THE VIET MINH ELIMINATION OF NATIONAL PARTIES AND GROUPS (1945-1947)

Although it was a relatively small organization at the outset, the Viet Minh were led by a well-organized and highly disciplined core of Moscow-trained agit-props among whom were Ho Chi Minh and Tran Van Giau. They were the agents who had expertise in executing political maneuver in almost all instances. The Viet Minh fought with vigilance and all means to an end for their cause. In the fight for power, they usually played an upper hand over the Nationalists, and thus their success swept to victory in the August uprisings of 1945. Practically, they outfoxed their Nationalist opponents with well-defined objectives and well-thought strategies.

Communism was unknown to common people in the 1950’s; the Communist-led Viet Minh were therefore not popular. Nationalist leaders of revolutionary parties, however, had clear and thorough thought about communism, and Communist practices. The fact caused great disadvantage to the Viet Minh and thus construed the reason for which the Nationalists became the danger to the existence of the Viet Minh. As a matter of fact, they were targeted with elimination. Ideologically, communism and nationalism, are like water and fire. Thus, the Communist-Nationalist confrontation during the August uprisings and the years that followed had increasingly intensified with bitterness and complexity. Both sides had been ever since entangled in an incessant internal war of attrition with hatred and violence.

Tactically, to mask the true face of Viet Minh. Ho Chi Minh and his comrades had, at first, to disguise themselves as Nationalists. They kept their identity a secret. They often camouflaged their activities under a hidden scheme. They acted as patriots with nationalistic zeal and patriotic fervor. It is no wonder until the end of the Vietnam War (1955-1975), quite a few people still believed that Ho Chi Minh was truly a patriotic Nationalist-- Nguyen Ai Quoc, Nguyen, the Patriot. (A member of the Third International, Ho Chi Minh had used as many as 50 secret names!)

The Viet Minh were notorious in propaganda to win popular support. Low-level Viet Minh cadres usually repeated what their superior had said without thinking about what it meant to draw people to their side. They were commonly called by the nick name "V(E)M," an allusion to V(E)T, a parrot. Nevertheless, superior cadres were clever and cunning. To their political opponents, they temporarily backed off and make concessions when necessary to achieve their purpose some time later. Using tactics of this kind in their fight for power during the August uprisings of 1945, they carried out defined strategies, well-set programs, and well-thought methods. Best of all, they cleverly exploited all their advantages to eliminate opponents and swept away their opponents to win final victory.

Upon his abdication and transfer of power to the Ho Chi Minh government in August 30, 1945, Emperor Bao Dai declared that he himself and the royal family were ready for any sacrifice and their sacrifice should be useful to the people. He requested the new government to take care of the royal temples and tombs, to deal fraternally with all parties, to give them the opportunity to participate in the national reconstruction, and to demonstrate that the new regime would be built on the absolute union of the entire people. Contrary to his wishes, chaos ensued, and terror began to expand.

Even before the Nationalist-Communist conflict intensified, the Viet Minh felt perfectly justified in their role as the executioners for social justice; they considered themselves the liberators of the people. They practiced monopoly power and liquidated political opponents. In Saigon, the prominent intellectual Phan Van Hum was murdered at Thu Duc District, Gia Dinh Province. The leader of the Dang Lap Hien (Constitutional’ Party) Bui Quang Chieu was abducted and executed at Hon Da Bac, Rach Gia Province. In Hue, the Prime Minister of the Royal Cabinet Pham Quynh, the Governor Ngo Dinh Khoi and his son, Ngo Dinh Huan, being accused on ungrounded charges of treason, were executed clandestinely. In Hanoi, Truong Tu Anh, the leader of the Dai Viet, was assassinated. Ly Dong A, the First Secretary of the Duy Dan Dang (The Party for the People), escaped death but disappeared. The former Prime Minister Tran Trong Kim, targeted with suspicion, sought refuge overseas. Emperor Bao Dai imposed himself self-exile in Hong Kong, and Empress Nam Phuong and the royal family, under the patronage of the Redemptorists in Saigon, evaded Hue and took refuge in Paris.

　

THE VIET MINH ELIMINATION OF THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE FORCES IN THE SOUTH

　

　

The Political Situation in the South prior to the August Uprisings

After the coup d’etat of March 9, 1945, the Japanese authorities in the Indochina intended to transfer power to Cao Dai political leaders. However, being committed to their religious faith, they declined. His Excellency General Tran Quang Vinh, a prominent political and military leader, in a meeting at the Holy Site, explained to a group of Cao Dai youths that their role as patriots had been played, that political power should be transferred to Emperor Bao Dai, and that the emperor would then choose politicians to govern the country and the people of Vietnam would decide what political regime Vietnam would adopt. Cao Dai believers should perform their duties as citizens and attend to their faith (Van Chuong, September 1991)

Two atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. On August 14, spiritual and political leaders in the South among whom were Ho Van Nga, the Prophet of Hoa Hao Buddhism Huynh Phu So, Nguyen Van Sam, and Tran Van Thach formed the Mat Tran Quoc Gia Thong Nhat (United National Front). On August 15, Japan surrendered to the Allies. In Saigon, the Japanese authorities transferred power to the Hoi Dong Nam Ky (Council of Administration of Cochinchina) with Tran Van An as the chairman. Ho Van Nga was assigned as the Vice-viceroy of Cochinchina while awaiting the Viceroy Nguyen Van Sam who was on the way from Hue to Saigon.

Tran Van Giau’s Chicanery

Hanoi sent Tran Van Giau, a Viet Minh politics commissioner, and Nguyen Binh, a veteran member of Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang, to the South to seize power Aware of the overwhelming political and military strength that would destroy their control of power. Tran and Nguyen sought support beside the Nationalist spiritual and political leaders. At the Cao Dai Headquarters of Militiamen, Tran and Nguyen earnestly preached national unity and solidarity. With mere rhetoric, they were successful in convincing the Nationalists to cede power to them, dissolving their four military divisions under their command. Militiamen were to go back to their native villages and join local national resistance units. Only two companies were retained.

General Tran Quang Vinh of Cao Dai resigned from office. The command of the two military detachments was passed to His Excellency Nguyen Van Chu. On his way back to the Cao Dai Holy Site, the general was arrested at Cho Dem, Duc Hoa District, Long An Province, on the order of Huymh Van Tien, the then Director of Police in the South. He was abducted to the Viet Minh Headquarters in Dong Thap and then to Ca Mau guerrilla zone where he was to be executed. By miraculous chance, he was saved there by Nguyen Van No, an old militiaman under his command, who was a lead-serviceman of the local Viet Minh troops (Van Chuong, September, 1991).

The Viet Minh’s creation of the Uy Ban Hanh Chanh Lam Thoi (Privy Council of Administration) on their own initiatives aroused deep resentment among leaders of the political and revolutionary circles. The members in this council consisted only of Communists or pro-Communists, which fact presented an act of presumptuousness to spiritual leaders, much to the indignation of the Nationalist leaders and non-Communis figures. Worse still, they executed outright plans to eliminate the Nationalists, even the sympathizers with them. Ho Van Nga and many members of the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dang were among them. Faced with vile trick played on them by the Viet Minh, the Nationalists reacted with vehemence. In the conference of September 7, 1945, spiritual figures, leaders of national parties, and members of the Fourth International strongly blasted Tran Van Giau and the Viet Minh for their act of superiority and monopoly of power. The Viet Minh backed off but did not compromise.

As the conflict persisted, the tension built. On September 8. at Can Tho, the Hoa Hao organized a demonstration to protest against the Viet Minh in support for the United National Front. The following day, the Viet Minh reacted with violence. A huge meeting was proceeded with plan of actions at the Can Tho City Hall. The Hoa Hao were charged with carrying out the dark scheme to overthrow the people’s administration and take it by force.

The retaliation was brutal. The Viet Minh launched a string of search-through operations throughout Can Tho to arrest Hoa Hao leaders and cadres. The city prison was crammed full of Hoa Hao dignitaries and adepts. Within hours, the organizers of the demonstration among whom were Huynh Thanh Mau, the younger brother of the founder of Hoa Hao Buddhism, Tran Van Hoanh, the eldest son of General Tran Van Soai, and Nguyen Xuan Thiep, the Hoa Hao representative who was about to go to Hanoi for negotiation with the central government. They were all executed at the Can Tho soccer field a month later, on October 7, 1945.

In Saigon, Tran Van Giau, on September 9, had his men surrounded the headquarters of Viet Nam Van Dong Hoi (Vietnam Alliance for Independence) on Miche Street where the Prophet Hyunh Phu So was in residence. On September 13, Viet Minh police led by Ly Hue Vinh hunted down prominent leaders of the Front, Vu Tam Anh, Ho Van Nga, Tran Quang Vinh, Luong Trong Tuong. Tran Van Giau gave Le Van Vien a black list comprising the names of hundreds of intellectuals to be executed. This Binh Xuyen leader nevertheless did not execute the order, convincing himself that if all these intellectuals got killed there would be no one left to reconstruct the nation. In this first wave of terrorism, the Viet Minh abducted and killed many prestigious Nationalists.

The Resistance

In addition to threats and violence from the Viet Minh, the Nationalists got entangled in a series of unforeseen events and problematic issues. On September 13, 1945, British General Douglas Gracey who executed the decision of the Allies at the Postdam Conference in September 1945 came to Saigon to disarm the defeated Japanese troops. On September 16, the French troops landed on Saigon. On September 18, Tran Van Giau was denied the recognizance as the legitimate representative of the Vietnamese administration by .the Allies. General Gracey agreed to create a Vietnamese Foreign Affairs Committee that served as a liaison team beside the Allies, instead. Tran Van Thach, Ho Van Phuong, and Nguyen Thi Suong were assigned to the task. All of them were not -Viet Minh.

