DOUBTFUL RENOVATION

DOUBTFUL RENOVATION

Van Nguyen

The “People’s Democracy came to a close. Degradation persisted in every aspect of the social, economic, and political life of the Vietnamese people. It denotes the burning failures resulting from the monopoly of power of the conceited of the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam.  The situation of national education with a health care system ranked among the sectors of success is much more adverse. Le Thanh Khoi remarks that, beginning from 1980, the school registration figures fall considerably and little is known about the weaknesses. Class repetition, poor quality of teaching, and female participation (30% only) are among the problems of concern. At the higher levels, ideological education actively recommended. A question is raised: "How to show the genuinely of socialist idealism when the real society is organized by the culprits of corruption." Other problems converge on the study of Pham Thi Hoai on the winding evolution of female condition which she examines in all facets --formation, job, and access to levels of control, conditions of work, marital services and divorce. After a savoring note excerpted from the passage of the relatively traditional vision, she misses conclusion.  Taking into consideration all the historical parameters that interfere in shaping the present, the author ascertains that this may result from the timidity of actions of the leaders of the Union of women. "Let's hope,” she concludes, "they will go farther."

   

  The whole phenomenon, so rich and new, raises several questions that remain unanswered. It is a surprise to public opinion that keen observers such as Marcel Autret and Nguyen Duc Nhuan do not formulate any reserve vis-a-vis the policy of displacement such as the solution to demographic explosion. Timidity? The will of not to cause damage to the dialogue with the Vietnamese authorities?  None of the authors approaches the political aspect of the problems, regardless of the fact that it is a fundamental one. All show that, nowadays, the system of the unique party leads to an impasse. Wouldn't it be good to seek to institutional formulas to guarantee the expression of diversity of opinions? If not, all renovation of the spirit of critics remains illusory. If this type of the question remains a taboo in Vietnam, Three would be more of this type among the Vietnamese of the diaspora.

    

 Certain texts might be gained, and so many things had evolved between 1984 and 1986. And this evolution had been carried out.  A dispatch from the AFP of October 12, 1987 signaled that the "renovators," nowadays, agreed to disengage themselves from the cumbersome tutelage of the clan chief Le Duc Tho that set obstacle to an open-door policy towards the West. The total absence of access to this information on the future policy in the Parisian press was Imminent. Without “openness”, Vietnam could fall in the nothingness in the eyes of the French public.”

Mistakes and errors appear to be redundant. They were found out even in the ideological context and policy for renovation with precepts modeled on “glasnost and perestroika” in the later years of the 1980’s. It was extensively popularized but gained little success. The sense about the floral goal and grandiose programs for renovation meant little significance and vague importance to the masses. Common cadres and state officials without emoluments might also feel what irony empty speeches on renovation were about.  What would it mean by “renovation” in a country where "principles of socialism" are the sole compass illuminating the path to a classless society in every aspect? It is difficult to figure out what such a society would be. Hopefuls with reason for optimism expected a return to a “Worsen democracy style.”

Nguyen Van Tran, a long-standing Communist of the South, in his memoirs “Viet cho Me va Quoc Hoi” (To Mom and the National Assembly), depicted the somber picture of the regime following the ten-year period of People’s Democracy. Vietnam was hampered with numerous impediments to renovation. The mechanism of leadership “engenders a cumbersome machinery of administration. Reduction of the staff would immerse civil servants in unemployment. The Party leadership hierarchy .is even more riddled with good-for-nothing organs. We have, for instance, a Front, which only serves instrumentally for an apparent democracy. We also support satellite organs that are deceitfully attributed to as the organs of the Front. Other impediments lie on the path to renovation. The political subordination to the Soviet Union and dependence on the COMECON for mutual economic aids are central. Still, renovation is conditional on other noxious factors that were ruining the ailing economy, including the failures to incorporate regional economic operations into the national economy systems, inflation, and the overpopulation.”

