vietnamese dong is for the countryside. The newspaper stressed that the administration had to administer scientifically credits to reimburse regularly instead of taking recourse to expedients every yearend as it has usually conducted its affairs. Moreover, it had to serve a writ until it reached its purposes: to eliminate theft and peculation in all forms. Commenting on the Vietnamese Communist Party's approaches to policies, a longtime member in the Vietnamese Communist Central Party Committee said in bitter terms that, after the 1975 victory, there appeared ideas of an eccentric pride among the leadership of the Party, a Communist deceit. Even worse, trading and business transactions were virtually monopolized by state enterprises. The Company for Agricultural Commodities and Foods of Ho Chi Minh City directed by Nguyen Thi The (female), for instance, trampled underfoot laws and regulations, monopolizing the purchase of rice in the provinces.  On the other hand, private businesses were in disarray. Sean Kelly, an Australian businessman in Saigon, observed that "one can do anything as one wishes."  Indeed, imported goods were not regularized on social needs. Japanese cars and French wine, for instance, were imported to publicize the "freedom of trade." Worse still, contraband goods from Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Communist China inundated the streets of Saigon, creating an atmosphere of false prosperity.

Sunday, July 12, 2020

CHANGING THE COURSE


CHANGING THE COURSE

By Van Nguyen



   In his observations on communism in Asia, Peter Gareth noted:  “The profound contradiction of contemporary communism in which it occurred is surely recognized by Chinese, Vietnamese, and other Communist leaders in Asia. They were still in power in such that it would not be at all surprising if the same kind and level of identity and systemic crises were to become evident in China in the 1980’s as in the USSR and Eastern Europe experienced. Given the unrest that has sometimes followed the death of a leader in the People’s Republic of China will trigger a process that result in China moving into post-communism. Vietnam may already have altered that phase by then; if not, and if its leaders manage to hold on to power partly by orienting their country from the Soviet Union and more towards their traditional enemy, China, the collapse of the latter, too, as a role-model would almost certainly an irreversible move in Vietnam in the direction of post-communism. The disintegration of the USSR raises new questions about the relationship of the domestic affairs, foreign policy, and political culture of the whole Southeast Asia region. It likewise calls for approaches to political language, international relations and foreign policy that might lead to a better understanding of the important developments taking place in this part of the world.”  (Porter Gareth. Vietnam: The Politics of Bureaucratic Socialism, 215).

Ecro Panujoki pointed out: “Ostensibly, the Marxist-Leninist doctrine persisted in Vietnam during the period of upheavals in the international system between 1975 and 1993. Vietnam’s commitment to the Marxist-Leninist vocabulary after the spring victory of 1975 was understandable, for the Vietnamese Communists proved the superiority of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The Sino-Soviet rift soon made evident the limits and world’s socialist system formally placed into doubt the justification of the Marxist-Leninist theory of internationalism relations. However, the fact that the political doctrine has survived the radical changes in both the international systems and Vietnamese society indicates that the Vietnamese Communists have managed, so far, to combine different elements in their doctrine without totally abandoning Marxism-Leninism.” (Ecro Panujoki, Vietnam and the World, Mc. Millan Press LMT.Houndhills Basintoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London. 1997:209).                            

The normalization of relations between Vietnam and China and the finding of a solution to the war in Kampuchea became a major issue raised by the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam in its Resolution 32/BCT21 of July 6, 1986. On July 28, 1986, Gorbachev announced at Vladivostok a new foreign policy according to which the Soviet Union would move closer to China to dismantle international conflicts among which were the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the ending of dispute at the Soviet-China borders, and the ending of the war in Kampuchea. Gorbachev asserted that a solution to the war in Kampuchea could not be reached at distant countries, including the United Nations but must be solved by China and Vietnam, which are both the two neighboring socialist countries. Nevertheless, it was not until May 1988, by the Resolution 13, that the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam affirmed that the normalization of relations with China was a difficult and complicated process that required time. Only after relentless efforts of diplomatic corps from various channels-- Vietnam and China, and other countries including Japan, Kampuchea, and Lao, could the deadlock be broken. On June 5, 1990, Party Secretary Nguyen Van Linh expressed his wish at the reception of the secretary party of the Communist Party of China to Hanoi that he was ready, together with genuine communists, to discuss about the supremacy of socialism. He was willing to meet with the highest leadership of the People’s Republic of China to restore the good friendship and relations between the two countries.   

