CORRUPTION

CORRUPTION

By Van Nguyen

    

Corruption became a serious disease following the` takeover of South Vietnam. In June 1976, after the “de facto” though shortly before the “de jure” reunification, Communist Party Secretary-general  Le Duan, once again, castigated the party cadres for bribery, misappropriation of private property, and various other corrupt practices. In April 1977, the Party Secretary-general signed a Politburo resolution to heighten vigilance against corruption. It blamed State cadres and officials for abuse of power and corrupt practices. Rectifications followed in 1977, and anticorruption campaigns were activated accordingly. Several cadres and officials were expulsed from the Communist Party. However, corruption was increasingly pervading throughout the officialdom the following years. The Party leadership perceived that the problem was   alarmingly and sought for measures to halt it.

  In September 1983, after successive anti-corruption campaigns, a new Central Department for Internal Affairs was created to reinforce the task. Nevertheless the objective was not fully defined. It primarily focused on the relief of the Party Central Committee of Internal Affairs’ anti-corruption organs from collapse. The new organ, in its turn, failed to carry out its task, nevertheless.  In the early summer of 1983, the Party Central Committee issued a clearer statement according to which Party cadres were no longer permitted to own land, especially cadres on assignments in the administration in South Vietnam--22 per cent of whom were working at the district level or higher disposed of assets in the way decreed by the central authorities revealed as insensitivity and nativity. (Leslie Homes, 1993, p.187) 

 Instances of corruption were volubly numerous. Campaigns for fighting against it multiplied. Reports in various forms on corruption and abuses of power of individual cadres for personal interests accumulated. The report in the Vietnamese media in November 1984 is a classic example of how an individual can simultaneously practice serial corruption. The director of the public security in Dong Nai Province, Captain Nguyen Huu Gioc, engaged in various kinds of corruption during the period of 1979-83. He released ‘reactionaries’ from re-education centers, and then found them posts in government offices--all paid in return with bribes. He even secured the release of a former adviser to former President Thieu of South Vietnam when the man was arrested on charge of reactionary crime in return with a bribe. He extorted gold and money from a Chinese ethnic, who sought to flee Vietnam. He even distributed cross-border smuggling permits. Higher officials knew of Nguyen’s activities and tried to expose his crimes to light. Nguyen’s response was to draw up false reports to refute accusations, claiming that they are false. (Vietnam News Agency, November 9, 1984).

The fight against corruption reached momentum. At the end of 1984, the Communist Party, at a Party conference, prepared for a major campaign for eradication of the “negative phenomena.” It was chaired by the then Head of the Security Ministry and Politburo member Pham Hung. The five negative phenomena included the four issues related to abuse of power and corruption was given careful considerations. They were specifically enumerated as smuggling, financial speculation, bribery, and loaning money at high interest rates. Again, anti-corruptions campaigns began and continued well into 1986, even within the circle of the Party apparatchik and the legal institutions, being the two groups singled out for particularly vehement attacks. Ordinary citizens were encouraged to criticize acts of retrogression via letters to the press. In one weekend, about 1,300 letters arrived at the Ho Chi Minh City newspapers. In these letters, the second most criticized aspect of life in modern Vietnam. It is mostly on the poor side of the ailing economy, as a consequence of corrupt officialdom. At the Sixth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party, held in December 1986, the assembly tackled corruption and identified it as one of the Party’s major tasks for rectification.  (Beresford, 1988: 84).