In reality, beginning in mid-September, Saigon was in flames. The resistance war began. The Viet Minh’s potential human and material resources in Saigon were thin; they had almost nothing. The combined military forces under the command of spiritual and political leaders, by contrast, were imminently strong. The militia with the reinforcements from popular groups raised blockade in and around Saigon. Resistance fighters held key positions in the city. In the early morning of September 14, the militia prepared to fight. Everywhere, mostly in the poor residential quarters and suburban areas, Ban Co, Khanh Hoi, Cau Kho, Tan Dinh, and Thi Nghe trees were felled and furniture were thrown out on the street, raising a barrage to obstruct the advance of French troopers. The gas storage at Nha Be was set afire. The popular resistance fighters of national parties were in control of Cho Lon, Saigon China Town; the Binh Xuyen, along the Ben Nghe Canal to Saigon River; the Cao Dai Forces, on the routes to Tan Son Nhat Airport and Tay Ninh Province. the resistance force under the direction of To Ky; and the Viet Minh troops commanded by Hoang Quoc Viet, in the north of the city, Tan Dinh, and Thi Nghe.

On September 21, with General Gracey’s approval, Colonel Cedille, the France Commissioner, took command of the French troops. Vested with the military authority, the colonel declared, in a public notice, he would execute all troublemakers and banned the circulation of the local press. On September 22, General Gracey freed all French soldiers and nationals detained by the Japanese from prison and equipped them with arms, allegedly for self-defense. On September 23, the French Troops launched attacks on and seized Saigon City Hall and the main public administrative agencies, departments, services, and offices. French infantry troops conducted a thorough house search operation to look for weapons and ammunitions storage in the center of the city and the city port.

On September 23, 1945, facing the French infantry troops’ repression, the militia with coarse weapons valiantly stood up and pledged to fight. Tran Van Giau and the Communist members in the Privy Council of Administration of the South had already taken refuge in the secured zone of Cho Dem, Long An area, south of Saigon. Pham Van Bach and his colleagues of the new Viet Minh Administration, on their turn, retreated to the secure zone. The resistance leaders were put into a crisis situation. On September 27, they met and formed the National Government to reorganize the Resistance. On the other side, the French were also in a dilemma. They wanted a cease-fire. Upon agreement of spiritual and national party leaders, on September 30, negotiations for a truce between French Colonel Repito Preneuf and Pham Van Bach, chairman of the new Privy Council, took place. A cease-fire was taken into effect. The militia forces were reorganized and regained control at several key positions. Taking advantage of the situation, the Viet Minh secretly searched for and seized political opponents. Among the victims were also the lawyer Duong Van Giao, Ho Van Nga, Dr. Ho Vinh Ky and his wife, Dr. Nguyen Thi Suong, Le Kim Ty, Lam Ngoc Duong, Truong Lap Tao, and many members of the Fourth International in the South.

Worthy of noting is the case of Ho Van Nga, the chairman of the Viet Nam Quoc Gia Doc Lap Dang (Vietnam National Independence Party). A sympathizer with the Viet Minh, Ho Van Nga had many times praised Tran Van Giau as"the one who was ready to serve the country" He was nevertheless arrested along with the members of the Resistance Committee for the Blockade of Saigon, Kha Vang Can, Nguyen Van Sam, and Tran Van An. He and other leaders, Vu Tam Anh, Nguyen Thanh Phuong (Cao Dai), and Tran Quang Vinh (Cao Dai) were detained in the same prison. The latter inmates evaded the prison out of a plot meditated by Nguyen Thanh Phuong. Ho Van Nga stayed.

The Viet Minh security police came to arrest Ho Van Nga while he was on sleep. He was imprisoned without intervention from his best friend, Tran Van Giau. Nearly half a year later, in 1946, Ho Van Nga was transferred to Rach Gia for execution. He was stabbed to death at Kim Quy Hon Da Bac. And, his body was released into the river without leaving a trace. Until his death, Ho Van Nga still believed Tran Van Giau would never cause him harm.

Members of the Fourth International, Phan Van Chanh, Nguyen Van So, Phan Van Hoa, Tran Van Si, Nguyen Van Soai, and Nguyen Van Tien were abducted and killed. They were buried alive at the Long Tao River, Binh Thuan Province. Ta Thu Thau, the leader of the group, was arrested, jailed, and executed at Tu Nghia District, Quang Ngai Province when he was on his way home in the South from Hanoi. He was presumably executed on the order of Tran Van Giau. Ta Thu Thau had treated Tran like his student while Tran was in Saigon and took care of him during his stay in France.

Operations to Eradicate Traitors

Trinh Hung Ngau recounted in his memoirs "To the Present and Future Generations," July 13, 1946, that Tran Van Giau disclosed to him Tran had ordered his men to execute approximately 2,500 national party cadres in the several months the Viet Minh were in power in the South in 1945. To execute their plan, the Viet Minh security police spread the rumor that the operation was targeted at the traitors. The vile scheme was aimed to blind the people and deviate public opinion from the truth. The hunt for traitors was carried out with arrests, abductions, and executions on false charges. The victim was difficult to escape death. A notice published on the Viet Minh press on September 8, 1945, specified that the administration was in the process of instituting an investigating commission whose aims were to examine into and denounce the crimes of the gang of traitors. The traitors would be brought to the People’s Court. They would be punished. Their properties and lands would be expropriated and given to poor people.

A Clean Pair of Heels

While the militia were fighting hard against the invaders in Saigon and the surrounding areas, Tran Van Giau and members of the Privy Council fled without a word to Cambodia. A People’s Council of Administration was created and led by Pham Ngoc Thach. The new organ, on its turn, moved to the rear area in Cho Dem, Long An Province. The purpose of the move was destined not to prepare for the resistance but to negotiate with the French for the sake of convenience, to deal with the enemy under favorable conditions. However, the negotiations lasted only 10 days and came to no result. The war spread. The People’s Council chose not to confront the enemy. They quietly retreated to Hau Giang (Bassac River plain). Some members in it evaded to Thailand, and Pham Ngoc Thach and the others, to Hanoi. Nguyen Binh was in full command of the Viet Minh troops.

In Saigon and elsewhere in the adjoining areas, the militia, and not the Viet Minh, sacrificed themselves for national cause. They used all kinds of weapons they had in hand to fight against the invaders. Subdued in face of a mighty military force, they were fast disbanded. The French Expeditionary Corps seized Thu Dau Mot, Bien Hoa, and My Tho, on October 25, Vinh Long, October 2, Can Tho, October 30, and Ca Mau, February 2, 1946.

In February 1946, the Viet Minh administration in Hanoi vested Nguyen Binh with full authority to reorganize the resistance.. Following his predecessors’ political practices, Nguyen wooed the resistance leaders to join the Viet Minh. Having experienced the malicious tricks of the Viet Minh in the past, they declined. Many expressed worries about Nguyen’s scheme. Le Van Vien, the leader of the Binh Xuyen forces, who had worked under the command of Nguyen Binh in Guerrilla zone 7 --Saigon and the adjoining areas--, had doubts about Nguyen’s thought and act. Le Van Vien left the guerrilla zone, returned to Saigon, and cooperated with the French to fight against the Viet Minh. Cao Dai and Hoa Hao military commanders, being aware of the use of tricky language that was common to the Communist-led Viet Minh were on their guard against this opportunist and broke relations with him.

A Term for Reconciliation

On March 6, 1946, the Viet Minh administration in Hanoi and the French compromised on a momus vivendi. The Viet Minh regained the commanding position. The Viet Minh in the South, this time, tried to win support of free-floating elements of Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, and political parties. Nguyen Van Thanh of Cao Dai, as a case in point, was lured into the maze. Quite a few religious dignitaries and Nationalists resisted. The conduct of bad faith of the Viet Minh made them examine into the past experiences They could not cooperate with the Viet Minh again as a result of their dishonesty. Having had distrust of the Viet Minh’s conduct, the Nationalists worked hard towards winning back their commanding position, neutralizing the Viet Minh’s monopoly of power. However, for national cause, they expressed their spirit of reconciliation by creating a National Front in which members of the two camps, the Nationalist and Communists, could represent and work to settle dispute. Only in this way could they unite themselves in the resistance against the French.

On April 2, 1946, leaders of Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Roman Catholicism, Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang, Viet Nam Doc Lap Quoc Gia Dang, Binh Xuyen, military commanders of the resistance forces and representatives of the Viet Minh met in a conference at Ba Queo, Cho Lon. On April 20, representatives of both sides elected leaders to the Supreme Commission for the Resistance. The Prophet Huynh Phu So of Hoa Hao was elected chairman; Vu Tam Anh (Resistance Militia), vice-chairman; Mai Tho Tran, (Communist) secretary; Le Trung Nghia (Resistance Forces), member in charge of propaganda; Huynh Van Tri (Binh Xuyen), member in charge of the military affairs. Elected as advisors were Pham Thieu (Communist), Pham Huu Duc (Communist), and Tran Van Lam (Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang).

The creation of the Front posed serious problems to the French. French neocolonialism was at stake. With millions of supporters and militiamen under its leadership, the Front could resist the French troops with force and reverse the situation. Being aware of this, the French changed their strategy, spearheading against the Front’s militia instead of focusing on eliminating the Viet Minh troops. In Saigon, French security police opened strings of search-through operations. Police checkpoints were posited at crossroads to arrest suspects. Liaison teams of the Front were fast disbanded. More than 150 members of the Front were arrested, among whom were the key leaders, Nguyen Trung Chanh and Nguyen Thanh Tan. French troops, at the same time, launched alternative attacks on the guerrilla bases at Ba Queo, Tho Dia, and Binh Hoa. Unable to resist, the Front militia were forced retreat to the Vietnamo-Cambodian borders. Those units that stayed had to operate their activities underground.