     On August 29, 1990, Beijing invited Party Secretary-general Nguyen Vam Linh, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Do Muoi, and State Advisor Pham Van Dong to come to a summit conference on Kampuchea and the China-Vietnam diplomatic normalization at Zanto, the capital of Tse Zchuan Province scheduled on September 3, 1990. There was no joint communiqué after the close of the conference, but the two parties came up with a major principles according to which the two socialist countries unanimously intently flattened out difficulties and made void the imperialist’ vile schemes  aiming at erasing socialism.

The Zanto Conference played the key role in reopening the process of China-Vietnam post-war political normalization. It was the foundation on which peace between Kampuchea and Vietnam was restored and the friendship between China and Vietnam resumed, making the China-Vietnam borders the market boundaries. Beginning on September 3-4, 1990, it is noted, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam changed its course, gradually distancing itself from the Soviet Union and increasingly implemented close alliance with China. Do Muoi, Chairman of the Ministers Council and the key signatory to the Zanto Agreement, replaced Nguyen Van Linh and became Party Secretary-general, and General Le Duc Anh, another signatory to the agreement, was chosen to be the President of the State. The selection of the former defense minister, who had reportedly given the People’s Army battleships the order not to exchange fire against the Chinese warships when they launched fierce attacks, gunned down the Vietnamese battleships, and seized Vietnam’s Garma Island in the Spratly Islands in the East Sea in 1988, imperceptibly indicates a political subordination to an “all-powerful China” in the eyes of patriotic Vietnamese.

    The leaders of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam after the Zanto conference, for a time, showed perplexity as the Soviet ceased to be a mighty ally on whom they leaned on for support, both politically and economically. They then looked to China, again, for support as Ho Chi Minh had in the years of the Resistance War against the French. With all efforts that translate their will for change, they had not hesitated to coax the brother socialist country with praises and compliments on the “centuries-old Vietnam-China friendship.” The People’s Republic of China was no longer a threat to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and became, again, the mightiest stronghold country, taking the lead in the protection and preservation of socialism.

   Other striking changes mark this period of transition. In September 1992, the National Assembly adopted a new constitution, particularly transposing anti-Chinese sentiments of the Vietnamese people. Part of the statement in the preface of the 1980 Constriction that eulogized “the glorious victory in the two wars to protect the country against the invasion of the reactionary Kampuchea in the northwestern border and the transgression of Chinese hegemony in the northern frontiers” was suppressed. China was, again, a cause of glorious socialism, tangible friendship, and genuine alliance which Vietnam would ever cherish.  The Soviet Union and several other socialist countries were still mentioned in the preface of the new constitution, although they were no longer socialist. “In a way, Socialism still exits and it still develops,” as Lt. General Nguyen Minh Chau suggested.

Modeling on the USSR Constitution, the new constitution provides Article 4, reserving the right to the leadership of the people for the Communist Party. The single-party State rule is unified under the leadership of the Communist Party. The constitution professes no rule of law, and thus no separation of powers. The supremacy of leadership of the Communist Party is absolute. The legalization of the right to the leadership of the people the Communist Party practically manifests the monopoly of power of the Communist Party. The then National Assembly Chairman Le Quang Dao, in his address to the representatives at the People’s Assembly on February 1992, had admitted that in many places party organs “have established for themselves a State, even a “super State.”

 The  1992 Constitution, in addition, codifies many free market reforms, but significantly lacks progress in the area of civil and political rights, negating the rights to which the Vietnamese people are entitled as provided by the  1945 Constitution, namely, civic rights, universal suffrage, democratic freedoms (freedom of creed, freedom of opinion, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement), equal rights for the nationalities, and equal rights for men and women.

 The China-Vietnam friendship in the years following the Zanto Conference became increasingly attached. Hanoi had achieved full relations with the United State and sought diplomatic normalization. Nevertheless, until the present day, it still clings to the repressive policies of its one-party system in the civil and political spheres. Nowhere is the persistent intolerance of political rights more evident than in the repression of religion and conscience. Like Beijing, Hanoi has made market reforms, allowing the rights to start and own businesses, to enter into joint ventures, and to own property. Nonetheless, with its monopoly of political power and pervasive police apparatus intact,  it continues  to ban or restrict independent thought, speech, the press, association, union organizing, and civil society.