Corruption became a national scourge, but the administration came up with no practical solution.  From the early to the mid-1980, the Communist administration intensified its fight against corruption. Nevertheless, high authorities were spared from “washing dirty linen in public.”  Politburo member Le Duc Tho, in an article in the official daily “Nhan Dan,” in May 1986, acknowledged that “in this second stage, the challenge has been faced with material temptation, bourgeois lifestyle, money, beautiful girls, and luxurious commodities. Retrogression gradually dissipates the best qualities and ethics of a revolutionary. It destroys in secret the strength of our contingent. Ideologically speaking, complex developments are being identified among cadres and party-members. Corruption, bribery, and smuggling are a phenomenon. This situation is existent everywhere and at every echelon. It causes great losses to public properties and the people’s material life. It degrades the cadres and party members, and it denudates the public’s confidence. It may be said that, in our Party, there has been no such a degeneration of virtues ever before. This is a major and serious issue.”    

In August 1987, an article published in the Party’s theoretical political journal “Hoc Tap” (Studies) denounced with analysts on the indecent conduct of public affairs of the Politburo member To Huu and a number of party functionaries for their corrupt practices. Corruption remained a critical issue. Corrupt practices were exposed on the official media. Reports on the military’s misusing of socialized property in Ho Chi Minh City, for instance, was published in the daily “Saigon Giai Phong” (Saigon Liberated), January 10 1988. The publication of the case might be part of the campaign designed to bring the Vietnamese military under control. Phan Van Thanh, one of  accomplices of the Twenty-eighth Convalescence Group that used military vehicles to hinder people from escaping Vietnam in exchange for bribes-- 20 taels of gold each person. Phan was tried by a military tribunal and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. His accomplices received the sentences ranging from three years to 11 years in prison  

Complaints over social insecurity are heard everywhere, in the cities and the countryside as well. Nguyem Xuan Thieu, a high school teacher of geography and history under the old regime who retired to his home village in Binh Duong groaned: “Social corruption grieves me.  I survive poverty on my own labor.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                Although old and Weak, I still labor miserably to subsist. Robbers and malefactors rule the village I raised a chicken and lost it. I raised a rabbit, it was swiped. There is no law and order. I would be unavoidably tripped off a piece of furniture by a hamlet official if he insistently wants to take it. The piece of land I am allocated is always preyed to confiscation for the State’s use any moment. Life here is happy if one is spared from theft, piracy, and corruption.  Grumbles as such are familiar to anyone with knowledge of Vietnam today. To be fair, local authorities are aware of these social evils, but turn a blind eye to it. 

Corruption linked to abuse of power is a serious problem. Georges Duhamel, a French writer, noted that “a senior Communist told city officials in Hanoi that fighting against corruption should be the top priority. Throughout the country, as many as 74 communal officials have been assigned on mission to carry on the fight against corruption. A high official with a State company has just been given the life sentence for embezzlement of $US 30,000 dollars.” (Georges Duhamel, the Post-revolution Vietnam. Doan Ket. No.338. Jan. 1988, pp. 36-37).

    The State condemnation on and the press campaigns for elimination of crimes initiated by the authorities continued all through the later years of the 1980’s. In his Lunar New Year speech of February 1988 published in the daily “Nhan Dan”, April 8, 1988, Politburo member Nguyen Van Linh listed five main tasks for 1988, the last of which was the urgency of the purification of the Party and the officialdom, weeding out degenerate and degraded elements, regardless of their ranks and positions. The daily acknowledged that “It is a matter of concern that the elimination should concentrate on party members and cadres at the highest echelon. Their indecent conduct is covered up in one way or another. Party, State, and police officials are tantamount to committing corrupt practices. Crimes as such impair the prestige of the Party and State should be brought to court. Crimes of infringements on the Party discipline and the law should be severely punished to consolidate the people’s confidence in the Party.”  On June 9, 1988, the same official daily reported that more than 500 members of the Communist Party in Cao Bang Province had been expelled from the Party while another 391 had been subjected to “disciplinary action” for embezzlement and other abuses of power. This was another achievement following the “purification campaign” directed by the administration.