Seizing the opportunity, the Viet Minh, as always, accelerated their secret plan of actions, neutralizing the Front politically. They created the Hoi Lien Hiep Quoc Dan Viet Nam (The People’s Associations of Vienam) abbreviated as Lien Viet to replace the Front. Nguyen Binh and Pham Thieu, the key representatives of the Viet Minh in the Front, withdrew their representation. They broke relations with the Nationalists. Worse still, in the name of the Viet Minh administration in the South, they dissolved the Front. Successive political events with the expense of the Nationalists ensued. On February 26, 1946, France and China signed an agreement by which France returned to China Canton, the concession it had occupied in exchange of China’s agreement to let the French Expeditionary Corps land on the seaport of Haiphong, North Vietnam. In addition, on April 1, the French Expeditionary Corps replaced on agreement terms the Chinese Koumintang troops to assume the legitimate role of an Ally Army in North Vietnam.

In the South, the Viet Minh regained the commanding position, playing an upper hand over the Nationalists .In the North, Ho Chi Minh made volte face, eliminating the Nationalist leaders and destroying their organizations. Repression of the cadres and members of opposing parties was in full swing. In the South, the situation became exceedingly complicated. On March 26, the French authorities nominated Dr. Nguyen Van Thinh as the Prime Minister of the Nam Ky Tu Tri (Self-governed Administration of Cochinchina). Faced with the oppression of the French, on one side, and the repression of the Viet Minh, on the other, the leadership of the Front decided to withdraw its military forces from the guerrilla zones. They returned to Saigon where they believed they could confront the French, reactivating the resistance clandestinely.

The most active resistance force operating in Saigon composed largely of devout members of Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. although a number of it still served under the command of Nguyen Binh in accordance with the terms upon which the Front and the Viet Minh had agreed. Because of this, the resistance force fought in a difficult situation. Having had clear and thorough knowledge of the Nationalists’ new strategy, the French tightened control on the Front’s activities. Operations of terrorism were activated. Members of the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and other elements having ties with the resistance were arrested and jailed. To their disadvantage, the Front lacked a rear area where it could find human and material resources. Finally, the Front leaders had, again, to change strategy, to withdraw its forces to Tay Ninh in the west, where the Cao Dai enjoyed great popular support, and Hau Giang (Bassac River plains) where the Hoa Hao had a solid army of militiamen and a rear area abound in human resources and fertile lands.

In a concerted effort to prevent the French’s recrudescence of colonialism and the Viet Minh’s hostile practices against them, Nationalist personalities among whom were Nguyen Van Sam, Tran Van An, Nguyen Bao Toan, Le Van Thu, Lam Van Tet, and Dang Van Ky, called for the creation of a union. They urged on leaders and personalities who had disassociated themselves from the French to join in it to fight against both the French invaders and deal with the Viet Minh aggressors.

On February 27, 1947, the Mat Tran Quoc Gia Thong Nhat Toan Quoc (Pan-Vietnam National Union) was created in Nannin, China. In the South of Vietnam, the conflict between the Viet Minh and the Nationalists was at its height. In the western provinces, clashes between the military forces of the two sides happened anywhere and at anytime. At the beginning of April 1947, the military forces of Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Dai Viet, Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang and Binh Xuyen occupied Dong Thap Muoi (Plains of Rush), transforming it into a guerrilla zone. On their move, the militia were caught under crossfire by roadside ambushes of the Viet Minh and under raid on inland waterways by French air-force.

To ease the tension that generated constant bloodshed, the Viet Minh and the Nationalists agreed to negotiate on a dialog of reconciliation. The Prophet Huynh Phu So was prearranged to meet with the representatives of the Viet Minh at Tan Phu, Dong Thap Muoi. On the night of April 16, 1947, when approaching the rendez-vous, the founder of Hoa Hao was all of a sudden entrapped in an ambush. He was abducted to unknown whereabouts and disappeared thereafter. Assassinations of key leaders of the Union by the Viet Minh resurfaced. Dr. Tran Van Tan was assassinated in Gia Dinh, in November 1947. Bloody clashes between the Viet Minh and the Nationalist resumed.

Thousands of Hoa Hao Buddhists were abducted and killed. Along the boundaries of the Phu Thuan and Long Thanh villages were found three collective graveyards at each of which more than 200 Hoa Hao Buddhists had been executed on vengeance by the Viet Minh. They were stabbed, hand-tied and eye-folded, then dumped into the ditches. Passers-by, two or three days later, still heard the groaning and moaning of the dying. They were only half-buried! The victims were portrayed as bloodthirsty bandits and killers. A temple was built in dedication to the martyrs. After the fall of South Vietnam in April 1975, the local Communist authorities destroyed the worship-place. Tran Kieu, who was the secretary of General Tran Van Soai of Hoa Hao, kept full documents of more than 11,000 martyrs who were killed before and after the Tay An Co Tu (Tay An Old Temple) massacre on April 16, 1947. (Interview with Hong Van Hoanh, April 1992)

The Cao Dai Church suffered similar tragedy. Following the days of the August uprisings in 1945, the Viet Minh in Quang Ngai massacred as many as 4,000 Cao Dai followers. Hundreds of them were buried alive in collective graves along the bank of Ve River and at the foot of Ve Bridge. Witnesses reported a total of about 6,000 Cao Dai followers being executed in the Cu Chi and Trang Bang areas, east of the Tay Ninh Township. Collective graves with thousands of remains of the victims killed by the Viet Minh were found in the Tra Cao area, Tay Ninh Province. (Vo Dinh Tan, December 1991).

Witnesses in Tay Ninh related that on the eve of the Lunar New Year’s Day of Dinh Hoi (1947), the Viet Minh burned down all the houses and killed an uncounted number of innocent Cao Dai followers of the 50 hamlets in the Long Thanh area. The tragedy took place when the Viet Minh troops were on their way of retreat to San Cu Bau De Mountains after they failed to make attack on the Tay Ninh Holy See. The massacre still imprints on the memory of the survivors with the slaughter of Nguyen Van Dien, Thi Van Loc, Do Hoang Gian, and his wife and their two children. After they had executed Nguyen Van Dien, the murderers searched through his body. They found only some pieces of precious metal. Angrily, they threw the body into a ditch nearby. With a machete, they cut off Do’s and his wife’s head. Angered by loud cries, they threw Do’s 4- and 2-years children into the burning flames. Thi van Loc was found lying disemboweled in a forest nearby several days later (Vo Ha Quyen, 1985:11-12)

"The love for life and faith in Goodness," the Reverend Le Van Mang of Cao Dai contended, "are manifest in the Cao Dai Writ and the Holy Messages from the Supreme Cao Dai. Cao Dai followers are brothers and sisters to themselves and members of the same family to others. We preach peace for everyone, for the Viet Minh. During the Idochina War (1946-1954), His Holiness Pham Cong Tac and Cao Dai dignitaries saved hundreds of thousand Communist cadres and followers from persecution by the French. By that time, there was no clear indication as to whether the Viet Minh were the believers of bad faith. Atheism pervaded, and the devils were victorious. Only Ho Chi Minh himself knew he was a Communist. His goal was to transform Vietnam into a Communist country. Anyone who disagreed with him was anti-Viet Minh. As a consequence, he was reactionary and put to death. Cao Dai believers were a target for elimination. No one really knows how many brothers and sisters of ours were abducted and killed. In the archives on file prepared for the canonization of Cao Dai believers who died for their faith during the first years of the resistance war, we have a list of 1,271 martyrs.

Millions of Cao Dai followers lived under threat. To protect the lives of Cao Dai adepts and fellow countrymen who only had their bare hands to resist the atrocious Viet Minh, his Excellency Tran Quang Vinh, with the approval from His Holiness Pham Cong Tac, signed an agreement with the French authorities in the South. The terms served a twofold purpose. One, they would help the innocent from being arrested without a reason during a French military operation. Two, they gave ordinary people an instrument for self-defense by means of which they could fight against both the Viet Minh aggressors and the French invaders. It was not an easy task to do, however. The French authorities had doubts as to whether Cao Dai believers were loyal to them because they themselves were patriotic and revolutionary. Because of this, for twenty militiamen, only one was equipped with a rifle. In Long An Province, several thousand men had only one rifle. However, with determination, Cao Dai followers stood firm. (Van Chuong, September, 1991)

Having suffered tragic losses inflicted on them by the French troops’ attacks and the Viet Minh’s repression, the two largest Nationalist military forces, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, were forced to fight on the defensive and guerrilla warfare tactics. The groups of militiamen under the command of Trinh Minh. the military groups under the leadership of Le Quang Vinh, and the militiamen under the direction of Nguyen Giac Ngo retreated to their guerrilla zones. Trinh Minh The and his fellow fighters occupied the That Son Mountains, Le Quang Vinh and his warriors operated their military activities in the swampy U Minh areas, and Nguyen Giac Ngo and his fighters, to marshy areas in the Bassac River plains. These leaders pledged to fight against the French invaders and the Communist Viet Minh aggressors. Other groups returned to the French-occupied zones and risked their lives to operate their clandestine activities.

