AT A STANDSTILL

 

AT A STANDSTILL

 

By Van Nguyen

 

 

     

 

The move to renovation is decisive. The Seventh Party Congress (1991), in this effort, sets forth policy and strategy to build national reconstruction in in every aspect of the life of the people in the coming transitional period to socialism. It is a socialist society where the working people are the master and where a developing economy founded on progressive forces of production and the public system of ownership to the means of production. The ultimate objectives are to be achieved in harmony with the cherished national cultural heritage to liberate man from oppression and exploitation.

 

Rhetoric and reality does not match. Religious intolerance, as a case in point, is flat and merciless. Amnesty International (1992), published a long list of Catholic priests and Buddhist monks whom it recognizes as prisoners of conscience Catholic priest Tran Ba Loc was arrested in 1975  and detained  at Nhu Xuan reeducation camp, Thanh Hoa Province, North Vietnam. Catholic priest Nguyen Thai Son was arrested in 1975 and detained at Nhu Xuan reeducation camp, Thanh Hoa Province, North Vietnam.  Catholic priest Nguyen Van Ly was arrested in 1983 and detained at Ba Sao reeducation camp, Ha Nam Ninh Province, North Vietnam. Catholic lawyer Nguyen Khac Chinh was arrested in 1975 and detained at Xuan Loc reeducation camp, Long Khanh Province, South Vietnam. Buddhist monk Thich Huyen Quang was placed under house arrest in 1982 at Quang Nghia Village, Nghia Binh Province, and Central Vietnam. Buddhist monk Thich Quang Do was placed under house arrest in 1982 at Vu Thu Village, Thai Binh Province, North Vietnam. Buddhist monk Thich Duc Nhuan was arrested in 1985 and in 1988, and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Buddhist monk Thich Tri Sieu was arrested in 1984, sentenced to 20 years in prison, and detained at Xuan Loc reeducation camp, Dong Nai Province, South Vietnam. Buddhist monk Thich Tue Sy was arrested in 1984, sentenced to 20 years in prison, and detained at Xuan Loc reeducation camp, Dong Nai Province, South Vietnam. Buddhist monk Thich Thien Tan was arrested in 1978, sentenced to life imprisonment, and detained at Xuan Phuoc reeducation camp, Phu Khanh Province, Central Vietnam. Buddhist monk Thich Phuc Vien was arrested in 1980, sentenced to 20 years in prison, and detained at Xuan Phuoc reeducation camp, Phu Khanh Province, Central Vietnam. Pastor Vo Xuan was arrested in June1975and detained in a reeducation camp until 1987. He was rearrested on December 12, 1989, and detained at Thuan Hai Province, Central Vietnam. Pastor Tran Xuan Tu was arrested in 1985 and sentenced to 3 years of “reeducation.” His term in prison was extended to three other additional years in 1990, and was detained at an unknown forced labor camp.

 

Problems surged as the administration moved towards renovation. The daily Tuoi Tre (The Youth), on September 28 and October 8, 1991, reported that, one year after the operations for anti-corruption had completed, the General Inspector of the State Le Quang Tham announced that the State had executed 2,572 inspections and taken stern administrative measures against 19,220 officials, among whom were 7 vice-ministers and high-ranking officials at the same level, 6 chiefs of services and enterprises, 8 commissioners at the province level. Ten per cent of the personnel of the national reserves department, 2,128 officials of banking services, among whom 134 were chiefs of services, were subject to administrative measures. Six thousand seven hundred twenty-six (6,726) were brought to trials in the courts of justice. The administrative measures were evaluated as weak and late, according to the general inspector. The state property losses exceeded 25,000 billion dong (1,947 million dollars), which was approximately equal to the annual national income in foreign currency. 

 

 In his official report to the Laws Committee of the National Assembly on October 11, 1993, Tran Van Luc, Inspector of the People's Council of Ho Chi Minh City, brought out such fact as, up to September 1993, the City had conducted 106 instances of inspection and found out the State had lost 53.5 billion dong, 3,695 ounces of gold, 8 houses, 11,875 square meters of land due to corruption. One hundred twenty-five (125) state officials were interrogated; 33 of them were subjected to investigation; and 22 were arrested for violations of the law. Tran Van Luc further stated that there was indication that corrupt state officials had conjoined themselves in an intertwined network to create a hard shell to protect corruption. Corruption spreads everywhere. It takes place in both political organizations and the mass media.