  Social evils were rampant as a result of corrupt practices. The daily “Nhan Dan,” in August 2, 1988, acknowledged in bitter terms that, as of the end of 1987, there were 6,845 thefts of public proprieties valued at 1,320,700,000 dong, and 60% of the speculators were state cadres. Sixty-five percent of the soldiers discharged from military services could not find jobs. Robberies in broad daylight increased daily. Juvenile delinquency was another major problem. Previously, reports from the security police admitted that the statistics collected in 1979 revealed that 15,511 teenagers committed crimes, were addicts to drugs, and victims of prostitution.   

In January 1989, in a speech delivered at Vinh Phu, Truong Chinh heightened vigilance on the disrespect of social law and order, referring to the widespread corruption among cadres and party members. Official report on the instance of corruption in Cao Bang made a topic in the press. Members of the Party committee of the province had stolen large quantities State properties. The situation became so critical that Party Secretary-general Nguyen Van Linh unwillingly ordered a clamp-down on media reports and criticism on negative phenomena, including corruption. The active participation of the media crimes revelations had been undermining the prestige and credibility of the Communist Party of Vietnam. The measure was strongly endorsed by the Vietnamese Communist Party. It was not until its seventh plenum in August 1989 that the leadership, again, appealed to Party cadres and officials for resolute anti-corruption actions. The appeal appeared to be unconvincing, however (Le Dinh Dieu, Interview with Nguyen Minh Can. VNCR February 20, 1998).  

ENEQUALITIES

ENEQUALITIES

By Van Nguyen

   Uncertainties are pervasive in every aspect in the social life of the people. It is self-evident in the corrupt practices in the conduct of public affairs of the officialdom. It is equally manifest in social inequalities, ills, and perils, a reflection of disdain for and disrespect to the population. As a result of ill-conceived economic reforms under the People’s Democracy (1975-1985), the economy worsened, leading to the retrogression in the lives of cadres, workers, and state employees. The magazine “Cong San” (The Communist), in March 1987, acknowledged that until December 1986, the real salary of workers and State employees only values at about 30% of that in October 1985. The Labor Company of Mines in Hon Gai, North Vietnam disclosed that the real salary of mine workers remained at 35% of that of 1985. The mineworker lived on a monthly salary of 3,139 dong.  Nevertheless, he was practically paid only 925 dong. He and his family could survive on meager diet from 7 to 10 days. The conditions of living of the intellectuals, im general, were much more deplorable. On the average, a mlddle level state employee was paid 600 dong monthly   It was less than the income of a soup vendor

    During June-August, 1986, 15,700 workers of the Company for Rubber Plantations in the Western High Plateaus quit jobs. The Sixth National Party Congress in December 1986 found it necessary to issue a stern warning against opportunism, individualism, corruption, and a desire for special prerogatives and privileges. A report to the congress urged the Party to intensify the class struggle to combat the corrupt practices that engaged those who "had lost class consciousness." Official efforts were heated to purify the corrupt ranks and file officials of the working class. However, they failed to combat the responsive chord. The proceedings of the Sixth Congress left the inescapable impression that the regime was barely surviving the struggle between socialism and capitalism and that an early emergence of a Communist class structure was unlikely.

    As ideally envisioned, the socialist sector was expected to provide 70 percent of household income, and the "household economy" or the privately controlled resources of the home were to make up the balance. In September 1986, cadres and workers were earning their living mainly through moonlighting and, according to some Vietnamese source, remained on "the state rolls only to preserve their political prestige and to receive some ration stamps and coupons." The source further disclosed that the society's lack of awareness of class struggle was reflected in the party's membership, among them only about 10 per cent were identified as from the working class (Cima, 1989: 112).