The independent journalist Nguyen Ngoc Lan confided in his friends that he was born on July 14, the day the French people destroyed the Bastille bastion. He said, complaining: “I have lived through many periods of history: the French colonialism, the August Revolution in 1945 and the Government of the Democratic Republic Vietnam, the Bao Dai Government backed up by the French, the Nguyen Van Thieu Government supported by the Americans, and now the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. I have witnessed the change of course of history. All this has made me think so constantly about the term 'independence.”  Someone says we enjoy independence now. I say independence should be for the whole people. It should be for the absolute majority. Only independence as such is meaningful. Under the French domination, there was full independence for 10,000 French colonialists just like the one for the French in France while our 20 million Vietnamese fellow countrymen were slaves. Now, there might be, perhaps, independence for approximately 10% of the two million members of the Vietnamese Communist Party, but, how about more than 70 million Vietnamese fellow countrymen. That's painful! (Do Trung Hieu, 1995: 59).”   

    Intolerance persisted. Nguyen Ho, an outstanding veteran communist of the south, pointed out that the Communist party has persistently followed a policy of discrimination against whatever organization deemed to be hostile to communism. By believing in such Marxist concepts as materialism is antagonistic spiritualism and atheism to theism, for instance,  the Vietnamese Communists have executed policies of oppression, repression, and even murderous terrorism against the religions, namely, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao Buddhism, Evangelical Christianity, and Buddhism. Religious followers are “reactionaries” and “henchmen if the imperialists.” With the armed forces they had at hand, the Communist opened weeping operations to destroy the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao Buddhists. They launched waves of attack and executed series of mass killing of dignitaries and followers of these religions during the first years of the Resistance War against the French (1945-1959).

   The targets for elimination of the Cao Dai were the mainly areas in the Eastern region of South Vietnam including the provinces of Tay Ninh, Gia Dinh, Thu Dau Mot, Bien Hoa, and Ba Ria. As regards the Hoa Hao Buddhists, the targets were the areas in the Western region including the provinces of Long Xuyen, Chau Doc, Rach Gia, Bac Lieu, and Can Tho. Throughout the nine years of resistance against the French invaders (1945-1954) and the twenty years of the country’s parturition, the Catholics and Evangelicals in the North were the objects of fierce repression of socialism. At the time the Geneva Agreements were signed (July 1954) regulating the partition of the country, two million Catholics and Evangelicals instantly immigrated in waves to the South to escape the “Communist Peril. “The twenty years (1955-1975) were, to the dignitaries and followers of these religions who stayed in the North, a grievous endurance. They were treated as if they had been in a large prison. (Nguyen Ho, 1993: 39).   

There was no green light at the end of the tunnel. Repressions, oppression, and persecution ever continued following the Communist takeover of South Vietnam. The year 1984, in particular, involved a mass arrest of "counter- revolutionaries." It was reported that there 2,000 people were convicted on various charges following a treason trial with five defendants sentenced to death that ended on December 18, 1984. A big trial of about 80 Buddhists from a temple near Ho Chi Minh City convicted on charges of suspected "counterrevolutionaries" was reported. Series of trials were planned in the months that followed with charges ranging from "counterrevolutionary" activity to opposition to the Hanoi government. Overall, the Court would try some 2,000 people in Saigon before April 30, 1984, the 10th anniversary of its fall to the Communists (Charles-Antoine de Nectar, AFP, December19, 1984).   

     

  Internal conflict posed a serious problem. After the reunification of the country in July 1976, the politics of “Northernization of the South” was carried out unremittingly to the detriment of the leaders of the former National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. The seizure of power of Hanoi extended to the district level in the South. Ranking cadres of the former Front promoted to key positions in the Party and the State were rare. Thus, for example, of the 13 members of the politburo, one Southerner (Vo Van Kiet) was present at the Sixth Party Congress (December, 1986), and only three members from the South emerged after the Seventh Party Congress: Vo Van Kiet and his two protégés, Phan Van Khai, vice prime minister, and Vo Tran Tri, first secretary of the Party at Ho Chi Minh City. The other members of the politburo were from Central and North Vietnam.