Saturday, June 27, 2020

THE COMMUNIST BLOC AFTER THE COLD WAR (III)


THE COMMUNIST BLOC AFTER THE COLD WAR (III)

By Van Nguyen



Vietnam

     After the April 1975 victory, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam sided with the Union of Soviet Republic, leaning on it politically and economically. It distanced itself from the People’s Republic of China, disregarding all its intentions of the latter in creating South Vietnam a non-aligned country, making it a buffer zone under China’s influence as North Vietnam had been in the Cold War.  The hidden scheme was aborted nip in the bud right after the takeover of Saigon with consistent programs for national unification policy, successive political and economic reforms, and plans for “northernization of South Vietnam” by the Communist Party of Vietnam. The rift between China and Vietnam ever deepened following the Chinese-backed military incursions of the Khmer troops into Vietnam from 1976 to 197 8.

On January 17, 1979, the military forces of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam swept off the last pockets of resistance of the Pol Pot’s troopers at the township of Ko Kong. These military efforts were only the first step of a decisive factor. The Vietnamese troopers had to additionally tale Phnom Penh, the Capital of Kampuchea and other provinces. On June 19, 1979, the military forces of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam defeated the Red Khmer troops and took the stronghold of Ko Kong Township. Impediments still lay ahead, The Khmer Rouge were defeated but were not disbanded.  Owing to tangible military aids from the People’s Republic of China, Khmer Rouge guerilla fought back with all tactics of a war of attrition. Beginning in the dry season of summer 1980, the Khmer Rouge launched fiercest counter-attacks. The Vietnam volunteer troops and Heng Samrin military armed forces suffered serious losses. Attacks and counter-attacks took place across the country. The armed forces of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam lost their commanding position, especially after bloody battles with the Red Army divisions from China along the Sino-Vietnamese border provinces.

    In the rainy season of 1983, the infantry Division 4 under the command of General Pham Van Tra stationing in Ko Kong had to take on heavy shillings from Khmer Rouge heavy artillery from across the Thailand-Kampuchea borders. The Division 330 of the Vietnamese armed forces won the great battle in the dry season of 1984 but suffered great losses. One hundred and three officers and soldiers died in the battle field, and 400 others were wounded. Fierce seesaw battles ensued all through the dry season of 1984-1985. Fierce battles increased in quick succession from Phnom Penh to Konpong Cham. The troopers of the Kampuchea forces from then on assumed responsibility to defend the areas along the Thailand-Kampuchea frontiers. Beginning in 1987, the Vietnamese armed forces in Kampuchea became bogged down and fought on the defense until the end of the war.

     The invasion was drawing to an end. The war of attrition under the direction of Poll Pot that lasted ten years (1979-1989) paralyzed the armed forces of Vietnam on all fronts. Vietnam had to withdraw all its armed forces from Kampuchea following persistent international pressure. To all disadvantages on the military plane in all these years, Vietnam, was isolated either politically or economically and both by Western democratic and ASEAN countries. The United States, in particular, imposed the trade embargo.  In April 1989, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea symbolically began a process of renouncing communism by renaming itself the State of Kampuchea. By September 1989, the last of the occupying Vietnamese troops had to withdraw from Kampuchea. This intriguing war, in the last analysis, cost Vietnam not only deprived of the reputation of an “invincible army that had defeated the two mightiest imperialist armed forcesin the world” but also the invaluable human lives and immensurable material resources  

     Coincidentally, the collapse of Europe and disintegration of the Soviet Union created deep impact on the situation of the country, politically and economically. The year 1989 presented, indeed, what was to become the most eventful period in the Communist world since the 1940’s far more so even than 1956. At the beginning of the year, the Soviets completed their military withdrawal from Afghanistan: This was a highly significant symbol of the reversal of their earlier expansionism. Beginning in April 1989, Chinese students protested against the authorities and occupied Trainmen Square. In June 1989, many of those students still demonstrated in Beijing and were then victoriously massacred. However, none of the events in Communist Asia was as momentous as those occurring in Eastern Europe. The collapse of Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the USSR worsened and deeply influenced the political situation in Vietnam. The struggle for freedom and democracy and the economic reforms in Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, the demands for political plurality, inside the country caused much anxiety to the Party leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
             
