THE RESISTANCE

THE RESISTANCE

By Van Nguyen

The North Vietnamese Communists took over Saigon on April 30, 1975. The Republic of South Vietnam collapsed in an instant. The fall of the regime drew with it the disintegration of all the institutions of the suprastructure and the dissolution of the entirety of the infrastrure base. The new regime instituted in their place intricate systems of political and economic institutions with ideals and values that were totally foreign to the people of the South.  They reared a new order destined to destroy the old regime’s centuries-old political systems and cultural and moral values. Prior to the Communist invasion into the Central Highlands in Spring 1975, leaders of religions, political parties, social organizations, and prominent personalities from various walks of life had foreseen that disaster would prevail if the Communists successfully defeated the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. They called for a war of resistance against the communists. They urged on the then President Nguyen Van Thieu to form a front uniting all the religious, political, and social forces in the South, preparing for firm military self-defense, establishing resistance war zones, and making use of all national potential spiritual and material sources to resist the invaders, regardless of whether or not the United States abandoned Vietnam. Plans to form defense lines along the western provinces in the South were in preparation. All proposals were nevertheless negated by the president himself.

   On Aril 30, 1875, General Duong Van Minh, who assumed power conferred upon by President-designate Tran Van Hong, appealed to the Armed Forces of the Republican his own initiative to lay arms and surrender to the invading forces.

The situation throughout the South was in total chaos. In the western provinces, the reactions of the military authorities were multifarious. A number of military units deserted their positions; others sought to leave the country, but the majority of the elite troops resolutely committed to resistance. The latter elements regrouped and retreated to the Hoa Hao stronghold at Tay An Co Tu (Tay an Old Temple) where Hoa Hao’s Bao An Security Guards were reactivated for military service. They and other unflagging military elements of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam put together forces to determinedly hold back the North Vietnamese invaders.

It is generally believed that strongholds from Can Tho to Lomg Xuyen would be like the Maginot fortifications. The communists would not be able to spread their   forces to occupy all over the territory of the South. The same situation was true with other military zones in the Central Highlands and the Center, in Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Phan Rang. The communists could only overwhelm the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam where the resistance was weak, the leadership was poor, and the determination was ephemeral. Strategies and plans without support and cooperation from the central government came to no avail. The resistance elements fought in vain against the invading forces. The stronghold at Tay An Co Tu, Long Kieng Village, Kien Giang Province, fell to the communists. The headquarters of the Hoa Hao Security Forces were under siege and was then overwhelmed by the invading forces. On May 1, 1975, a congress of military and political leaders of Hoa Hao was held under the chairmanship of Lt. General Lam Thanh Nguyen and Honorable Phan Ba Cam, Secretary General of the Social Democratic Party of Vietnam, discussed war developments. Military leaders from various regions decided to leave the Holy Site. Armed units were given orders to retreat to secret war zones in the mountainous region of That Son where they resisted until the 1980’s.  

  Witnesses reported that following the defeat of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam in 1975, separate units of various army divisions and regional troops retreated to forests and mountainous regions to resist the aggression of the Northern military might. Lines of pockets of resistance, in particular, were formed along the provincial route of Saigon–Vung Tau, in the areas bordering Saigon River from Ngoc Ha to Lam Son in and around Trinh Mountains where the regional troops under the command of Captain Giang Van Be resisted recently against the North Vietnamese. Numerous officers regrouped their troops and engaged the Northern aggressor’s right in the heart of Saigon and the neighboring districts. The resistance did not last long due to short of military equipment, provisions, and medical supplies. Upon disbandment, most of these fighters sought to evade to their home provinces or neighboring foreign lands. Others committed suicide to keep their honor and dignity intact, expressing loyalty to the Republic of Vietnam. 