Facing both political and economic problems in perspective, the Party, on the one hand, soothed dissidence among the student ranges by apportioning them with larger food rations. At the same time, it loosened economic restrictions, relaxing to some extent small private businesses and preparing the laws and regulations for foreign investment and international transactions.  On the other hand, the administration launched campaigns of repression against political plurality negating all forms of opposition inside the Party and among the masses. To this end, the Central Executive Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party held its conference in Saigon in September 1989 and decided to take harsh measures against possible dissidence and opposition. The daily Nhan Dan (The People) ran a long article warning the masses and public opinion against what it called "the freedom in the manner of capitalism," the phrase which was alluded to the demands of political reforms in Poland. Of particular concern, it called for the protection of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the role of leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

RHETORICAND REALITY

RHETORICAND REALITY

By Van Nguyen

Van Duc recounts in his memoirs “Vuot Qua Con So Hai” (Let’s Overcome Fear) that “after 1975, Vietnam, in the eyes of quite a few people, was a military power in Southeast Asia. It enjoyed the respect of many countries. Some neighboring countries even stood in fear of it. Although it was a small and underdeveloped country, Vietnam heroically defeated the United States, the mighty empire that had acted freely as it pleased all over the five continents ever since the end of  World War II. No one would ever think that a small satellite country of the Soviet Bloc could throw down this mightiest opponent in an unequal match! The prestigious Communist Party of Vietnam had never been so admired. The appellation Vietnam was identified with the loftiest ideals, the conscience of the world the pinnacle of human intelligence. Such a prestige caused, at the same time, fear among its neighboring countries in Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia and Thailand, where the seeds of communism had been sown and taken root for a long time. Prime Minister Pham Van Dong's declarations during his visits to Southeast Asian countries engendered even more unease and anxiety among the leaders of these countries. The military invasion into Kampuchea, the search-and-destroy operations against the Khmer Rouge in Phnom Penh, and the installation of the Heng Samrin and the military  clique as an Instrument the liberation in Kampuchea had made the world suspicious of a territory expansion.  It was well agog at Vietnam's vile scheme.

   One may recall an event as it just happened yesterday. The giant Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, with his black eyeglasses and strings of flowers around his neck offered by young Kampuchean ladies, haughtily overshadowed his Kampuchean entourage when he presided over the first press conference in Phnom Penh. (The ladies of the old regime in Saigon who served as entertainers at the reception that day whispered to one another that Uncle Dong was so frail that he could not walk. He had been reluctantly supported by attendants on both sides as he came to the conference!)

    

Being panic-stricken, the world hastened to isolate Vietnam, pressure on it, cut off foreign aids to it and imposed a trade embargo against it.  Some countries even lent a hand to the Pol Pot-Yeng Sary clique, the gang of murderers thirsty of blood that had killed millions of their countrymen. The world had charged them with crimes of genocide. Communist China, which had been weakened by the Culture Revolution disaster and suffered economic depression all through the tragic days under the Gang of Four, flexed its muscles and threatened to give its former brother country a lesson. It came to no question when the elder brother country sustained a great defeat! It could only be dexterous in using sticks and stones to settle internal conflicts and excel in practicing human-wave attacks in battles and confrontations. Nevertheless, it failed to encroach on its brother country's territory.

 Economic depression and military great losses by the war in Kampuchea put Vietnam at risk the one-time elder brother country had then all its advantages in its hands. Colossal lines of army divisions flanked by armored vehicles, tanks, and cannons of all sizes overwhelmed the borders!  Vietnam had to rely on full support from the powerful eldest brother Soviet brother that took side with it, in hesitantly sending troops to the Russian-Chinese borders to challenge the People Republic of China’s Army. The Soviet superpower’s army would flatly crush Communist China  Red Army if it would not dolefully withdraw its troops from the China-Vietnam border provinces.  

    

 To everyone's knowledge, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam ceased to be a military power when the battles ended on the China-Vietnam frontiers in 1979. It even slid down pitilessly when the war began in the western provinces of the country and then escalated in Kampuchea. Popular resistance in this country developed and spread. The economy deteriorated after campaigns for confiscation of private properties. A myriad of men, women, and children escaped the fatherland in rush of freedom. It was a great loss for the country when thousands of professionals, experts, and technicians left the country for a new life. Vietnam, in the eyes of the world, was no longer an enjoyable place to live. Misfortunes never come singly. The countries that were unsympathetic to Vietnam were more than willing to resettle an unlimited number of boat people

 Cadres boasted about Vietnam's boundless potential wealth, land mines, and sea resources. They incessantly repeated Ho Chi Minh's prophecies about a prospective wealthy and mighty Vietnam: "After we have defeated the American imperialists, we'll build up Vietnam into a nation which will be tenfold wealthier and mightier than it has ever been before." However, every Vietnamese felt ashamed of his or her country's cripple economy when it was ranked among the few poorest countries in the world! Until this day, not only is it still economically dependent on foreign investment, it is also backward in every domain of the political, social, intellectual, and spiritual life. Methods of administration of the economy are in infancy; the laws are untrue, and the rules and regulations are executed in an inconsistent manner. Reports on the economic achievements, for instance, are unreliable. They often vary depending on whether they are advantageous or disadvantageous to the political regime. In 1989, reports from the People's Council of Thanh Hoa Province said that the province had good harvests. Local newspapers, in contrast, disclosed that the people of the province were facing a great famine! Still, the population suffered heavy damages caused by natural disaster.  (Achievements are flamboyant (!), but the famine is a reality).