     Facing serious economic and political problems in perspective, the Party, on the one hand, tried to sooth dissidence among party members in the South by mediating compromise with the dissent faction and solacing the student ranges by apportioning them with higher food rations. It even loosened economic restrictions, relaxing to some extent small private business and preparing laws for foreign investment and international transactions. On the other hand, it hastily launched operations for repression against pro-political plurality and multi-parties elements and negating all forms of opposition in the Party and the masses. In September 1989, the Party Central Executive Committee held conference in Saigon and decided to take harsh measures in response to the state of emergency under any circumstance. The official daily Nhan Dan (The People), in a long article warned the masses and public opinion of what it called "the freedom in the manner of capitalism,” an allusion to the demands for political reform in Poland. It earnestly called for protection of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the role of leadership of the Party. At the Congress of the Central Party Committee in Saigon, Party Secretary-general Nguyen Van Linh feverishly heightened vigilance, appealing to all party members to be firmly loyal to socialism and protect party members from being trapped by deviations, especially the erroneous political premises of pluralism and political plurality. By a gesture of vigilance, in October 1989, he dissolved the Democratic Party and the Social Party, forcing their members to voluntarily end activities, although these two parties were only nominally affiliated organs to the Communist Party of Vietnam.  By the resolution of the Central Party Congress VI, March 1989, the Communist Party professedly rejected political pluralism. To cleanse “the enemy from within,” the Party dismissed Tran Xuan Bach from the Politburo for conflict over views with Party Secretary-general Nguyen Van Linh. The former Politburo member was charged with having committed serious violations on principles of organization and discipline of the Party, causing vile consequences.

Another thorn in the side ever persisted: the religions in their struggle for their cause for existence and religious freedoms. In reality, the collapse of Eastern Europe and disintegration of the USSR forced Vietnam to turn to the West to seek financial support and economic aids from it. The new circumstances also compelled it to reassess religious policy, promoting religious tolerance to meets international standards in exchange for support and aids as required by Western democracies. The Party leadership was at a loss as it was well aware of the pro-democracy role played by the Churches in Eastern Europe and wanted to avoid a similar Church-nurtured popular uprising in the country. As a matter of fact, following the takeover of South Vietnam in 1975, all religions were kept under close watch, although their activities were tied to strict rules and regulations .Large Buddhist congregation, the Roman Catholics, the Evangelicals, and the indigenous Caodaists and Hoa Hao Buddhists were all viewed as “ the inside enemies” by the State. By the time political developments for change in Eastern Europe and disintegration in the Soviet Union were at its climax, the Catholics were targeted with harsh repression. The mass arrest of the members of the Congregation of the Mother Coredemptrix in 1987 is a case in evidence. The Congregation was dissolved on charges of “subversion.”  All its main offices and facilities in Thu Duc District, Saigon, were confiscated. Father Dominic Tran Dinh Thu, founder of the Congregation and 40 priests were arrested and sentenced to long prison terms. 

 Hanoi took notice of the role of Catholic Church in the democracy revolutions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltics. It executed a two-pronged policy. On the one hand, it loosened its grips on the religions for some time, lest Vietnam would go the way as Eastern Europe did. The Roman Catholic Church of Vietnam, which is regarded as “having had links with antirevolutionary and anti-communist imperialism,” was given keen watch. Strict rules and regulations on religious activities that limited when and where religious church activities could take place were mandatory. .Hope for a liberalizing trend was dim. There was no break in the ideology. The leaders held fast to the monopoly of power, persevering firm control in every aspect of the civil life, and religions were no exception. A Penal Code was promulgated. Under the law, there are no political or religious prisoners, There are only criminals. Anyone who violates the law is tried under this category. Priests and villains are treated in the same manner, being incarcerated in isolation in dark cells and doing forced labor as criminals indiscriminately. 

Sunday, June 14, 2020

THE COMMUNIST BLOC AFTER THE COLD WAR (II)


THE COMMUNIST BLOC AFTER THE COLD WAR (II)

By Van Nguyen



   China  

Ousted from office in the Cultural Revolution (1960-1969), Deng Xiaoping was reinstated. In 1972-73, the policy of détente between the United of States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics began.  In 1975, China introduced a new constitution and an economic plan termed “Four Modernization”--agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology aiming to instate the country in a par with the West by the year 2000. In 1978, following a violent struggle against the Gang of Four led by Jiang Qing, Deng Xiaoping was forced to live in hiding. In 1977, he returned to office.  Economic reforms were introduced and foreign investment in the “Special Economic Zones” was encouraged. By 1981, Deng gained political supremacy and carried out radical economic modernization program in a continuing process of controlled modernization of the economy.  His economic policy, evaluated by observers, was a drift towards capitalism, with a substantial economic development of the country, especially in the rural areas

The economic reforms, however, met with stress during 1978-85. By 1987, China experienced major economic difficulties. Foreign debt shot up. Inflation was running at an annual rate of about 30 per cent. There was anger over corruption and division in the leadership. Events with violence following the USSR-China dispute across their long land frontier and the appearance of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe coincidentally happened while China was engaging in a continuing process of controlled modernization. In spite of pressing difficulties, the leadership remained held firm maintenance of domestic affairs, politically and economically.
   