   Three years after the collapse of the Saigon government a significant resistance force--possibly numbering several thousand men--continued to operate in the Mekong Delta province which was headquarters for the Hoa Hao Buddhism. McArthur mentioned the fact that the Hanoi radio quoted the district commander, Captain Dang Huu Trinh, saying that in Cho Moi District, An Giang Province, the "remnants of the puppet army, here, total tens of thousands, and a fairly large number of diehard officers have evaded reeducation. Therefore, maintaining combat readiness is a matter of constant concern to the local armed forces and militia and self-defense forces..." The troop commander of the district, identified as Hai Man, said that "there are 23,000 puppet army and administration personnel, here. Many of them have stubbornly evaded reeducation. Some have finished reeducation but are unwilling to work honestly for a living. Reverting to their old ways, they have continued to oppose the revolution and the people. Therefore, standing ready for combat in Cho Moi District is one of our permanent tasks."  McArthur further noted: "the emphasis of the broadcast made clear that the military preparedness was largely directed against 'remnant forces' and not incursions from Cambodia, although these have taken place." (George Arthur, Los Angeles Times, January 1978)

INSECURITY

INSECURITY

By Van Nguyen

Black April

    On March 21, 1965, a conference took place at La Fayette Hotel, Paris, in the presence of French prominent political figures among who were former Prime Minister Giscard d’Estaing, Pierre Messmer, Jacques Chirac, and others. Former France Ambassador to Vietnam Merillon disclosed his attempts at establishing a regime of political neutrality in South Vietnam prior to the fall of Saigon on April 30 1975. He had maintained close contacts with the last US Ambassador to Vietnam Martin after the fall of Phan Rang province in the Center. On March 18, 1875, Martin duly said that the United States would abandon Vietnam,  He assumed himself the role of a faliitator, to help South Vietnam successfully resist the Communist invasion and establish a regime of political neutrality.South Vietnam could still stand with a politically non-aligned government. Red China, on the other hand, agreed with France to establish a tri-partite politically non-aligned government in South Vietnam with the inclusion of the Front for Liberalization of South Vietnam. The ultimate decision belonged to the generals who were in command at the Communist headquarters of the Ho Chi Minh Campaign at Long Khanh. 

  France was then in favor of a coalition tri-partite government comprising the nationalists, the neutralists, and the pro-Chinese members in the Front for Liberation of South Vietnam among whom were Truong Nhu Tang, Nguyen Thi Binh, General Le Quang Ba, and General Tran Van Tra.  To the utmost disadvantage of France the general Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party Le Duan was at that time all-powerful and pro-Russian, and, thus seemingly constituting an irreversible situation to the scheme.

     On the morning of March 24, the French Ambassador to Vietnam sent for General Duong Van Minh for a meeting at the France’s Embassy in Saigon. The former four--star general, accompanied by a large entourage among whom were Huynh Tan Mam, Hoang Phu Ngoc Tuong, Pham Thi Thanh Van alias Madam Ngo Ba Thanh, Buddhist Nun Huynh Lien, Ly Quy Chung, Vu Van Mau, and Ho Ngoc Cu. The ambassador presented a three-phase government strategy so that he and the general would discuss the matter. 

    Plans were projected for a transfer of power. On the political plane the coalition government was established. At the head were Duong Van Minh and Tran Van Tra as Co-chairmen; Vu Van Mau, Trinh Dinh Thao, and Vo Chi Cong, Co-Vice Chairmen. Other members of the government were General Pham Van Phu, Minister for National Defense, Nguyen Thi Binh, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Truong Nhu Tang, Minister for Justice; Vu Quoc Thuc, Minister for the Interior; Nguyen Van Hao, Minister for Finance; Le Quang Uyen, Minister for Commerce; Tran Ngoc Lieng, Minister for Labor. To mediate differences of political diversity within a ministry, a principle is predestined, If the Minister is a nationalist, the vice minister will be a member of the Front, and vice-versa. An Advisory Council beside the government would include Nguyen Huu Tho, Huynh Tan Phat, Buddhist Monk Tri Quang, Luong Trong Tuong, Ho Tan Khoa, Reverend Chan Tin, and former Prime Minister Tran Van Huu.  Duong Van Minh and his close entourage were assured that twenty-four hours after the proclamation of the coalition government, France and the world and Europe and non-aligned government leaders would recognize the new government, and thus halting the Soviet tanks to enter Saigon. On the military plan, the military corps would still be capable of detaining the communists for ten months. France would play the role of mediator, promoting the policy of political neutrality, exerting pressure on North Vietnam to affect a cease-fire. Duong Van Minh would have time to redress the army and choose able generals to counter attack the enemy. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam would surely withstand, and the Communist North would not easily win.