　

　

　

　

　

　

　

　

　

　

　

　

　

　

　

　

THE VIET MINH SEIZURE OF POWER (1945)

　

　

　

In 1942, Ho Chi Minh distanced himself from the Cach Menh Dong Minh Hoi (Vietnam Alliance for Revolution) known as Viet Cach and founded the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Vietnam Alliance for Independence) abbreviated as Viet Minh. Thereafter, this Communist-led organization succeeded in laying the foundations for two guerrilla bases, one in Dinh Ca, Thai Nguyen Province and the other in Bac Son, Lang Son Province. Two platoons of guerrillas were formed; one was led by Phung Chi Kien, a graduate from Whampoo Military Academy, China, and the other, by Vo Nguyen Giap, a history teacher at Thang Long High School, Hanoi. Phung Chi Kien got killed in a confrontation with the Japanese troops, and the platoon under his command was disbanded. Faced with a possible disastrous incident, Vo Nguyen Giap and his group found their way to `Bao Luc to seek refuge in China.

After several months of active redress, Vo Nguyen Giap’s troops returned to Vietnam. They were then quickly developed from a platoon into a company, and a battalion. This small army comprised mostly armed squads of propaganda They were the only military force the Viet Minh had acquired at hand by the time the August uprisings were about to take place. It was relatively a small unit of armed men as compared to the greater and more powerful armed militia of the Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang (Greater Vietnam National Party) and the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang Vietnam National Party).

While the Viet Minh military force was in its infancy, DVQDD and VNQDD had founded bases for clandestine activities and military training. Ever since 1942, the DVQDD had succeeded in forming groups of militiamen that operated in various areas in the midlands of North Vietnam. The guerrilla groups at Kep base, Bac Giang Province, conducted secret military activities under the command of Vu Dinh Huyen. After the coup d’etat of March 9, 1945, the DVQDD guerrillas operated openly all along the vast area, from Bac Giang, and Bac Ninh to Lang Son on the Vietnamo - Chinese border. On March 15, 1945, the Military School of Lac Trieu was established with the task to train officers and noncommissioned officers for the party troops, particularly for the militia operating in the mining and coastal areas of Dong Trieu and Quang Yen. In Yen Bay Province, where DVQDD seized the control, Tran Quoc Tuan iMfantry Academy was founded. It received and trained as many as 500 cadets, most of whom were students and college graduates. The DVQDD militia grew rapidly with the coming into Vietnam of the Chinese Koumintang troops under the command of Lu Han and Tsiao Yan in September 1945. The militiamen under the command of Vu Kim Thanh that returned from China joined the DVQDD troops, raising the number of militiamen to ten thousand. The White Star Division was formed. This joint national forces controlled the vast coastal areas of Tien Yen, Mong Cay, Cam Pha, Hon Gay, Dong Trieu, and Pha Lai.

Although under violent oppression of the French colonialists, VNQDD survived with tenacity. After the bloody repression in the white terror, the revolt of Phuc Quoc Quan led by Tran Trung Lap in Lang Son in 1940, the uprisings in Nghe An and Do Luong in 1941, and continual unrest in Saigon, Can Tho Rach Gia, Bac Lieu, and Dong Thap Muoi in 1940-1942, veteran revolutionary figures among whom were the partisans of VNQDD were hunted down. A number of them had to evade the country and sought asylum overseas. Most of them. however, stayed in the country and fought in hiding. All activities of the party at the base in the provinces in the Center and the North, went underground.

The struggle for national independence rose as in a tide after the Japanese coup d’etat of March 9, 1945. Party mem,bers of VNQDD engaged in open activities in Quang Nam, Nam Dinh, Son Tay, Vinh Yen, Phu Tho, Viet Tri, Lang Son, Hanoi, Haiphong, Dong Trieu, Mong Cay, and Lang Son. They soon turned the fight for independence into an anti-Viet Minh struggle when the Viet Minh to all intents monopolized the power and used violence to eliminate the national parties and groups from the political scene. Trom Quang Ngai to Lang Son guerrilla zones were quickly formed with anew task, to fight, this time, against both the Viet Minh and the French, who had returned to Vietnam with intent to reoccupy the country.

The Viet Minh became a myth in the struggle for independence against the French colonialists and Japanese Fascists as soon as they successfully made contacts with the Americans at the close of World War II. In November 1944, Ho Chi Minh received arms and ammunitions from the British Army and a group of American businessmen in Indochina in addition to the meager amount of weapons he had acquired from the OSS in China. He had provided the American team with intelligence information, for instance, the traces of some pilots of the planes shot down in Indochina by the Japanese. Within a short period of time, they stood out among other resistance organizations in the country as a pivotal force that had had connections with the Allies and gained their recognition. Enjoying this prestige, the Viet Minh attracted to their side large groups of people from all walks of life who at the moment were thirsty for national independence.

The Viet Minh easily gained warmest popular support. They equally gained ground on other national political parties and groups in their justifications as a prestigious organization that fought for national cause. Above all, ,they ouywitted their opponents in operating propaganda activities. Their clandestine press, the journals Quan Du Kich (The Sniper), Co Giai Phong (The Liberators), and Cuu Quoc (National Salvation) enjoyed immense readership. They were equally acclaimed among the intellectuals of Hanoi, particularly, the democrats, Vu Dinh Hoe, Duong Duc Hien, and Phan Anh, and the socialists, Nguyen Xien and his group. These two groups became later the backbone elements that served the Viet Minh in the propagation of the ideals of the revolution. Quite a few of opportunists and hooligans joined in the Viet Minh movement and formed the largest obedient contingent in the Viet Minh Front onwards.

The victory of the Allies in Europe gave genuine impetus to the struggle for independence of the Vietnamese people. The thirst for it was so great. Hope and jubilation permeated the hearts and minds of the whole population, fascinating the old and the young and binding everyone to a cause. The people wished for change, getting off the life of bondage. They would follow whoever that could lead them to victory, to gain national independence. The fight against the French colonialists and Japanese Fascists by the militia of various revolutionary parties and groups sparked here and there in the mountainous regions in North Vietnam Soon after the surrender of Japan to the Allies in the Pacific Ocean on August 15, uprisings motivated by political parties and groups spread in the North and the South of the country.

In the North

In Hanoi, on August 17, the Lien Doan Cong Chuc (League of Civil Servants), out of the ins inspiration of the Dai Viet Dan Chinh (Greater Vietnam Civil Servants and Citizens Party) of Nguyen Tuong Tam and the Doan Thanh Nien Quoc Gia Xa Hoi (National Association of Youths for Social Services) of Nguyen Xuan Chu, organized a meeting in front of the Municipal Theater to demonstrate the wish for independence of the people and support the Tran Trong Kim government. The just cause attracted tens of thousand people. Worming themselves through the crowds, Viet Minh agit-props of the armed squads of propaganda spread news of a true demonstration under the direction of the Viet Minh, to make a revolution. The day was August 19, and the place was, again, the Municipal Theater. Revolution was to everyone something new and intriguing, evoking a change for a new life, a bondage-free life! People whispered the news in one another’ s ears. The masses were fascinated by it. People had one day to prepare for it. Just with flags and banners.

On August 19, a colossal meeting took place at Hanoi Municipal Theater. In the early morning, hundreds of thousand people coming from all directions had already gathered in front of the theater. The Viet Minh, within a moment, took the commanding role. and their cadres maneuvered with ease the event. There were chants of slogans and shouts of acclaim At eight o’clock, some cadres appeared in front of a microphone stand and read some sort of declarations, which were heard in tiny voice through the loudspeakers. A thunder of cheers rose on manipulation of the agit-props. People went wild as Viet Minh red-and-yellow-star flags suddenly floated around. And, with the Viet Minh vanguards’ maneuver, the meeting instantly turned into a march demonstration.

The demonstrators in waves marched to the Viceroy’s Palace. They marched while chanting slogans. At the palace, the Viet Minh delegates met with Dr. Nguyen Xuan Chu, the head administrator of the Royal Court of Hue in North Vietnam. The Viet Minh insisted on a transfer of power. The administrator refused with firm determination. The dialog between the two parties came to a dead end. Exchange of harsh words went on. The loyal administrator refused to give in although under threat. Nevertheless, the highest royal official, who was helpless and had no one around but himself to deal with the situation. He was finally subdued not by violence but out of clemency. He resigned to let the Viet Minh representatives did what they wished. He did not have the heart to order the national guards within his authority to fire at his innocent fellow citizens. The reception was over. The Viet Minh declared they had seized the administration.

Taking advantage of their victory, under the direction of the General Uprisings Committee, the demonstrators marched towards the military barracks on Dong Khanh Street where the Japanese troops stationed to seize the military power. There, they met with the firm stance of the Japanese soldiers on guard. The gate was tightly shut. Machine-guns were ready to fire. The demonstrators closed in and tightened their circle in front of the barracks, creating road blocks from Cho Hom Market to Dong Khanh Street. Someone threw bricks at the Japanese on watch at Cho Hom - Ham Long crossroads. They instantly retaliated with gunshots. Two people got wounded. Shouts of "fight! fight!" surfaced from the masses. At the gate of the barracks, a young student, in a show of bravery, rushed to the wall, tried to jump over it, and got shot. Within minutes, Japanese tanks were sent in, blocking the main entrances to the barracks to form a barrage in front of it to control public order. From then on, no one was allowed to get in or out.

The crowds became perplexed. Many people intended to leave but didn’t know how to get out of the place. Outside the barrage, mothers were hurriedly looking for their children. The crowds hustled all around for a withdrawal. Chaos was about to happen when the national flag in the barracks was lowered, and a Viet Minh flag was hoisted in its place. A thunder of cheers rose as the Japanese tanks prepared to retreat. The Viet Minh had seized the military power from the Japanese! Within hours, the Viet Minh  cadres declared they  had taken the power by force. 