  It is to our popular belief that the more children we may have the more wealth we may gain. The growth in population in our country is tremendously rising, creating anxiety. We should not be fearful as our natural resources are bountiful.  Nevertheless, without scientific knowledge and modern technology, we hardly extract and make proper use of them. In the 1920's, our scholars of the Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc (Tuition-free School of Tonkin) brought up with the practical ideals that to realize a 10-year economic plan we need to grow trees, and if we wish to achieve a 100-year national policy, we need to cultivate men. The Vietnamese youths are well known for intelligence and diligence.  With a sound, fair, and democratic policy of national education only could Vietnam take off and catch up with modern countries in the world.

   

  The most serious setback in the Communist administration is, perhaps, the mismanagement of the economic infrastructure and the squandering of “war booties.” Those war booties, according to some estimates, valued at 4 billion U.S. dollars, equivalent to the amount of money the Vietnamese signatory at the Paris Treaty in 1973 demanded for the compensation as amends for war damages. Only a few years after the “liberation,” could the people in the South could not help from complaining about the deplorable conditions of road communications. Almost all the inter-provincial roads built by the old administration became timeworn. Many of them were downgrading to an alarming degree. Old-age bridges connecting the highways crumbled one after another due to constant heavy traffic. The roads in the countryside were almost impassable to vehicles. In the Mo Cay District, for instance, roads that were dug up by bush-fighters for guerrilla tactics remained intact. The road from Ham Long District to Thanh Phu District was entirely impassable to vehicles and was only used for buffalo carts and pedestrians. The modern Bien Hoa bridge and highways, constructed by the American Johnson and Drake Pipe Co., suffered  damages. On the inauguration day, when the constructions were open to public traffic, the Communist propaganda hissed the rumor that the Bien Hoa highway would be used as an airstrip for American jet planes. Until the war ended in 1975, never had the people in the South seen an American plane landing its troops on it, however. Ever since 1975, the highway networks from the demilitarized zone--Ben Hai to the Ca Mau Cape--with bridges connecting rivers and canals, have become increasingly superannuated but have never been maintained or repaired. During the war, the Engineering Corps of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces was mostly in charge of the construction, maintenance, and repair of roads, highways, and bridges, from the lowland to the highland of the Republic territory. It was served by a contingent of experts, engineers, and technicians who were well trained in civil and military schools of engineering in the country and abroad. After the takeover of the South of North Vietnamese troops, these men of expertise and abilities were summoned to reeducation. Many of them were only released recently. It was a true waste of expertise!

  

   The waste of means for transportation, road and bridge construction materials and equipment, was another setback in the administration. Thousands of jeeps, trucks, and bulldozers, were found lying exposed to the scorching sun and heavy rainfall. An engineering officer of the old regime related that, during the time he was detained at the old Fifth Engineering Group Headquarters near Saigon, he happened to find dozens of tractors and trucks left unused in the old hangars of the headquarters. Many of them were all brand new; some were in good conditions, and others only needed some minor repair. Later, they were all found unused and turned into dumps of old scrap iron. Their tires were taken off and used as materials to make troop sandals! Poor gatherers of waste materials also happened to find dozens of drilling machines used in road and bridge construction buried in deep muddy gutters. The troopers of the “liberation army” found that these machines were so monstrous that is quite monstrous, and that were kept in mothballs. Their containers were made for use as water tanks in the kitchen. The drilling machines, which seem to be unusable, were thrown into the nearby gutters for the sake of convenience! An officer of a new battalion who came to station at the headquarters a few years later reported the matter to a senior officer. To his amazement, his superior said without a sigh: "Well, that doesn't matter, comrade! After reunification, we'll build up our country into a nation that will be tenfold wealthier and mightier than it has been." In a way, the latter really learned by heart Uncle Ho's prophecy about a bright prospective Vietnam! In 1984, an officer who worked at the Prime Minister's Office in the North told the following story.