Concerning diplomacy, the government of political neutrality would declare to establish diplomatic relations with China and other socialist countries including the Soviet Union. China would then send its ambassador to Vietnam to Saigon in 24 hours. He would hand to the coalition government an aid of 420 million dollars, an aid which China had previously promised to grant North Vietnam. The coalition government would ask China to force Hanoi to engage in the talks for an immediate cease-fire. China had been in good terms with the Front for Liberation of South Vietnam, and thus fostering its influence in Indochina, a term that the Front also wished to realize to get out of the Communist North Vietnam’s orbit. Accordingly, France would transfer to the coalition government an aid of 3000 million dollars to perpetuate the regime of political neutrality. At the same time, it would canvass support from its allied countries in Europe a sum of 200 million dollars through programs of economic aids.

  The plans came to no result, nonetheless. During the week between April 23-28, while the Communist troops flanked by tanks were advancing as far as Xuan Loc, a hundred kilometers north of Saigon, French Ambassador Merillon was actively shuttling between President-designate Tran Van Huong and General Duong Van Minh. Efforts were made to push for a transfer of power from the president-designate to the General, although it might well be too late. The ambassador saw President Huong at least once and usually twice a day that week. At every meeting he urged the preside-designate to give way to the general. At almost every meeting the latter managed to work with the idea that history had apparently chosen the general to play the role of Petain in a Vichy South Vietnam. Attempts for a coaltion government proved to be futile’ 

Terror and confusion followed. By April 26, the communist had cut Saigon off from the adjoining areas and bombarded the city. On 27; heavy bombs fell on Tan Son Nhat Airfield. Communist planes swept down and bombed the base.  Sixty thousand (60,000) soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam inside Saigon shored vigilance. On April 28, when General Duong Van Minh and his entourage prepared a celebration to officially accept the transfer of power from the president-designate Tran Van Huong to General Duong, Van Minh. The French ambassador really lost heart. He had had words from the American Ambassador that the latter would be leaving, The French Ambassador, in fact, had already agreed to attempt to act as caretaker for American property. He was then occupied himself with conducting a security meeting with about thirty figures of the French community about the evacuation of some 15,000 French nationals out of South Vietnam.  Earlier, in the middle of April, he had quietly closed the schools.

On April 28, the North Vietnamese divisions tightened siege around Saigon when General Duong Van Minh became the third president in replacement of President-designate Trran Van Huong, who assumed power as president for seven days after the resignation on Nguyen Van Thieu. Thousands of people gathered in front of the American Embassy. Waves of people headed to the center of the city, along Nguyen Hue Boulevard and the adjoining streets leading to wharves and docks on Saigon River banks. The North Vietnamese divisions were thirty miles north of Saigon. The U.S. Air Force had flown 43,479 people out of Saigon.  The agony of the capital really began, Early in the morning of April 28, rockets and mortars were raining on Tan Son Nhat Airfield. For hours, Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky was unable to fly to Can Tho to lead the resistance. Thousands of boats were sailing around the American fleet in the East Sea.