The plain truth is that a pro-Japanese Vietnamese had successfully got inside the barracks and negotiated for a solution with Kawada, the Japanese officer in command. His solution was simple: to restore public order with an symbolical act, to replace the national flag with a Viet Minh flag This would relieve tension and thus make the crowds disband. The proposal was accepted by the Japanese central command in the city. No Viet Minh representatives were present at the event. They had disappeared.

At the front doors of the Municipal Theater, a memorial service honoring the death of the brave youth who died for national cause was conducted and attended by a huge crowd. His betrothed lover was introduced at the ceremony. The lady was Ph. Th. Th. She was years afterwards the very famous singer Th. H.

In the Center

On March 9, 1945, the Japanese Army in Indochina staged a coup d’etat, overthrowing its servile administration with French Admiral Decoux at the head. Vietnam was nominally given back independence. French-instituted Emperor Bao Dai was still entrusted the authority to rule the country. On March 11, the emperor declared Vietnam was an independent country and annulled the unequal treaties it had signed with France on June 6, 1882 and August 15, 1884. The Tran Trong Kim Cabinet was created on April 17 and resigned from office on August 7 for the failures in the incapacity to rule.

The Tran Trong Kim Cabinet, in truth, had faced with all kinds of difficulties in external and internal affairs. The Japanese Army still held the power to rule and exercised control on it in every aspect. The short-lived cabinet, on the one hand, had to fight beside the Japanese authorities for a competent administration. It made every effort, on the other hand, to redress an ailing economy devastated by the war and the unprecedented hunger that had killed two million people, to reform a frail military defense. and to flatten out a seriously corrupt officialdom. Chaos reigned over the country. The Premier also faced with a political situation that entangled the country in a dilemma. He made contacts with personalities and groups of prestige for solution, including the Communist-led Viet Minh with whom he thought he could find compromise. The letter organization, through its representative, refused to cooperate with the government and vowed to fight against it for its ideology, instead.

The Royal Court o Hue reached an impasse with the Viet Minh’s refusal to compromise. The Honorable Ngo Dinh Khoi, in his letter to the Royal Court, proposed the emperor to seek support from the Japanese, asking them for a transfer of their arms and ammunitions with which the government could confront the Viet Minh. He nevertheless refused the invitation of the emperor to form a royal cabinet in replacement of the Tran Trong Kim government. His brother, the former Royal Minister for the Interior Ngo Dinh Diem was mentioned to be the right personality in this position, instead. It was not an easy task, nonetheless.

On August 19, Emperor Bao Dai urged on the people to support him to defend national independence and the interests of the country. The following day, he sent a wire to General De Gaulle of France demanding the latter political figure to give up the intention to return to Indochina and reoccupy Vietnam. He also wired to President Truman of the United States of America, requesting the latter personality to intervene in De Gaulle’s intention to return to Vietnam. His efforts came to no avail, nevertheless.

The Viet Minh mounted pressure on the Royal Court of Hue. They fomented popular uprisings in the provinces of the Center. Protests resounded almost everywhere. In Hue, tens of thousand demonstrators incited by veteran Communists, Ton Quang Phiet and To Huu among others, demanded Emperor Bao Dai to abdicate and cede power to the Viet Minh. The emperor, through the mediation of his chief of office Pham Khac Hoe, a Viet Minh follower, agreed in the last resort to invite the Viet Minh to form a government. Nevertheless, from Hanoi the Viet Minh-led Privy Government demanded the emperor to abdicate.

On August 24, at the suggestion of Pham Khac Hoe, Emperor Bao Dai decided to abdicate. He admitted that the Viet Minh were a new competent political force. On August 30, Tran Huy Lieu who represented the Viet Minh government accepted the transfer of power from the emperor himself..

In the South

In Saigon, the situation was much more complex. After the coup d’etat of March 9, 1945, the Japanese authorities still maintained the French colonial administrative machinery, regardless of Japan’s official recognizance of Vietnam as an independent country. The Japanese Ambassador Yokohama replaced Admiral Jean Decoux as Governor General of Indochina. Tasukamoto headed the administration in North Vietnam as Residential Governor. in the South, Minoda replaced Pages, acting as the Governor of Cochinchina. Iido replaced Ducoroy and seized the control of the Tong Doan Thanh Nien The Thao (Youth General Associations for Sports), an active organization that played a role in the social life. South Vietnam, apart, remained a colony. Minoda specifically declared that no indigenous political parties or groups could participate in the new administration. All government agencies and services remained to be in existence, and all the actual laws remained to be in effect. Faced with the new arising difficulties, Vietnamese political personalities and leaders of parties and organizations who had received some sort of protection from the Japanese authorities reacted passionately. They made every attempt to influence the Japanese authorities to gain back the country’s suzerainty.

The days following the coup d’etat created favorable conditions for the struggle for national independence. Such personalities as Tran Trong Kim, Tran Van An, and Duong Van Giao who had lived in exile overseas, returned to the country. Political figures and spiritual leaders of the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang, the Fourth International, the Cao Dai, and the Hoa Hao met and discussed plans of action. The Mat Tran Quoc Gia Thong Nhat (National United Front) came into existence. At the beginning of June, at the Vuon Ong Thuong (Saigon City Park) the organization succeeded in organizing a masses demonstration that attracted tens of thousand supporters. A ceremony in commemoration of the death of the veteran revolutionary Duong Ba Trac, who had died while on political refuge in Singapore, was proceeded. Speeches activating patriotism and the struggle for national suzerainty were delivered and warmly acclaimed.

On August 14 and 15, two atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On August 16, Japan surrendered to the Allies. On August 16, the national parties and groups of Mat Tran Quoc Gia Thong Nhat comprising the five major political organizations in the South--Phuc Quoc Dong Minh Hoi (League for National Restoration), Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang (Greater Vietnam National Party), Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen officially declared the will to serve the national cause. Four divisions of people from all walks of life were enlisted to serve the country. With a good sweep over Saigon, these forces took all the offices and military positions previously held by the Japanese army. On August 19, the Viceroy Nguyen Van Sam, came to Saigon. In his capacity as the head of the administration of the South, he immediately initiated negotiations with the Japanese to take the arms and ammunitions in their possession to secure public order and national defense.

The situation became complicated after the abdication of Emperor of Bao Dai and his transfer of power to the Viet Minh in Hue. The leaders of the National United Front was cornered at the dead end. In addition, the Youth General Associations for Sports suddenly deviated from its course of actions. From an apolitical organization, it turned into a political force. The new orientation was "to serve the country and sacrifice for national independence." The command was placed in the hands of the Communist-orientated medical doctor Pham Ngoc Thach. The latter doctor replaced Iido to direct the organization on the recommendation to the Japanese authorities of Ho Van Nga, the leader of the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dang (Vietnam Independence Party) on August 15. Nevertheless, Pham Ngoc Thach did not assume his role and placed it unconditionally under the leadership of the Viet Minh, instead. The organization was quickly transformed into a political instrument with the expense of the national parties and groups. It became a backbone of the obsolete Viet Minh military force thereafter.

By that time, Tran Van Giau, the Viet Minh politics commissioner in the South, proposed to the National United Front leadership to join the Viet Minh Front to serve national cause, to struggle for the support of the Allies and to cope with the new situation, as the French colonialists prepared to return to Vietnam. On August 23, to show its good wiill and spirit of national concord, leaders of the National United Front agreed in a meeting to disband its military forces and transferred the military command to the Viet Minh. All of a sudden, on August 25, there appeared on a large wood-board in the center of Saigon on which was posted a list of a 9-member Privy Council of Administration of South Vietnam. Eight members in it were Communist and procommunist, and one member was independent. This supercilious attitude of the Viet Minh was an act of impudence to the leaders of the National United Front. The Viet Minh had flatly negated the role of the nationalists. to monopolize power to the detriment of the national parties and groups. Such personalities as Vu Tam Anh, Le Kim Ty (Cao Dai), Pham Huu Duc (Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang), Ho Van Nga (Viet Nam Quoc Gia Doc Lap Dang), Nguyen Van Huong (Dai Viet), Huynh Phu So (Hoa Hao), Ho Vinh Ky, Lam Ngoc Duong, Huynh Van Phuong, and Duong Van Biao met and discussed measures to deal with the Communists.

In his briefing to the audience on August 23, Duong Van Giao presented with evidences relating to acts of treason of Tran Van Giau. In early 1944, when Tran Van Giau was jailed by the French at Ba Ra he met a fellow comrade, Duong Bach Mai. The latter inmate was transferred while under detention from the sea-island Poulo Condore. Duong disclosed to Tran that he was brought back to the inland jail on predisposition by the French security police for an anti-Japan scheme. Right at that night, Duong Bach Mai and Tran Van Giau were brought to Saigon to carry out the secret plan. The Nationalists demanded in a meeting the Privy Administration to clarify the situation. A joint session of negotiation was held at the School of Arts at Gia Dinh to settle the dispute. The Communists took a step backwards. Tran Van Giau resigned from his position as chairman of the Privy Council of Administration and held the second position in it. Pham Van Bach of the Viet Nam Quoc Gia Doc Lap Dang became the chairman.

On September 2, a march demonstration to mark the Day of Independence took place on Catinat Street Saigon. The Catholic priest Tricoire was killed by a gunshot from the French Club across the street while standing in the City Cathedral of the Dame. Seizing the opportunity, the security police under the direction of Duong Bach Mai arrested some 200 Europeans and French nationals. Taking advantage of the chaotic situation, a number of hooligans rushed in and pillaged the French and Chinese stores. Disorder spread, and the Viet Minh failed to control the situation.