    Son Tra reported in the weekly “Tuoi Tre Chu Nhat” (The Youth Sunday”, November 2, 1990, how a weaver and her family survived under “doi moi” (renovation). “What are they going to do to survive?  The hard pressure for money burdens on her family. Her 18-year-old daughter, a weaver like her, ran away from home. The job is chancy. The factory is planning to lay off hundreds of workers, mostly women workers. “ No jobs! That is the most restless anxiety of thousands of most workers and craftsmen. Not only that. The production is slumbering. The living conditions under which Nguyen Thi Hoang Anh and her husband live are another example they got married a year ago.  Hey saved several ounces of gold and bought a loom. In the beginning, they earn a good living due to working on contract with a textile cooperative at Bay Hien, Saigon. The textile industry is then in abeyance. The business is dying. The businessman is bankrupt, and the contract worker’s business dies accordingly. Nguyen Thi Hoang Anh and her husband work for other weavers. They gain approximately 100,000 dong a month all day and night to support a family of five members, including 3 children; the oldest of them is not yet 5-year-old. “  

   Son Tra noted, in his account of the gap between the rich and the poor in Ho Chi Minh City, as follows: “While the poor people rake for every cent in heaps of garbage, a class of “mandarins of the revolution” indulges in luxurious living. Abuses of power pervade the officialdom, and injustices create anger and discontent, resulting in a serious problem. The occupation  of public estates of party members and cadres takes place in almost all big cities and townships even the center of Ho Chi Minh City where the fight against and the annihilation of corrupt practices is on the rise. Those slogans are mere catchwords for propaganda used to cover up illegal favors for protégés and screening them from crimes and mistakes.

   There is brazen truth linked to almost all rank and file officials of the Party and State. Many of them are not only allocated public facilities for habitation and leisure but also served by men-on-duty and public servants! These privileges have never been scrutinized in the searchlight of renovation as if public properties were reserved for the privileged class! The budget spent for this kind of luxury is really astounding.  If we rent a four-seat sedan plus a driver in Ho Chi Minh City or Hanoi for one day, we have to pay from 70,000 d0ng to 100,000 dong, depending on what the makes are. As regards house rentals, in business quarters such as Hang Dao Street tin Hanoi or Le Thanh Ton Street in Ho Chi Minh City, a businessman has to pay30, 000 per month for each square meter. Redesigning, we will see how colossal the State debt paid for all the allocations under the “bao can” (cadre’s protection policy) will be!

   There is, of course, no equality of wealth between the rich and the poor [even in a classless society as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam aspires to come up to!] However, no particular class is entitled to favors without the control of the society. Social objections will become increasingly intense as the commodity economy requires all citizens to familiarize themselves with the measurement of every ounce of raw materials, every minute of work, and every square meter of estates, facilities, and factories. The question is to open a bookkeeping account for national properties, the budget paid for each State agency and each state official in such a way that the people will be able to duly tolerate errors and mistakes. Every legal payment must be approved by the legislative body. The nominal salary should not be used as shield for an act of indecent conduct or a cover for an unjust allocation of public property or interests, and, worse still, for the protection of corrupt practices that are decaying the officialdom and breaking down the State (H. Son Tra, 1990).

      Le Ha Van depicted the utter misery the true “class of workers” in the Socialist country suffers under renovation. They are mostly homeless and do up garbage for living. They are commonly called garbage excavators.  Waste materials are like silver and gold to them. An old person is observantly working beside a rubbish-heap at Hoang Van Thu Park (Saigon). Her rheumy eyes which are used in place of a flash light are searching through the heap that has been dug up with fingers by a younger and stronger “excavators” who have come previously. A filthy smell expires. She says: “Waste paper is sold at 1’000 dong (approximately 10 cents) per kilogram, nylon bags may be sold at 1,500 dong, and paper bags and bottles can be sold only at 500 dong.”       

     “Excavators” are mostly young people. They are from suburban wards of Tan Binh Precinct and Hoc Mon District. That “army” work from midnight to dawn when luxurious Saigon restaurants are gradually transforming their plain figures into the picturesque scenes of neon signs and perfume. With a bicycle and two bamboo-latticed baskets or sacks, the garage gatherer rushes for garbage cans along the sidewalk, turns them upside down, gathers anything he could sell, and leaves for the “market place. Garbage gatherers are everywhere, in the center of Saigon, in Cho Lon (Saigon Chinatown), or Hang Xanh Street. Gia Dinh Township.