April 29, the situation was hopeless. The North Vietnamese divisions were apparently moving to take Saigon. Prime Minister-designate Vu Van Mau went on the radio to make public the government’s order that all American personnel and military officials must leave the country the next twenty four hours. The evacuations of U, S. officials and Vietnamese employees and families accelerated. Around 8:00 o ‘clock, a Chinook escorted by Cobra gunships appeared like dragonflies above the American Embassy compounds. The last U, S. officials and Marines left the roof of the American Embassy. They were then on board of CH46, flying out of Saigon. At 10:00, Radio Saigon broadcast the announcement by President Duong Van Minh, saying that “to avoid the bloodshed, the President asks the soldiers of the Republic to put an end to all hostilities, be calm, and remain where they are to save the lives of the people and do not open fire.” He also called on the troopers of the Provisional Revolutionary Government not to open fire. He was waiting to meet with their representatives to discuss the orderly takeover of power, both civilian and military without causing senseless bloodshed to the people.

The surrender announcement created confusion and panic. Chaos intensified. People in mass sought to leave Saigon. Thusands of escapees crowded itto wharves and docks. Desperate escapees looked for departures at seashore beaches in Vung Tau, Can Tho, Rach Gia, and Phu Quoc.  Looting spead and ravaged the city, Pillage broke out in Binh Dong, Cho Lon (Saigon Chinatown), Khanh Hoi, in residential quarters in Tan Binh Precinct, at abandoned American offices in the center of the city, and at warehouses in Tan Cang (New Port), Binh Thanh District, Gia Dinh Province. Amid tumult, columns sifter columns of North Vietnamese troopers from Binh Chanh, Hoc Mo Cu Chi southwest of Saigon streamed into the city. Abandoned South Vietnamese soldiers left their positions on the battlefronts northeast of Saigon ran along the Bien Hoa Highway, leaving arms and uniforms on either side of the road.  

At noon, North Vietnamese tanks from Bien Hoa Highway roared into the city and proceeded up to Indepenlance Palace on Thong Nhat Boulevard. In a moment Soviet-made tanks rammed the gates. The infantry and tank crews joined, inundating the lawn. A Privy government flag appeared on the balcony. Guns were fired into the sky while two North Vietnamese troopers were waiving their flags. General Duong Van Mimh was waiting for the newcomers to turn over the government. At the headquarters of various military zones, Generals Nguyen Khoa Nam, Le Quang Hung, Pham Van Phu, Le Nguyen Vy, and Tran Van Hai committed suicide. They refused to haul their flag. Pockets of resistance still continued here and there in various regions in the South.

THE PROBLEMS

THE PROBLEMS

By Van Nguyen

The Exodus to the Promised Land

Before 1975, the Vietnamese emigrants overseas were a little number. There were about 160,000-170,000 Vietnamese in Southeast Asia (50,000 in Thailand, 40,000 in Kampuchea, and 30,000 in Laos). Outside Asia, there were about 30,000 in France, some 4,000 in New Caledonie, and 3,000 in the United States. During the two decades that preceded 1975, the Vietnamese emigrants mostly came from South Vietnam. They formed a little number in other countries in Western Europe and most of their time there was devoted to carrying on their graduate studies. They often chose the Francophone countries such as Canada, Belgium, and Swiss. Certain others went on doing their studies at the universities in Australia, West Germany, and Japan. The fall of South Vietnam in April 1975 accompanied an unprecedented exodus in the history of Vietnam. The U.S. military force performed the first evacuation. It essentially comprised the military and civil personnel who, mostly, belonged to the ruling class of the old regime and easy quarters--cadres, high-ranking officers and civil servants, bankers, financiers, industrialists, intellectuals, medical doctors, pharmacists, dentists, engineers, businessmen, and so on.). According to the statistics by the United Nations that agreed with those tallied by Hanoi, the number of these first refugees rose to 143,000.