Elsewhere in the cities, from the North to the South, officials and officers of the royal administration at public offices and services and military commands, abiding by the order of the emperor, voluntarily and readily ceded the authority to the Viet Minh. Some clashes between the Viet Minh and the royal authorities happened here and there, but no serious confrontation took place. Few Viet Minh cadres but a large number of opportunists and hooligans played a role and assumed the responsibility to rule. In the countryside, the seizure of the power took place in chaos. No one knew who the Viet Minh really were, and virtually no resistance to Viet Mnh occupation of public offices and services occurred. The Viet Minh themselves did not even know what they were supposed to do with the administration at hand. Local cadres fumbled their way in the provinces, and so did the central administration in Hanoi. Abductions and killings of opponents activated by either side of the struggle for power occurred almost daily until the resistance war broke out.

RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION

The religions were ever targeted with severe restrictions and elimination. In the first years of the Resistance War (1946-1954) against the French, the Communists in the South under the leadership of Tran Van Giau had carried out plans of execution to eliminate the leaders of the Cao Dai Church and Hoa Hao Buddhism. His Excellency Tran Quang Vinh of Cao Dai was abducted and escaped execution. The Prophet Huynh Phu So, the founder of Hoa Hao Buddhism, was entrapped in an ambush and killed. During the guerrilla war for the liberation of the South Vietnam (1956-1975), the Communists delayed their plans, realizing that it was an ill-time to do this. Nevertheless, as soon as they took over the South Vietnam in April 1975, they resumed their plans. This time, they aggressively dismantled, not only the two indigenous Churches but also all other religions.

To begin with, they confiscated all religious, social, educational, and cultural establishments. Religious activities, and religious practices were subjected to restrictions. Religious intolerance was harsh. Dignitaries, priests, and prominent followers were treated with discrimination, hatred, and detention. On November 11, 1975, only six months after the Communists took control of the South Vietnam, the Venerable Thich Tue Hien and eleven monks and nuns of the Duoc Su Pagoda in Can Tho Province immolated themselves by fire in protest of the government's repressive policy against the religion. The Catholic Archbishop Coadjutor Nguyen Van Thuan of the Saigon prelacy was taken into custody. The Archbishop of Hue Nguyen Kim Diem was placed under surveillance. The Hoa Hao Buddhist dignitary Luong Trong Tuong and his wife were imprisoned for unknown reasons. Fourteen Catholic priests and followers of the St. Vincent Cathedral on Tran Quoc Toan Street, Saigon, were arrested for unfounded charges. The Reverend Nguyen Huu Nghi and two former officers of the Republic of Vietnam, Nguyen Duc Hung and Nguyen Viet Hung were given the death sentence without trial.

Religious persecution escalated and became increasingly rude with the arrest of the Catholic priests and the confiscation of the abbey of the Dong Dong Cong (Order of the Mother Coredemptrix) at Thu Duc, Ho Chi Minh City, in 1987. Hundreds of priests were detained and imprisoned because of profession of faith and religious practices or for unfounded reasons. Among them were Mgsr. Nguyen Van Nam, the Reverend Nguyen Van De, the Reverend Le Thanh Que, the Reverend Joseph Nguyen Cong Doan, Pastor Dinh Thien Thu, Pastor Nguyen Ngoc Anh, Pastor R' Mah Boi, Pastor Tran Dinh Ai, Pastor Tran The Thien Phuoc, Pastor Vo Xuan, the Venerable Thich Quang Do, the Venerable Thich Duc Nhuan, the Venerable Thich Thong Buu, the Venerable Thich Huyen Quang, the Venerable Thich Tri Sieu, and the Venerable Thich Tue Sy.

International organizations raised concerns over the violations of the rights of man in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The victims of religious intolerance were honored, their cause was justified, and the intervention for their release was affected. Many priests, pastors, and monks were recognized as the prisoners of conscience by International Amnesty. They faced arbitrary sentences and suffered unjust detention:

The Catholic priest Tran Ba Loc was arrested in 1975 and detained at Nhu Xuan reeducation camp, Thanh Hoa Province, North Vietnam. The Catholic priest Nguyen Thai Sanh was arrested in 1975 and detained at Nhu Xuan reeducation camp, Thanh Hoa Province, North Vietnam. The Catholic priest Nguyen Van Ky was arrested in 1983 and detained at Ba Sao reeducation camp, Ha Nam Ninh Province, North Vietnam. The Catholic lawyer Nguyen Khac Chinh was arrested in 1975 and detained at Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Province, South Vietnam. The Buddhist monk Thich Huyen Quang was placed under house arrest in 1982 at Quang Nghia Village, Nghia Binh Province, Central Vietnam. The Buddhist monk Thich Quang Do was placed under house arrest in 1982 at Vu Thu Village, Thai Binh Province, North Vietnam. The Buddhist monk Thich Duc Nhuan was arrested in 1985, then in 1988 and sentenced to 10 years in prison. The Buddhist monk Thich Tri Sieu was arrested in 1984, sentenced to 20 years in prison, and detained at Xuan Loc reeducation camp, Dong Nai Province, South Vietnam. The Buddhist monk Thich Tue Sy was arrested in 1984, sentenced to 20 years in prison, and detained at Xuan Loc reeducation camp, Phu Khanh Province, Central Vietnam. The Buddhist monk Thich Nguyen Giac was arrested in 1984. The Buddhist monk Thich Thien Tan was arrested in 1978, sentenced to life imprisonment, and detained at Xuan Phuoc reeducation camp, Phu Khanh Province, Central Vietnam. The Buddhist monk Thich Phuc Vien was arrested in 1980, sentenced to 20 years in prison, and detained at Xuan Phuoc reeducation camp, Phu Khanh Province, Central Vietnam. Pastor Vo Xuan was arrested in June 1975 and detained in a reeducation camp until 1987. The Reverend was re-arrested on December 12, 1989, and detained at Thuan Hai Province. Pastor Tran Xuan Tu was arrested in 1985 and sentenced to three years of reeducation, (his term in prison was extended to three other additional years in 1990, and he was detained at an unknown forced labor camp (Amnesty International 1992).

A list of 10 pastors of the Vietnamese Evangelical Christian Churches recognized the cases of arrest and detention:

The Reverend Vo Xuan was arrested in June 1975 and detained in camp until April 1987. The Reverend Tran Xuan Tu was arrested in 1985 and sentenced to 3 years of reeducation. His prison term was extended to three other additional years. In 1990, he was detained at Vo Dat forced labor camp in Ham Tan District, Thuan Hai Province. The Reverend Vo Minh Hung was arrested in December 1989 and detained at Camp A20, Dong Xuan District, Phu Yen Province. The Reverend Tran The Thien Phuoc was arrested in November 1989 and detained at Camp Tong Le Chan, Song Be Province. The Reverend had never received a trial. The Reverend Dinh Thien Tu was arrested on February 22, 1991 and detained at Chi Hoa prison, Ho Chi Minh City. The Reverend Tran Dinh Ai was arrested on February 27, 1991 and detained at Chi Hoa prison, Ho Chi Minh City. The Reverend Tran Mai was arrested in October 1991 and detained at Phan Dang Luu prison, Ho Chi Minh City. The Reverend R'Man Boi was arrested in August 1989 and detained at Camp A20, Dong Xuan District, Phu Yen Province. The Reverend Ya Tiem was arrested in August 1990 and detained at Dalat, Lam Dong Province, Central Highlands. The Reverend R'Mah Loan was arrested in June 1991 and detained in Ban Me Thuot, Dac Lac Province, Central Highlands (Indochina Journal, January 1992).

Asia Watch was among the first Western human rights groups to visit Vietnam (mid-March 1993). A Vietnamese official, who requested anonymity, said that the U. S. - based human rights organization checked the civil rights in Vietnam. However, it did not put out a number of political prisoners in the camps it visited. Western diplomats estimated between 100 and 300 political prisoners. News that reached Vietnam Human Rights Watch in February 1993 said that, at the Thu Duc Camp near Saigon only, there were at least 1,000 political prisoners. They were all subjected to strict discipline measures.

Sources from the Office of the Propagation of the Buddhist Faith in Exile in Paris announced in March 1994 that approximately 2,000 political prisoners, be convicted or not, were under detention in various labor camps or prisons in South Vietnam. From 400 to 500 hundred political prisoners were detained at Camp A20 in Xuan Phuoc, Phu Yen Province. About 600 political prisoners were detained at Camp Z30 D & C in Gia Trung, Central Highlands. About 400 political prisoners at Camp Z30 A in Gia Rai, Pleiku Province. Nearly 400 political prisoners were detained at Camp C3 Suoi Mau in Dong Nai Province. Sources also specified with proofs that among the political prisoners at Camp K3 Suoi Mau were the Buddhist Monks Thich Tri Sieu Le Manh That (20 years in prison), Thich Tam Tri Huynh Van Ba (20 years in prison), Thich Tam Can Nguyen Van Tinh (20 years in prison), Thich Hue Dang Nguyen Ngoc Dai (20 years in prison), Thich Nguyen Giac Nguyen Dung (20 years in prison), Thich Thanh Tinh Hoang Van Giang (not convicted), the citizen Nguyen Van Tho (not convicted), citizen Tran Van Tu (not convicted), the citizen Nguyen Van Hoang (not convicted), and the citizen Nguyen Van Trung (not convicted).