  When extracting rock from a mountain for road repair, the People’s Army could not afford to get US-made boring drills, which are made of platinum, which are both powerful and endurable, by it could not find one. It had to use low-quality Soviet-made boring machines, instead. It was estimated that a single drill cost 1,000,000 dong! Expensive American commodities and equipment of all kinds during the Vietnam War were stored in warehouses at Long Binh, Bien Hoa Province. They were left abandoned there for years. Poor gatherers of waste materials could also find, deep in the ground, tons of precious commodities, sand bags, nylon bags, and even brand new typewriters, which the one time American military authorities had to bury for the storage of new materials and equipment. (Van Duc, VNHRW, 19 (1993:6-7) )

A TIME FOR CHANGE

 A TIME FOR CHANGE

By Van Nguyen

  The conformist leadership with Party Secretary-general Le Duan, obsessed with ideological dogmas, had striven in vain all through the two five-year economic periods (1976-1985) to remedy the ailing economy and stabilize political instability. In 1985, Hanoi declared that it had completed the period of people’s democracy and paved the way for building socialism. To pursue the goal, it pronounced to accede to demands for a socialist transformation, politically and economically. In September 1985, Hanoi took a general consensus of private industry and business enterprises, changed the currency, and dispossessed the capital which was still in the hands of entrepreneurs and businessmen. The People’s Council of Ho Chi Minh City selected Third District for a pilot case. A large number of small manufacturing establishments and trade businesses were in operation readily served at hand easy-to-access conditions for study and investigation.

Attempts were made to change the course of the existing failed centralism economy as carried out by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and his cabinet ministers. To the distress of the regime, after ten years in operation, it brought the country’s economy to a standstill. To effect change in conformity with pressing needs of “renovation” under the pressure of economic depression and political unrest, Hanoi, again, revised its ambitious intention. It stopped short its plans for socialist transformation and worked headlong for “economic renovation.” This economic process was ideologically interpreted as the by-passing period to socialism. Its ultimate goal was to transform Vietnam into a Communist country.           

On June 2, 1986, the Chairman of the State Council Truong Chinh decided to dismiss from key positions the highest cadres who failed in their responsibility to redress the corrupt bureaucracy and ailing economy of the country.  The chairman had, nevertheless, seemed no conceive no clear vision of the renovation that was in full swing in the USSR.  He made his official visit to the USSR. On August 12, 1986, he had a conference with Party Secretary-general Mikhail Gorbachev.  In November 1986, he came to Moscow to attend the conferences of world top Communist party leaders and the COMECON.

    After cautious preparations, and under the pressure of the situation following the passing away of Party Secretary–general Le Duan, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, on December 18, 1985, elected Nguyen Van Linh, Party-secretary of Ho Chi Minh City, to Party Secretary-general. Nguyen was believed to have been entrusted with power to carry out a policy modeled on Mikhail Gorbachev's plans of renovation of the economy and restructuring the administration Upon assuming his functions, Secretary-general repeated his venerable Ho Chi Minh's gesture,   using the pen name XYZ during the Resistance War to rectify cadres and officials’ errors in their conduct of public affairs. Nguyen used his initials NVL in the official press to popularize his ideas and ideas about "renovation." In this endeavor, the press was encouraged to engage in the revelations of the errors and mistakes in the conduct public services as well as the flaws found with State agencies or setbacks entangled in government's programs.

    “Doi Moi” (renovation) was officially adopted at the Seventh Party Congress in mid-December 1986. The socialist economy was to be substituted by some forms of market economy –“market socialism.” Plans would be carried out to promote intricate changes from collectivism, State-controlled economy, to economic openness, opening up the door to welcome non-communist countries. Insurmountable difficulties were still problematic impediments, nevertheless. The burning failures of the five-year plan (1976-1980) and erroneous administrative, economic and financial measures (1981-1985) farfetched the Communist Party to carry out  the policy of “doi moi,”  Cleavage and internal conflict emerged as the regime moved into the new era.. 