 In 1987, Deng Xiaoping retired from the Politburo and his position as chair of the State Military Commission, but still held control behind the scene. Political developments leading to the collapse of the European Communist Bloc, nevertheless, had great impact on China. The exciting changes in Eastern Europe stimulated expectations for change. In the early months of 1989, acute inflation rose, and an austerity program was imposed, fueling popular anger. This was also the background to a new wave of student demands for change. Encouraged by the presence of sympathizers with liberalization in the governing oligarchy, they demanded that the Party and government should open a dialogue with a newly formed and unofficial Student Union about corruption and reform. Protests and rallies calling for democracy ensued. The leadership was alarmed, but refused to recognize the Union as it might create the harbinger of a new Red Guards movement.

      Successive demonstrations occurred in many cities and as the seventieth anniversary of the May 4th Movement approached. The demonstrators evoked its memory as to give a broad patriotic fervor to their campaign, but they were unable to arouse strong support in the rural areas or in the southern cities. Encouraged by the obviously sympathetic attitude of the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhao Ziyang, protesters began a mass hunger strike. The campaign won widespread popular sympathy and support in Beijing. By the time tension reached apogee, the senior members of the government, including Deng Xiaoping, appeared to have been thoroughly alarmed.  Disorder spread. China faced a major crisis. A new cultural revolution would arise if the situation got out of control. On May 20, martial law was declared.

There were signs for a movement that the government might not be able to impose measures at its will to have the command of the situation. As a result, the repression which followed was ruthless. The student leaders changed tactics, focusing their efforts to an encampment in Tiananmen Square in Beijing where thirty years before, Mao had proclaimed the foundation of the People’s Republic. From one of the gates of the old Forbidden City a huge plastic figure of a “Goddess of Democracy,” was placed.  On June 2, the first repressing military unit entered the suburbs of Beijing on their way to the square. There was student resilient resistance mainly with bare hands and barricades. Military forces forced their way through. On June 4, the students and sympathizers were overcome by rifle-fire, teargas, and a brutal crushing of the encampment under the threads of tanks which swept into the square. Killing went on for some days, mass arrests followed. Thousands of people were repressed. Violence took place before the eyes of the world thanks to the international media in presence in Beijing.

Regardless of political events that shook the capital, the Party leadership was in tirm control of the political situation. The rural masses did not sympathize with the protesters; rather, they were against the changes in the ruling hierarchy. Gaining the command of the situation, the administration stepped up vigorous attempts to impose political orthodoxy. Thought reforms organs were reinforced again. Peace was restored. In many ways, China had not encountered critical problems as most countries in Eastern Europe had and was apparently not going the way of Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union.

    In foreign affairs China’s rift with Soviet Union over policy differences became irreconcilable.in 1982 when Russia sided with India during the Sino-Indian border war. Chia pursued thereafter the non-aligned strategy, projecting itself as the voice of the Third World Nations. The relations between the two countries were increasingly deteriorating. On the other hand, the reverse proved to be true with the West. After the massacre at the Tenement Square in June 1989, the relations with the West were increasingly warm and the Deng administration’s economic contacts with the West, especially with the United States, were broadening. In December 1989, US President George H. Bush sent a surprise mission to China, demanding the contacts as an effort to prevent dangerous isolation of China and as a way to engage it in constructive peace proposals for Kampuchea.

China after the Tiananmen Square tragic incident was peaceful. The masses seemed to be immune to political currents in the Communist Bloc. The Communist Party of China held firmly to the role of its government and acted as the vanguard to persevere Chinese Communist orthodoxy.  Economic modernization turned out in the end the real economic salvation, and not a mode of economic “westernization.” The People’s Republic of China emerged as a powerful nation, especially in the eyes of “non-aligned countries,” following the period of détente between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the growing disintegration of the latter.