The political prisoner Pham Van Thanh (1992) requested the United Nations Commission on Human Rights: To investigate into the deaths of the religious dignitaries, specifically the cases with the Venerable Thich Thien Minh, Buddhist monk, who died at Camp 20; the Most Venerable Thich Tri Thu, Buddhist monk, who died at Thong Nhat Hospital; the Reverend Nguyen Van Vang, Catholic priest who died while under solitary confinement in 1986; and the Reverend Minh, Catholic priest of the St. Vincent Cathedral, who died under solitary confinement in 1986

In a communication dated August 10, 1993, addressed to the Government of Vietnam, the Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Commission on the Implementation of the Declaration of the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion of Belief brought to the attention of the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the United Nations the following information (E/CN, 4/1993, para. 68):

"According to the information received, the practice of religions is subjected to severe restrictions. It has been reported that no one can openly practice religion as a priest or minister without the Government's approval of candidates for ordination and enrollment in seminaries. Restrictions in the exercise of religious freedoms are said to have affected the holding of religious services, gatherings and retreats, religious education and the publication of materials. It has also been reported that sermons are subjected to Government approval and that any type of proselytizing is prohibited.

The Government has already made attempts to unify religious groups by establishing State-sponsored religious associations such as the Committee for the Solidarity of Patriotic Vietnamese Catholics, the Union of Patriotic Priests, the Protestant Association, and the Vietnam Buddhist Church, the only officially recognized Buddhist organization. It has been alleged that growing numbers of clergy as well as religious activists have been imprisoned since 1989 because of their religious beliefs. It has also been reported that the Government had launched a particularly intensive campaign against religious leaders between April and September 1990.

A new decree on the regulation of religious activities passed in May 1991 reportedly stipulates that any nominations to religious office, travel abroad by members of the Vietnamese clergy and visits to Vietnam by representatives of foreign religious organizations, religious meetings such as regional and national conferences, and the opening of religious schools and seminaries must be approved by the Government. Catholic priests, nuns, and lay Catholics are reportedly assigned by the authorities to religious functions and duties at the local level without prior consultation with the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy.

In addition, the Special Rapporteur has been informed that numerous members of the clergy belonging to various religious denominations have been imprisoned since 1975. This is said to particularly be the case with Roman Catholic priests and Buddhist monks as well as Protestant pastors, who have been executed systematically and placed in arbitrary detention for prolonged periods as political prisoners in reeducation and labor camps. Military chaplains allegedly were also sent to such camps after 1975, at a time when all foreign missionaries were expelled from the country, numerous places of worship and religions presses closed and religious property confiscated. Large numbers of religious schools, seminaries, hospitals, and orphanages were reportedly also closed and nationalized, as was the case with the Evangelical Nha Trang Seminary."

The undisputed violations of human rights by the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam were substantially raised in the report submitted by Mr. Abdelfattah, Special Rapporteur in accordance with the Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/25, specified that at least 40 reeducation and labor camps were in existence and that at least 60 prisoners of conscience were detained in Vietnam on account of their religious beliefs.

The living conditions prevailing in reeducation camps, in particular, were described as extremely harsh. The prisoners suffered illness, hard labor, torture, and inhuman treatment. Lack of food resulted in malnutrition. Lengthy indoctrination sessions were common practices. The Buddhist monk Yoshida, as a case in point, is said to have lost the use of his legs after 13 years of incarceration in a reeducation camp where he was subjected to electric shock torture. Worse still, prisoners who were ill and unable to work were not allowed to eat normal poor food rations since their working capacity was diminished. Handicapped prisoners who worked less were forced to eat less. For instance, they were allowed only 12 kilograms of rice that most prisoners were allowed to receive. It had also been said that many prisoners were not allowed to receive packages of food sent to them by their families.

The Puebla Institute, a human rights group in the United States that defends religion worldwide, reported that repression against all of Vietnam's religions continued. Vietnam, it noted, is one of Asia's most religious societies, with nearly 90 per cent of the population identifying with one of several religions. The Institute's report (1994) examined the situation of Vietnamese Buddhists, Roman Catholics, Evangelical Christians, the Cao Dai, and the Hoa Hao. The organization demonstrated that the repressive apparatus of the regime against all religious groups remained widespread and resilient, despite some free market reforms. It listed as evidences the cases of 22 Catholic Priests and lay persons, 12 pastors, preachers, and lay persons, and 75 Buddhist monks and lay persons who were detained or under police surveillance and house arrest.

Serious problems arise as repression against the religion and dissidence increases. Personal security is one among the most serious problems at camp. According to various sources inside Vietnam, until this day, prisoners of conscience are mixed with both common criminals and horrendous hooligans of the underworld whom the camp supervisors often use as spies to control the political prisoner. Concerns over the problem are always ignored. Health care and medical treatment present another serious problem. In many instances, no doctors or medicine are available. The prisoners, in many instances, are forced to resort to the use of traditional medicines such as herbs and roots when they are available. As a result of such an ill-treatment, the inmates are said to die at the rate of 10 to 15 percent a year.

In the civil society, religious intolerance is pervasive as white regions --where religions are supplanted-- grow. People who are said to have been critical of the State Church hierarchy and the Government are arrested, tried, and given prison terms. The religious and dissidents of all walks of life are targeted with suspicion, discrimination, hatred, and violence because of their profession of belief or faith in their just cause. Many of them are harassed, incarcerated, or placed under surveillance. Quite a few believers of all legitimate Churches face unjust sentences and are drained in prisons and camps.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

On January 27, 1973, representatives of the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam signed the Agreements on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam. The Agreements were based on the respect for the Vietnamese people's right to self-determination and the contribution to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world. Article 9b of the Agreements provided self-determination for the South Vietnamese people according to which "the South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic elections under international supervision."

Article 11 of the Agreements, in particular, promised to honor the civil and political rights of the Vietnamese people, with all citizens being equal and free to enjoy authentic democratic freedom. "Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will: -achieve national reconciliation and concord, and hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other; -ensure the democratic liberties of the people, political freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of the meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political parties, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, right to property ownership, and right to free enterprise ..."

Article 5 stipulates that "Within sixty days of the signing of the Agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from the South Vietnam of troops, military advisors, and military personnel including technical military personnel and military personnel with associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war material of the United States and those of the other foreign countries ..." The Agreement nevertheless left the 219,000 North Vietnamese troops with all their armaments, munitions, and war material not only to stay not only in place but also in attack positions in the South Vietnam. No sooner had the cease-fire taken effect than North Vietnam expanded both political and military activities in the South Vietnam.  It consistently made every effort to take it by force. More divisions from the North  went south. The Paris Agreement ended the Vietnam War, but  another  war had already  begun.

At the 21st Plenum of the Workers’ Party, the Communist leadership decided to shift the primary emphasis from political warfare to military offensive. In late October, 1974, field commanders and chief politics commissioners in the battle areas of the B Front, i.e. the South Vietnam, received the Politburo’s new directives on the strategy concepts for 1975-1976. In January 1975, Le Duan gave the Politburo’s directives for the 1975 campaign to the Military Committee of Central Highlands to further attacks towards Ban Me Thuot. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam did little to hold them back. Armaments were affected due to U. S. serious military aids cuts. Heavy weapons such as artillery, tanks, and jet aircraft were largely useless against the North Vietnamese troops equipped with multiple war armaments from the Soviet Union and Communist China. The American Vietnamization of the war came into play. The South Vietnamese defended the South Vietnam on their own.  

By March 1975, the North Vietnamese troops launched a series of attacks throughout the Military Zone I, including Da Nang, the area between Da Nang and Hue, Hue, and Quang Tri. Within days, Quang Tri, the farthest north province of the South fell into the hands of the North Vietnamese army. Both ends, north and south, of Highway I came under heavy fire of North Vietnamese artillery By April 1, North Vietnamese troops held Military Region I, Hue and the adjoining southern provinces Quang Tin and Quang Nam. The North Vietnamese divisions in the Central Highlands met no resistance, advanced toward the coastal provinces, and took Nha Trang. With little resistance against them, they seized the entire Military Region II by mid-April. Defeat after defeat, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam lost the best troops.

General Van Tien Dung, the Commander-in-chief of North Vietnamese Troops in the South, received the Politburo’s directives to take Saigon. On April 30, the North Vietnamese troops from all directions inundated Saigon, dismantling the various units of the Armed Forces of Vietnam that defended it. The Vietnamization of the war came to an end. The red flag of North Vietnam was hoisted over the South’s presidential palace. The Republic of Vietnam  administration crumbled and so did  U. S. military power in the Southeast Asia. The United States of America lost the war!

Before its takeover of Saigon, the Provisional Revolutionary Government gave, in its 10-point declaration, assurances to carry out the national concord and reconciliation policy. Nevertheless, the councils for these purposes never functioned. In his speech delivered during the May 75 victory celebration in Saigon, Party Secretary-general Le Duan promised that the Party would turn the prisons into schools and fostered national reconciliation. Notwithstanding, the Military Administration Committee of Capital Zone Saigon - Gia Dinh, by its communiqué in June 1975, appealed to all superior officers from the rank of captain and above and all officials from the grade of assistant director and vice province chief or above from the former administration to turn themselves in at Gia Long High School for Girls and Taberd High School for reeducation. Officials, officers, members of the Senate and House of Representatives, politicians, and priests and monks of all Churches were to register with the Communist military authorities. Reeducation began in the awe of the South Vietnamese people.

In the months that followed the liberation when the wounds of the war were yet to heal, political hatred, economic oppression, social injustice, and corruption spread everywhere. While hundreds of thousands of high-level officials and officers of the Republic of Vietnam were sent to reeducation camps, civil servants and the military personnel of the lower ranks were to attend reeducation sessions in place at the local wards. To begin with, in the summer of 1975, the Communist government carried out a general administrative measure. This measure nevertheless evolved into a policy following the reunification of the country.