   Policy ambiguities and poor dissemination, sudden change in policy can mean that what is generally perceived as legal one day becomes illegal the next. Sometimes, it is not easy to change one’s situation as the new policy requires. The economic renovation has its setbacks. Getrud Winkie reported in the French magazine “Le Monde Diplomatique” in July 1995 that Vietnam’s economy is viable, but not everyone enjoys its achievements. There is an absence a social orientation in the economic development. It neglects other sectors of the country’s life, thus creating a distant detachment between the rich and the poor.

INSTABILITY

INSTABILITY

By Van Nguyen

     The fight for powers by underhand means between top leaders in the Politburo persisted in secret. It became increasingly tense at the outset of the Congress of the People’s Army of October 13, 1986. The prestige of General Vo Nguyen Giap, the hero of Dien Bien Phu victory and his two close colleagues, General Chu Huy Man, commander-in-chief of the People’s Army and General Van Tien Dung, the general commander of Ho Chi Minh Campaign in the spring of 1975, was immersed in disfavor. Political maneuvers closed in on the military leaders after the doubtful deaths of three other outstanding generals, Hoang Van Thai, Le Trong Tan, and Dinh Duc Thien. Out of a hidden scheme instigated by Le Duc Tho, top leaders in the Politburo, Pham Van Dong, Pham Hung, and Vo Chi Cong, Party Secretary-general Truong Cinhh was forced to resign from position. 

     In the opening session of the internal Congress of the Communist Party on December 15, 1986, Nguyen Van Linh, the Committee Party secretary of Ho Chi Minh City was chosen Party Secretary-general for renovation by a unanimous vote. With the ascension of Nguyen Van Linh to powers, the Communist Party of Vietnam hastened a move from command economy to market economy.  As a consequence of burning failures of successive economic reforms for a decade-long People’s democracy, instability in the economic, social, and political life were still very much with the people of Vietnam, however.

 The Peasantry in the North

 In Thai Binh Province, well-known “the granary of rice North Vietnam,” people still labored under “doi moi” (renovation). There was no change in the life of the peasantry.  A three-generation family still lived under the same ancestral thatched-roof cottage. They had no other means for production but bare hands and rudimentary farm implements. Agricultural communes and cooperatives were dissolved, but everything was under the control of the commune.

Previously, under the agricultural communes and cooperatives system, the peasants worked for the agricultural cooperative and were paid for the labor they contributed to it. In principle, the better you contribute to it, the more interest you get from it. Contrarily, the peasants, in reality, were cleaned out shamelessly. A cooperative farmhand was given only 6 kilograms of rice over a month, nothing else but rice. He had no sick-leave. If he wanted a day off, a portion of his rice ration would be taken off. If he was absent from work, he would be interrogated and punished. His rice ration could be cut on charge absence from work without a reason. He committed the serious crime of sabotage against the policy for socialist production. The peasant labored as ever. He worked twelve months a year including communal works such as digging canals and damming a river. He was nevertheless paid for eight and a half months. The compensation was meager. A cooperative farm hand could only have nearly 50 kilogram s of rice for the whole six-month rice season. In times of drought and flood, the peasant went hungry without a doubt.