  Beginning in July 1975, the confiscation of private properties and the repression against the capitalist compradors and capitalist businessmen, the land collectivization during the years 1978-79, and the Sino-Vietnamese war  (February-March 1979) coupled with the expulsion to China 276,000 Chinese in the North, the movement of clandestine emigration began. Another form of illegal immigration by the sea termed as semi-official departures developed.  From the up north province of Quang Tri in the Center to the southernmost Ca Mau peninsula in the South, the authorities, mostly the personnel of the Pubic Security, patronized these semi-official departures in exchange for gold. Most passengers were Vietnamese of Chinese ethnic. Organizers collected gold from the passengers, 10 to 15 taels each. Saigon, Ca Mau, and Rach Fia offered the safest embarkations, In Saigon; Chairman of the City People’s Council Phan Dinh Dong alias Mai Chi Tho was the patron. Embarkations even took place at Saigon Wharf, near the one-time My Canh Floating Restaurant.  The shipwreck at Cat Laiin September 1979 astounded not only city dwellers but also the authorities themselves.   Cat Lai is located in Thu Duc District, several kilometers east of Saigon where the 30-meter merchant ship Thanh Xuong anchored. Witness said tickets were sold out to around 300 passengers, but more than 400 passengers were taken in aboard. Passengers who paid the lower fares were assigned to seats in the hold. Unable to suffer suffocating heat, many passengers preferred to stand on the deck, the ship weighed anchor at high tide. A few kilometers from Cat Lai, it swayed out of hot hustle of the passengers, slid sideways, then turned upside down. There was no reuse whatsoever. The best morning, bodies of the drowned were seen floating up as far as Thu Thiem boat ferry across from the My Canh Foating Restaurant.   

 At the time of the launching of the operations for systematic socialization in the years 1983-1985, the “boat people” who, mostly, comprised lower-ranking civil servants, artisans, small traders, peasants, fishermen, workers, and craft-men, left the country. During the first ten years, from 1975 to 1985, the High Commission for Refugees registered 650,000 arrivals of boat people at the coasts of the countries of first asylum. Tens of thousands of other Vietnamese leaving their country during this period never came to destination. They were victims of storms, of sun, of Thai or Malaysian pirates, Vietnamese or Malaysian coastguards and the indifference of merchant ships sailing on the waters of the South China Sea. Experts of the High Commission for Refugees estimated that 20 or 30 per cent of boat people had perished on the sea. Thus, in ten years, approximately a million Vietnamese escaped their country in search for refuge overseas (Lam Thanh Liem and Jean Mais, 1995: 3-4).

According to Que Me Magazine (1981), from 1979 to 1981, 396 719 boat people had arrived at refugees camps. Estimates by the Red Cross, nevertheless, pointed out, until 1983, around 5,000 boats of the refugees had perished at sea, and around 300,000 boat people had lost their lives. The report by the High Commission for Refugees in 1984 indicated that 1,800 refugees were killed by pirates. In 19882, one fourth of 1, 2 million refugees had been beaten or tortured and around 81% of the women in the refugee’s boats were repeatedly raped. Fifteen years after the communist takeover of Saigon, the escape across the sea ever continued. On January 15, 1990, 11 naked bodies identified as female Vietnam were drifted ashore on Nakkhon SiThammarat in South Thailand. Thai authorities confirmed they were victims of piracy. They were  thrown into the sea after they had been raped then killed.

The Frontiers Wars

Amid insurmountable difficulties, the administration faced the invasions of the Red Khmer into the South West provinces in the South and Chinese troops the along the borders Northwest provinces of the country. On April 30, 1977, the Chinese-supported Khmer Rouge transgressed and made attacks along the southwestern borders provinces of Tay Ninh, Ha Tien, and Kien Giang. Seven battalions launched in-roads attacks into the regions of Bay Nui, TINH Bien, and An Giang. Three infantry regiments of the People’s Army supported by airplanes and flanked by armored vehicles and tanks from Kienn Giang routed the invaders out of the territory.  In January 1978, the Khmer Rouge, again, deployed troops along the borders provinces. From January 11-19, three   Khmer Rouge regiments launched attacks into the districts of Tinh Bbien and Phu Cuong, north of Vinh Te Canals. On January 18, two other regiments made inroad attacks and seized Giang Thanh, Ha Tien District, Kien Giang Province. Heavy artillery from Kampuchea shelled in Chau Doc Township and Tay Ninh Township and the surrounding areas. Vietnamese villages along the borders were destroyed, and Vietnamese and Kampuchea residents as well were massacred.  Bloody battles ensued. On January 7, 1979, the People’s Army launched an all-out offensive into Kampuchea, seizing the vast territory from Neal Luong to Phnpm Penh. The Khmer Rouge genocide war enfolded. It is estimated that 1.671 out of the total population 7.890, 000 of Kampuchea were massacred during the period from 1975 to 1979. Victims of Chinese nationality were 215,000 out of the total 400,000, and those of Vietnamese nationality were 4000-10.000 out of the total 200,000 people who failed to escape the country before the Red Khmer occupation (The Pol Pot Regime, Yale University 1966, p.458). On January11, Khmer Rouge’ top leader Ieng Sary successfully escaped to Thailand borders. He was brought to Bangkok by the Thai Armed Forces and was then transported to Beijing.