The Law on Counterrevolutionary Crimes and Punishment, promulgated in North Vietnam on November 10, 1967, came into effect in the South on July 2, 1976. Article 15 of the law, in particular, stipulates that "those who, for counterrevolutionary purposes, commit the following crimes: 1) Carrying out propaganda and agitating against the people's democratic administration and distorting socialism; 2) Propagating enemy psychological warfare themes, distorting the war of resistance against the U.S. aggressors for national salvation, independence, democracy and national reunification, and spreading baseless rumors to cause confusion among the people; 3) Propagandizing the enslavement policy and depraved culture of imperialism; and 4) Writing, printing, circulating or concealing books, periodicals, pictures, photographs or any other documents with counterrevolutionary contents and purpose... will be punished by imprisonment from 2 to 12 years (Aurora Foundation, 1989: 76). Anyone who showed negative attitude toward and non-cooperation with the new regime were likely subject to arrest and detentuon.

Intolerance against freedoms of expression and of the press was noticeable in the press policy of the Vietnamese Communist administration. Through the medium of the Front of Fatherland, it executed control on all means of public expression. Besides the daily Nhan Dan (The People), which was published in Hanoi, only the Tin Sang (Morning News) and the Saigon Giai Phong (Saigon Liberated) were circulated in Saigon. The ideological control laid hand on the printing and publication of books. The control of associations throughout the South was also of prime target. Associations could only exist under the control or supervision of the Fatherland Front. Along with the administration of the old regime, all political parties and economic, social, cultural, and religious associations in the South Vietnam were dissolved.

THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM

by Van Nguyen and Associates

Copyright by Vietnam Human Rights Watch

　

The Ideological Premises

Vietnam under communism is a one-party state. The Vietnamese Communist Party shows all of its ambitions to monopolize the power to govern the entire Vietnamese people, shaping the development of society in all domains of life and the fate of the individuals that constitute it. It considers itself the savior and leader of the nation. This party empowers itself with the rights to the leadership of the people. By Article 4 of the 1992 Constitution, it vests itself with the mission to bring into play what it calls the socialist transformation of the nation. None of the sectors of the political and civil life could escape from it.

Despite the 1992 Constitution stipulates the division of powers, the functioning of the actual nomenklatura exhibits identical entreaties of the Party and the State. The distinction in viewpoints and the interpretation of the laws and policies are virtually nominal. The Vietnamese Communist Party decides everything. The practices of the official ideology --communism-- are the legitimate way of life. It forms the backbone of all other social institutions. It institutes the history of the Vietnamese people, elaborates all values it holds dear, and establishes the norms for the supra- and infra- structures of the country.

On his seventieth birthday, President Ho Chi Minh, the founder of the Indochina Communist Party, explained how he became a Communist. At first, in his words, "Patriotism, not yet communism, led him to have confidence in Lenin, in the Third International. Step by step, in the course of struggle for his cause, by studying Marxism-Leninism parallel with participation in practical activities, he gradually came to realize that only socialism and communism can emancipate the oppressed nations and the working class throughout the world." For him, communism is a Book of Miracles. Anyone faced with difficulties could simply open it and find a ready solution. "Marxism-Leninism is not only a miraculous book but also a radiant sun illuminating the path to final victory, to socialism and to communism (Ho Chi Minh, 1960-1962: 448)."

History has recorded that Ho Chi Minh is the father and soul of the Communist Party of Vietnam. In February 1930, he founded the Communist Party of Indochina. In the same year, as Comintern representative, he drafted a program of action for it. This program aimed at carrying out such slogans as: overthrow French imperialism, feudalism, and the reactionary Vietnamese capitalist class; establish a worker-peasant and soldier government; confiscate the banks and other enterprises belonging to the imperialists, and put them under the control of the worker-peasant and soldier government. The program was later adopted at a Conference of Communists from Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina held in Hong Kong, where he served as a Comintern agent. At this conference, Ho Chi Minh declared that "the Communist Party of Indochina "is the Party of the working class. It will help the proletarian class lead the revolution to struggle for all the oppressed and exploited people (Ho Chi Minh, 1960-62: 145-48)."

Ever since its foundation, the Communist Party of Indochina, has never changed its ideological goals.On November  11, 1945, faced with strong opposition from the national parties, Ho Chi Minh used the delaying tactics, wooing their leaders to join him in the national union front to fight against the French. He declared to dissolve the Communist Party of Indochina but created the Hoi Nghien Cuu Chu Nghia Mac-xit (Association for the Study of Marxism) to operate in its place. Upon achieving his hidden scheme, he made volte face, decimating their leadership and eliminating their parties one by one. On March 3, 1951, with political and military support of the People’s Republic of China, the Communist Party of Indochina officially reappeared under its new name, the Vietnamese Workers’ Party. The party was placed under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. He reaffirmed on this occasion that the task of the Party was to lead the entire Vietnamese people and to bring the resistance to victory and revolution, i.e. communism, to success. (Ho Chi Minh on Revolution, p.228).

Ho Chi Minh and his successors have relentlessly striven to achieve Marx' and Lenin's, and later, Mao’s ideological axioms and teachings. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the basic principle. It dictates the goals and aims for a Communist revolution not only in Vietnam but also throughout the Indochina peninsula. At the Third Congress of the Vietnamese Workers' Party (1960), Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly Truong Chinh categorically contended that "The aim of the actual revolution is that the entire people and, particularly, the working people should thoroughly absorb the socialist ideology, that they should abandon their previous outlook on life and on the world and replace it with the Marxist viewpoint. Thus, Marxism - Leninism will assume the leading role in guiding the moral life of the country and will be the framework within which the thoughts of the whole nation are formed. It will serve as the foundation upon which the ethics of our people will be built."

After the takeover of the administration in South Vietnam, Party Secretary-general Le Duan at the 1976 Vietnamese Communist Party Congress interpreted in the same terms the ideological axioms as Truong chinh had. "The important task of ideological and cultural work is to combat bourgeois ideology and other non-proletarian ideologies; to sweep away the influence of the neocolonialist ideology and culture in the South; to spread thoroughgoing propaganda and education about Marxism - Leninism ideology and the lines and policies of the Party in order to give absolute predominance to Marxism - Leninism in the political and spiritual life of the entire people."

Party Secretary-general Nguyen Van Linh, who embraced openness and renovation, in his address on the 60th anniversary of the Communist Party of Indochina, on February 2, 1990, solemnly confirmed the mission of the Communist Party of Vietnam: "The party determinedly follows the path of dictatorship of the proletariat and resumes its supreme leadership of the people." He advocated that no other political parties but the Vietnamese Communist Party could shoulder the role of leadership of the people and country." He particularly stressed, on March 6, 1990, that "the Communist Party and people of Vietnam, now as before, unceasingly strive to consolidate the lasting and close friendship and all-around cooperation with the Soviet Union, the land of Lenin and the Great October Revolution. This is the principle line of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the internationalist sentiments of all Vietnamese."

General Le Kha Phieu, the successor to Nguyen Van Linh to head the Politburo, declared in the review Quoc Phong Toan Dan (National Defense Review) in September 1991 that "the Party's new platform would be carried out in the light of the Seventh Party Congress, that it would persistently follow the socialist line and other fundamental principles of socialism, and that it would ascertain the leadership role of the Communist Party, remain loyal to and apply creatively Marxism - Leninism and Ho Chi Minh's thoughts, and help cadres and soldiers heighten their love for the country and socialism. He asserted that constant efforts must be made to renovate and enhance the efficiency of party leadership. Resolute measures must be taken to reject the concepts of political pluralism and opposition by a multiparty system as well as to criticize attempts to diminish the party's leading role or to prevent the party from renovating its leadership." Le Kha Phieu also advocated that "it is necessary to closely combine Marxism - Leninism with Ho Chi Minh's thought in Vietnam, regarding them as the main ideological system to be applied to the revolution in the country because they can play a leading role in shaping the spiritual life of the socialist Vietnamese society (Le Kha Phieu, 1991).

Vu Oanh, a member of the Politburo, in the daily Nhan Dan (The People) on September 9, 199 further asserted that "to make the renovation of the country a success the people must be armed with a vanguard theory that is Marxism - Leninism and Ho Chi Minh's thoughts and be placed under the leadership of the working class party that must work out correct lines and strategies and effectively organize their implementation. He further stressed that the people want party leadership but demand that the party be composed of the people who are truly devoted to the common cause and have wisdom and ability. Particularly at this historical juncture when our economy is still backward, the enemy has devised many plots to oppose and attack us from both inside and outside. As a result, the people badly need party leadership. The Party must raise its capacity and strengthen its determination and arm itself with the new thinking to meet the needs of our time and the people's admiration." (Vu Oanh, 1991: 3).

　

The Realization

Opposition to Marxism - Leninism, thus, has never been tolerated in Vietnam. In February 1976, the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam made an official announcement clarifying its position: "It would absolutely not admit political speculators or counterrevolutionaries of any kind. This principle must be strictly applied to all activities in the course of the campaign and the elections for the National Assembly. The old exploiting classes in the South were seeking ways to conduct a distorted propaganda movement against the socialists by fostering opposition to the Socialist North, sowing division between the North and the South and advancing viewpoints on bourgeois democracy and freedom in order to create illusions in an attempt to sabotage the general elections, including the authorized existence of opposition elements under the capitalist system and the past U.S. puppet regime. Those schemes were only deceitful tricks to consolidate the yoke of the hostile exploiting and ruling class. The socialist transformation of the South, more than ever, is necessarily realized through the victory of the class struggle and of the revolution. It eradicates with vigilance the deep-rooted decayed imperial and bourgeois ideologies. It destroys without concession the hostile, class of oppressors. Ultimately, it uproots all its deep-seated vestiges of cultural, political, social, and economic decadence in the light of the unshakable Marxism - Leninism."