Renovation came but brought about even more evils. Taxes and fees accumulated. Peasants in the agricultural provinces like Thai Binh lived in penury. Crops yield could only afford even for three or four months yearly. Parents left homes for townships and cities to work on hire. Kids stayed home and took care of family matters. Misery plagued the countryside.  In the winter, kids didn’t even have shorts to resist the bitter cold. Every time, a visitor from the South came back to the home village, he or she usually brought with him or her bundles of old clothes collected from relatives and friends in the South and gave them to those poor children. An old piece of clothes was then worth several kilograms of rice. (Interview with Nguyen Thi Diep. VHRW. Novembe992)

    

In the beginning, the peasant seems to rejoice at the new policy, but he soon realizes that he is exploited even more cruelly than he had been. He is now reluctant and feels disheartened, being aware of the reality that he has to face new difficulties. As ever, the right to private ownership is a taboo subject. Land is state-administered. The peasant could rent it on contract. A family of 6 members, for example, could rent 7 “sao” (700m2). Under this new contract system, the peasant stands on his own, cultivating his fields and taking care of his crop. On the average, in a good season, a peasant cultivating 7 “sao” (700m2) can earn get 420 kilograms of rice. Under the commune cooperatives system, he is given 240 kilograms of rice. Under the new system, he can get the double amount. But, the situation isn't better. The peasant has to pay for everything, from seeds to manure. Before renovation, he works for the cooperative; he can be afforded commodities on state subsidies. Now, he has to buy them on market prices, which are often ten times higher. Before renovation, schooling for children was tuition-free. He doesn't even know if he will ever be courageous enough to continue working on the fields. Many peasants can't afford their children's tuition fees, which often cost almost all the crop of the family. They keep them home to work for the family. They need to survive first.

   Renovation depicts another somber picture. Begging in 1988, the agricultural cooperatives system was abolished as the first move towards the market economy.  A good story tells, as he believes that good times have come, a college student majoring in agriculture drops out of school, nurturing the idea that he possibly takes advantage of the new system to make good money. He goes back to his home village asking his parents to borrow money from relatives for him to rent a tractor. He hopes that once he has had the plough-machine at hand, every peasant in the region will ask him to plough the field—just for the sake of convenience. That will save time, labor, and money for the laborer. He will be there to gather money. To his distress, the peasants can’t afford to hire him. They are penniless. Moreover, they are accustomed to rudimentary mode of production. They still miserably depend on buffalo-drawn harrows and ploughs, and hand farming implements for cultivation.  (Thien Nhan, VNHRW, 7 (March 1992)).     

The Peasantry in the Center

 A peasant in Mo Duc District, Quang Ngai Province, told how he survived before and after the new agrarian reform: “After1986, the agricultural cooperatives system is abolished. Misery is still pervasive. The peasants and common people are in the same boat: They are equally miserable. The absolute majority of the people in his district are peasants. Before 1986, they worked for the agricultural commune but could not afford foods for their families. Three-fourths of the crop yield went to the state--practically local cadres and authorities. After 1986, the situation isn’t better. Adopting the path of market economy, the local authorities allocated 800 square meters of land to everyone who was 18 years old and older. On the average, the crop yield--the peasants usually grow rice--per rice season varied from 60 to 80 kgs per 800 square meters. Subtracting the expenses for the care of the land, there was only half of the crop yield left. The peasants nevertheless had to pay for all kinds of additional state contributions, from social relief services to military obligations --not to mention the tuition fees for their children. In addition, they had “the right" to pay the rent for the land they were allocated and taxes to the State. There was virtually nothing left after they had done all their "citizens' obligations"—from national defense to social welfare fees contributions.  

Propaganda is always instrumental to the policy of the State’. The Vietnamese people know that the Vietnamese Communist Party lies to them. It says the people are the "master of the country" but, in reality, they are only the slaves. They are like old and weak buffaloes laboring for the benefits of the state cadres and Communist party members. The people are "the master of the country" but the State is the true organizer that administers their lives and properties. The Vietnamese Communist Party is the true master who reserves the rights to the "leadership" of the people! Those plain lies camouflage hidden schemes that are contrary to reason and common sense. (Van Chuong, Interview with Dinh Phu: 11 VNHRW (July 1993)).