    Nguyen Van Linh, showed himself the champion of openness in the fashion of Mikhail Gorbachev. At a conference in Hanoi on October 1987, Nguyen recommended writers, artists, and the intellectuals of the country to tell the truth, to fight against authoritarianism, and corruption. He had two days for debate on an ideological examination on the role of the arts with the intelligentsia. He opened his heart and vowed to devote himself to then “unbinding the arts.” He recommended the regime's journalists and writers not to deface reality, to tell openly and truthfully. The secretary-general set examples himself in action. He published on the daily “Nhan Dan” (The People) a series of articles entitled "Things that have to be done right now." He revised and denounced “negative phenomena." He gave the journalists and writers “carte blanche” to perform their tasks. A breeze of “democratization” fanned in the arts circle, enlivening inspiration for many journalists and writers to engage in the battle for "renovation.”

     On October 6, 1987, the Party Secretary-general sat for hours listening to some hundred writers, artists, and members of the intelligentsia, running through the actual situation of the country. It was really “an act of openness” to the audience. The literary critic Nguyen Dang Manh had favorable remark, exclaiming: “In the past, in the meetings with the leaders of the Party and State, it was the leaders who spoke from one end to the other of the matter, or almost all. This time, it is a whole reversal. This unique act is a clear indication of renovation.”  A gesture of friendliness was revealed in the friendliness of the Party secretary-general himself. He listened with enthusiasm and without interruption to “antagonists to the regime.” The young female novelist Duong Thu Huong, the author of the best-seller novel of the year of 1987 "Ben Bo Ao Vong" (Beyond Illusions).expressed views so freely and openly in her speech that she  made the editors of the weekly “Van Nghe” (The Arts) sit up with a start. The audience was an embarrassing an awkward situation that had never happened before. The weekly did not even mention her name in its list of speakers at the meeting in its report later.

    Nguyen Van Linh’s speech was termed as "typically simple and frank," symbolizing a gesture of leniency of a "leader who has experienced trials of oppression under French domination and the restlessness of the age.” During hours later, the Secretary-general satisfied himself with listening to interlocutors with issues he had initiated from the start:  He said: "It seems that from the Liberation of the South (1975) until this day (1987), the arts has been impoverished in thought and expression. Is that true?  What Is that about? If that is false, I will be the first to warm the cockles. If not, why are we at fault, then? Does that come from certain constraints and harsh regulations of censorship imposed on the artists from the high authority above?

   The effects of "renovation" appeared to be exiguous. The country  stil suffered economic depression. At the end of August 1989, a month before the withdrawal of the People’s Army from Kampuchea, Nguyen Van Linh had to acknowledge that the economy was extremely deteriorating. From 1986 to 1990 renovation was at stake.  At the end of August 1989, a month before the People's Army Expeditionary Corps' withdrawal from Kampuchea, Nguyen Van Linh had to acknowledge that the economy deteriorated. Coincidentally, political developments in the Eastern European Communist Bloc worsened and made deep impact on “renovation” in Vietnam. The Chinese students' uprisings in Canton, Shanghai, and Beijing in June 1989; the struggle for freedom and democracy and economic reform in Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania; the demands for economic reforms, political pluralism inside the country exerted increasing political pressure for change on the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

“GLASNOST” AND “PERESTROIKA”

“GLASNOST” AND “PERESTROIKA”

By Van Nguyen

 

Destabilization was in full swing with the ascension to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republic (1981-1991). He was a member of the Politburo from 1980.  He was chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission during the Chernenko administration from 1981 to 1985). He became secretary- general of the Communist Party from 1985 and president of the Supreme Soviet from 1988. An advocate for renovation, he introduced liberal political and economic reforms “glasnost” and “perestroika” inside the union and attempted to halt the arms race abroad. He became head of State in 1989.  In March 1990, he was formally elected to a five-year term as executive president with greater powers. At home, his executed plans for economic and political reforms as conceived.