The invasion of the Vietnam People’s Army into Kampuchea was brought for discussion before the United Nations at the request of the China’s protégé Norodom Sihanouk. The U.N. General Assembly passed resolution to demand Vietnam to withdraw its troops from the country. It was an act of impudence to China. And, Beijing decided to teach Hanoi a lesion.  On February 17, 1979, opened attacks all along the northwestern borders provinces in the North, invading and occupying the whole territory from Phong Tho, Lai Chau to Mong Cay. Heavy artillery shelled in Lang Son, the capital province in upmost North. About 200,000 Red Army troops were deployed on the first day of the invasion. Taken by total surprise, the Vietnamese troops stationed near the Nam Quan Gate area were flattened out in an instant. The population fled in chaos. In Cao Bang people ran in flow into distant caves at the pursuit of the Chinese troops. In February, as many as 60 Chinese army divisions were deployed along the frontiers.

       

The invasion proceeded on different battle fronts, On February 17, six army divisions moved into Lang Son; and three other divisions moved into Lao Kay. Reinforcements with heavy artillery and tanks were sent in.  The stone-ore plant at Lao Cay was broken down’ two train stations at Goc Da and the Lang Coc Bridge were blown out. Innocent Vietnamese were massacred. Women were raped and children were no exception. In Cao Bang, the Chinese destroyed every office building and every office  building and residential  every house before withdrawal. The invaders met with furious retaliation from the Vietnamese force which was much weaker in arms and inferior in strength. In Cao Bang, on the advance from Cao Bang to Fai Ho Sin Pass, the Chinese suffered tragic battle losses. Memories of the “Bloody Patth at the Pass” certainly imprint on their mindss. “Approximately 25 Chinese troopers were killed and 37, 000 others were wounded. The lesson which Deng Xiaoping tended to teach the “brother hood country cost China 5.5 billion of yuan out of the 1978 fical year.

Economic Reforms--The Failures (II)

Economic Reforms--The Failures (II)

By Van Nguyen

 In 1976, agricultural production achieved high output leveling rice production rose to 11..8 million tons.  The guideline for economic development for the first five-year plan (1976-1980) by the IV Party Congress foresaw that by 1980 agricultural production should provide as much as 21 million tons of rice. Nevertheless, State trade agencies could only purchase with force 11.6 million tons. Vietnam had to import 1, 57 million tons of provisions. The reforms, as viewed by the ideological architects of the regime, were designed to stimulate production, especially in those areas of the economy which were administered by State plans. Beginning in June 1978, agricultural products were conditioned by these plans were nevertheless limited in scope. There was reflection of a caution. In the South, the old society was still undergoing tremendous difficulties resulting from the trade and industry policy on the one hand and the unpopular measure of population relocation on the other. The nil--growth economy persisted. The population—the workers, the peasants the youth, both men and women, and the intellectuals—were disappointed with it. . Pessimism was felt among various levels of the administration. In the domain of agriculture, millions of people had participated in bringing hundreds of thousands more hectares of land under cultivation and building thousands of kilometers of roads for circulation or dredging thousands of kilometers canals and ditches for navigation. However, these changes were performed only through coercion rather than of volition. The Party initiated various policies aiming at eliminating the comprador capitalists as a class and doing away with all vestiges of feudal exploitation. These measures failed to exterminate the oils exploiting class. Rather, they gave impetus to the appearance of a new ruling class. They radically realigned an elite class and created a ruling machine that was controlled collectively by the putative vanguard of the working class--the party--and by the senior cadres of the party that were mostly from the North (Cima, 1989: 110).