Warnings and threats are used as a means to an end to control not only the people but also party members and officials in the officialdom. They serve as the shields to cover up errors and mistakes. State policies are right, only the executors are at fault. To execute political intimidation, the Communist administration activates campaigns of propaganda to rectify their cadres' faux pas and corrupt practices. Those campaigns, in reality, are aimed not only to eliminate corrupt officials but also to monitor opposition from the masses to abort it right in the germinal stage. The repressive operations in the Center are a case in evidence. While the campaigns went on secretly in the provinces of Phu Khanh and Binh Tri Thien, they are carried out with hard measures in Thanh Hoa Province. Having failed to intimidate the peasants in the village of Ngoc Tho, district of Trieu Son, the local authorities suppressed with violence the villagers' opposition. Thirty district and province security policemen, armed with submachine guns and flanked by police-dogs, were given orders to assault the unarmed villagers (Thien Chuong, VNHRW: 1992: 4).

The Peasantry in the Mekong Delta

The demonstrations by the peasantry took place in many places in the provinces of the Mekong Delta during 1987-1988. The incidents were unknown to the West due to State mass media censorship   and the "Internal policy."  The developments were confirmed by well-informed sources in Ho Chi Minh City--high-ranking officials on mission in Paris and refugees from the provinces concerned. The first demonstration occurred at Mo Cay, a district in the province of Ben Tre, a hundred kilometers south of Ho Chi Minh City. The district was well-known for its “Dong Khoi” (general uprising) on December 20, 1960, the date that well marked the precursory step toward "the War for the Liberation of South Vietnam." Two other demonstrations, also organized by the peasantry, took place after that, in April and May 1988. The second demonstration was directed by veteran fighters of the Front for Liberation of South Vietnam, and it was the bloodiest one. Armed with hatches, knives, and hoes, the protesters occupied the fields of the commune cooperatives. Their demands were the return of their private properties, direct evaluation of land policies, and the lowering of taxation on farming. Police forces were sent in to repress the demonstrations. Many peasants were seriously wounded. Among them was Ho Sinh, a veteran cadre, who was incarcerated later. 

The peasantry also organized two demonstrations in Ho Chi Minacity, which occurred on August 12, 1988 and November 9-10. 1988. According to the AFP, approximately 1.000 people participated in the protest. Hanoi had to satisfy some demands. Each cooperative member was then allocated a piece of land for his own use. One might think that would be a signal for the return to the old mode of individual land production in the South as previously. However, the land ever belongs to “the people” as prescribed by the constitutional law (Article 17 of the 1992 Constitution). The agrarian taxation is lowered. The lease term, according to the law on land, passed by the National Assembly on July 15, 1993, is fixed for 20 years for the rice-field and 50 years for the land used for multiphase growing. The lease is restorable. Each household has the right to exploit three hectares of rice-field at most. These half-way measures, however, did not satisfy the peasantry's legitimate demands. They wish to be given back the rights to private ownership and direct evaluation of the land.  

The provision 17 of 1992 Constitution and the new law on land, in truth, dispossess the ownership of private property circumscribed by a lease.  Someday it will be manipulated by the government for certain some reason, transforming the peasants into the true "State farmers." Deprived of his land legally and only allowed by the government for cultivation, the peasant and his family only survive at the mercy of the State. They suffer almost the same fate as their peers in the North did during the bloody agrarian reforms in 1955-1956. Even though lowered, the taxation remained high. The yield of crops was not sufficient enough to relieve them from making ends meet due to heavy costs of farming. Worse still, despite good harvests, quite a few peasants went bankrupt because the selling price of rice in the market (averaging from 750 dong per kilogram (with one dollar equals 10,000 dong) was still low. It is equal to or lowers than the cost of production. The peasant was no longer interested in implementing the yield of land simply the land did not belong to him. The limit of three hectares per household discouraged the old middle-category cultivators who had possessed more than three hectares. As a consequence, in the Mekong Delta where the population was sparse and labor force was in want, the peasants abandoned farming. (Lam Thanh Liem 1993, 4-5)