    Glasnost (openness) defines Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of liberating various political aspects of Soviet life such areas as introducing greater freedom of expression and information and opening up relations with Western countries. Glasnost involved the lifting of bans on books, plays, and films, the release of political dissidents, the tolerance of religious worship, a reappraisal of Soviet history, the encouragement of investigative journalism ton, the uncovering of corruption, and the sanctioning of greater candor in the reporting of social problems and disasters. Journalists‘s rights to access are guaranteed. There is a right to reply. Citizens have the rights to receive information from abroad

 Under legislation adopted in 1990, censorship of mass media is abolished; however, publication of State secrets, calls for the overthrow of the State by force, incitement of national and religious hatred and State interference in people’s private lives are prohibited. In the economic sphere, Mikhail Gorbachev failed to avert a food crisis in the winter of 1990-91 and his desire to preserve a single, centrally-controlled USSR. He restructured the Party and State bureaucracies

He met with resistance from Soviet Baltic republics Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania seeking more independent government systems. In the foreign affairs domain, his achievements gained him reputation.  He was also faced with calls for cession from the Soviet Union and was forced to reconsider his earlier opposition to a multiparty system.  Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990. However, his reputation suffered as a result of harsh repression of nationalist demonstrations in the Baltic States in early1991. His peace initiative during the Gulf War during February 1991 gained him a positive stance among Arab leaders.

In the economic sphere, from 1987, Gorbachev pressed for his wide-ranging domestic economic and political programs of restructuring, “Perestroika.”  The term was first proposed at the 26^th Party Congress in 1979 and actively promoted by Gorbachev himself from 1985. In the economic sphere, perestroika was conceived as involving “the switching on to track of intensive development “by automation and improved labor efficiency.”  It specifically evolved to attend increasingly to market indicators and incentives 0f a gradual dismantlement of the Stalinist central-planning system.  Decision-making authority was devolved to self-financing enterprises. A form of “market socialism” came into being.

As the Soviet economy disintegrated during 1991, his political strength declined. Gorbachev was able to counter a short-lived coup in the winter of that year and regained some stature by helping to coven the Middle East peace conference in Spain in November 1991. Soviet might nevertheless gradually deteriorated following successive violent political developments leading to the collapse of the Eastern Europe Bloc in the later years of the 1980’s.

     A New Vision

“Glasnost,” Kien Van noted, “is the catchword for the new openness about problems in the Soviet Union and the greater tolerance of dissent. Gorbachev has allowed the Soviet press to publish exposes about the failures of and corruption in the Soviet system. He has brought Andrei Sakharov back from internal exile and has released a few other prominent dissidents. He has increased the number of Jews allowed to emigrate and has given exit visas to Soviet citizens divided from their spouses in the West. All these steps have been widely hailed in the West. These developments are significant and represent a welcome change from the past. But we should always remember that the literal translation of the “glasnost” is "transparence." Repression remains the keystone of the Soviet system. While fewer than 100 political dissidents have been released, another 40,000 still languish in prison camps. While more criticism of the system is permitted, it is all officially sanctioned criticism. It is no accident that those who are criticized under Glasnost never argue back.” (Kien Van. Doan Ket, February 1988, No.38pp.44-49).

In the views of Richard Nixon, “Gorbachev's purpose is three-fold. He wants to create a more favorable attitude toward the Soviet Union in the West in order to facilitate his pursuit of more important goals, agreements on trade and arms control. He wants to use Glasnost to weed out his political opponents. He wants to create a new spirit among intellectuals and particularly young people in the Soviet Union. Glanost is a small price to pay.

Gorbachev's speeches overflow with praise to democracy. But what he means by democracy is different from what we mean by it. He wants to open up the system; he wants to encourage people to step forth with new ideas; but his has no intention of relinquishing any of the power and prerogatives of the Communist Party. There is no real democratization outside the party. He wants to shake up the system to get it moving again. But it will not lead to anything remotely resembling a Western democracy.

This slogan for economic reform literally means restructuring. Gorbachev has spoken in sweeping terms about this program. He has called for the dismantling of much of the central planning apparatus. He has endorsed the idea of joint ventures with private Western firms. He has proposed giving greater decision-making power to factory managers. He has pushed for allowing some opportunities for very small enterprises to make private profit. But he has so far achieved little. The day-to-day workings in the Soviet Union still run by the dictates of the old regime. That Gorbachev seeks to take a new approach to Soviet problems does not mean that he rejects the basic premises of his system. He believes that the system is fundamentally sound but needs to be made more effective. We must remind ourselves that the reforms themselves tell us nothing about Gorbachev's intentions. Their purpose is not to move the Soviet Union toward more freedom at home or a less aggressive abroad, but rather to make the Communist system work better. He wants the system to be more efficient, not less Communist (Richard Nixon, 1989: 39-40).