 The economic development failed to achieve the purpose due to mismanagement and unpopular measures Approximately 1.8 million hectares of cultivated land were left abandoned, and 70% of agricultural machines and implements disposed from the comprador bourgeoisie were left unused in warehouses. Facing insurmountable difficulties, in the economy, in August 1978, the Vietnamese Communist leaders agreed upon a number of reforms in the economic system. They thus began a process of economic rejuvenation which they hoped to redress the economy., The five-year economic plan (1976-1980) that aimed to transform the South proved to be a failure. The industrialization of the nation in the areas of metallurgy, heavy construction, and agricultural collectivization planned by the Ministry of Planning, which was headed by Vice Prime Minister Le Thanh Nghi, declined.  Inexperienced and cupid high-ranking party members, usually blockhead political commissioners, executed unplanned practices, thus destroying the wealth of the country and the hopes of the people.  Political commissioners in the Dong Thap Muoi (Plain of Reeds) in the former Chuong Thien and Kien Phong provinces, for example, cunningly had poor peasants transformed moors into arable fields without  groundwork for irrigation. Thousands of labors and volunteers were sent to the area and worked for months, but the fields remained water-flogging. In addition, from the beginning, the new economic program ran into serious problems in recruiting labor (Van Duc. Let’s Overcome Fear. !993).

Work conditions and means of production in the fields were very harsh, especially for former urban dwellers with no previous farming experience. In spite of substantial state investment in the state farms, the remuneration to workers was low, and the living conditions were difficult, and productivity was disappointing. Large numbers of émigrés began to drift back to the cities--a move in itself entailed a considerable degree of economic insecurity. From the beginning, the new economic program ran into serious problems in recruiting labor.  Conditions were very harsh, especially for former urban dwellers with no previous farming experience. In spite of substantial state investment in the state farms, the remuneration to workers was low, living conditions were difficult, and productivity was meager. Large numbers of émigrés began to drift back to the cities--a move in itself entailed a considerable degree of economic insecurity.Another setback in the land betterment was the lack of responsibility and expertise of the cadres. The Tri An Dam on the upper Vam Co River failed to take shape due to mismanagement and corruption. Local political commissioners in the provinces adjacent to the highland ordered the inhabitants to clear productive forests and woods for the growing of manioc. Precious trees were felled and cut out then sold at any price, and the money went to the cupid authorities' pockets. The result was that productive forests and woods were gone, and the manioc never grew since the land was poorly treated and left uncultivated without attention. Rice fields in many other regions were, at times, left abandoned. The peasants were duped by empty promises and unplanned measures. They felt indignant; they were betrayed and exploited for the benefits of others.

The five-year economic plan (1976-1980) aimed to transform the South proved to be a failure. The industrialization in the area of metallurgy, heavy construction, and agricultural collectivization planned by the Ministry of Planning headed by Vice Prime Minister Le Thanh Nghi, fell into a decline. The national economy plunged in crisis the following years. Communist leaders in the South, particularly Vo Van Kiet, were blamed for deviations derailing the economy of the South from socialist economic centralism. In October 1980, the Party Committee of Ho Chi Minh held a congress, assessing the results of the five-year plan 1976-1980.  It then came up with determination to carry out the change of orientation of the Party Central Committee. In his speech to the congress on October 14, in the presence of Party Secretary –General Le Duan and, Vo Van Kiet, Secretary of Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee explained in concrete terms the shortcomings of an erroneous policy that, in their views, would  lead to chaos, and thus  annihilating the legitimate political  regime of  the people. In the North, the agrarian reforms, this time, also proved to be a failure. The peasants i n the provinces in the upper Tonkin Delta sold their land properties without state authorization, moved to the Northwestern highlands, cleared forests and woods for rice fields, and established permanent settlements. Hard measures were put into action but came to no result. Local authorities were resigned to inaction. Besides, those serious problems emerged beyond the Party’s prevision. Communist China withdrew its economic assistance as the war in Kampuchea escalated, and the brother country prepared to teach Vietnam a lesson. The economic life was deplorable

The predominant peasantry, which is approximately 80% of the population, is still exploited   mercilessly and lives in misery. “It could be argued that this situation was the inevitable consequence of a long and costly war and that, with peace; the victorious government could have been expected to give top priority to economic policies which improve living standards.  But, this did not happen. Instead, it became clear that the New Management System based on producer cooperatives was to be implemented in both North and South Vietnam. By late 1979, it appeared that NMS in North Vietnam had effectively collapsed; it had inhibited rather than assisted agricultural growth and the generation of an inevitable surplus. We simply do not have enough information to present a balance sheet on the impact of North Vietnamese agrarian policies up to 1980. While many government policies were clearly both inefficient and unpopular, it is likely that the estimated 250,000 cadres who poured out of state training institutes into the countryside in the 1960's and 1970's played an important role in introducing new ideas about technology, the economy, and society into a stagnant and oppressed rural sector further burdened with the consequences of a long and brutal war. In doing so, they may well have laid the foundations for a more dynamic and responsive agricultural sector in the 1990’s,” (FForde, 1989: 15).

  Reviewing the Vietnamese Communist Party's policies of land reforms, the Most Venerable Thich Quang Do had this to comment: “The policies for land collectivization throughout 20 years (1960-1980) had caused the country's economic exhaustion, the people’s extreme starvation --the rice production was insufficient for the population to subsist. Fearful of a popular uprising, the Vietnamese Communist Party had to change its policies, replacing the land collectivization systems with the land contracts systems to remedy the situation.  Because of its extremely heavy taxation on the products, the economic situation remained miserably unchanged --the people were still starving (Thuy Giao and Ngoc Phuong, 1995).

North Vietnamese agricultural output had been sustained because of the type of collective structures which had been established in the 1960’s in the North. The  neglect which the countryside had experienced the height of  the war had helped to paper over the cracks, so it was not  until peace was restored and the government made efforts to strengthen  the “socialist” character of the cooperatives that the real weaknesses of the system were freely exposed. What these weaknesses meant were that in the late 1970’s when the attempt to incorporate the South coincided with a series of poor agricultural seasons and renewed hostilities, this time with Pol Pot’s Cambodia and with China, the economy was unable to cope with the shocks. Instead of experiencing a downturn of a rising trend line of growth, the agricultural crisis of the late 1970’s precipitated a reversal of economic growth, which in the context of an economy as poor as Vietnam’s implied a renewal of the threat of famine for much of the northern population and called into question, for the time, popular confidence in the   leadership of the Communist Party

At the time of reunification of the country, the North Vietnamese economy had achieved a high level of socialism: most peasants were members of cooperative units and nearly all staple food production was carried out by the units; industry had also been incorporated into the socialist sector--modern industrial plants were owned by the State at the central or provincial level and handicrafts were run by cooperatives set up by districts or within agricultural cooperatives. But this socialization of ownership had not been accompanied by very effective forms of socialized productions powerful incentives existed in the way both industry and agriculture were organized for workers and peasants to transfer much of their productive effort to non-collective and non-state activities--either to legitimate black market variety. While some recognition of these problems had begun to emerge in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by the end of the war; it was not yet widespread--the difficulties of managing a war-time economy and the availability of foreign aid divided attention from them. The program for transformation of the South thus took the establishment of the same intentions for granted. However, the reactions of Southerners to the imposition of the “north model” were a key element in bringing about a fundamental process of reform (Huynh Kim Khanh, p.140).