 

According to Truong Van Da, vice-chairman of the People's Council of Ho Chi Minh City, there appeared an organized Mafia. Another vice-chairman of the People's Council of Ho Chi Minh City, Vuong Huu Nhon, reported that the city's economy growth slowed down partly due to smuggling of commodities into the city. As a case in point, Ba Ty, through the Dong Nai Import and Export Company, smuggled into the city 4 million meters of fabric valued at 38 billion dong. He further indicated that the city had administered 15,000 instances of smuggling, illegal business transaction, and counterfeit merchandise within the two months of August and September 1993. However, only 110 instances of violation were administered. Vuong Huu Nhon also indicated that one of the hurdles in the fight against smuggling results from inefficient coordination between authorities and abuses of power. There are "special quarters" such as the area surrounding the Tan Son Nhat Airport. Local authorities were not permitted to go into the area for inspection, although they were aware that smuggling commodities had been stored there

 

        Organized corruption ravages the officialdom, causing a serious problem to the regime. There is foul play in business transactions of which international investors should be aware. Professor Nguyen Cao Hach (1993) pointed out that “the Communist authorities have institutionalized corruption. To secure internal security, the superior authority forces unconditional submission on lower cadres. Even if cadres at all echelons of the officialdom take bribe, none of them will dare raise a voice. A strategy is formulated. In foreign investment, for instance, orchestrated plan is created to publicize, mostly appealing to capitalists overseas. “Projects” are tossed around at international conferences and meetings. They appear to be proliferating enough to give them a mantle of honesty and respectability. To the communist opportunists turned to be “red bourgeois,” foreign investment has the motive force to legitimize illegitimate business ventures.  Foreign trade exchange would justify their newly acquired illegitimate fortunes, as well as massive transfer’s refrigerated money in foreign countries where they are taking the precaution of sending part of their families there ahead of time to secure a foothold in the projects that are still more difficult to find a clue. “ (Nguyen Cao Hach, Viet Marketing and Report. August, 1993: 53)

SHORTCOMINGS

 

SHORTCOMINGS

 

By Van Nguyen

 

 

 

 

In March 1988, the government issued three new banknotes, the 1,000 dong bill, the 2,000 dong bill, and the 5,000 dong bill, to match up with the rising costs of living.  It was a burden for most Vietnamese, having faced soaring inflation and a rapid drop in purchasing power. Austerity was an inescapable fact of life. No one starved, but the average diet was highly deficient in protein and amounted to only 1,940 calories per day, 25 percent below the level required for manual labor. Moreover, as much as 80 percent of a worker's monthly wage was spent on food. A reader complained to a Ho Chi Minh City newspaper in 1986 that the monthly salary and price subsidies paid to an ordinary worker or civil servant were barely enough to support his family for part of the month. The writer also noted that an increasing number of workers and public officials had succumbed to the lure of "outside temptations" and were misusing their functions and power to get rich illegally.

 

  Conditions of living were deplorable. Illiteracy was high--9% of the peasantry was illiterates, and 50% of them had not finished primary education. The increase in population was another serious problem. The daily Hanoi Moi (New Hanoi), on June 4, 1992, revealed that the population in Hanoi increased to about 1 million, and the annual increase rate is 1.73%. About 100,000 inhabitants lived in ruined houses; 30,000 inhabitants were allocated each with 1.5 square meters of room for housing, and only 20% of the population in the city enjoyed 6 square meters of room per person for housing. Of more than 10,000 young married couples, only 30% are allocated private housing. Far from controlling unemployment, the communist administration failed in its control over the economic deterioration.  

 

A most visible obstacle to the economic development of the time is unemployment. The daily Quan Doi Nhan Dan (The People's Army), on June 8,1992, disclosed that Vietnam had 7 million people who were either out of work or unemployed. Most of those who were unemployed lived in cities, and 1.5 million people who did not have a regular job lived in the countryside. The daily also noted that, of 51 million people living in the countryside, 26 million people aged 15-59 were out of work. The number of unemployed people aged 15-59 increased to 75% of the total labor force. The high rate of unemployment resulted from the lack of capital, and the peasants were so poor that they could not afford to invest in grain production.

 

  By the end of the 1980's, the International Bureau of Labor predicted unemployment to be doubled by the end of 1990. It is caused by the restructuration of state enterprise and the release of soldiers from service. The number of soldiers discharged outnumbered the unemployed, estimated at 2 million. The ambitious program of restructuration, on the other hand, was inadequate. Minister of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Welfare Tran Dinh Hoan, cited in the weekly Lao Dong (The Worker), predicted that "the number of Vietnamese workers sent to the Soviet Union and East European countries will fall in the 1991-1995 period." This was due to economic difficulties, including unemployment, wracking these countries, which underwent major political changes. Up to 30 per cent of the 80,000 Vietnamese workers in the Soviet Union currently lacked employment and received tiny subsidies, making their daily lives a struggle as food prices continued to rise. Other socialist countries in Eastern Europe were facing similar problems due to political upheavals. Vietnam was likely to send workers to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. The Ministry showed that 240,000 Vietnamese had been sent to work overseas since 1980 (FBIS, January 29, 1990: 59).

 

  Observers said there must be more profound and efficacious reforms to get the country out of this stagnant situation. To master unemployment, the Vietnamese economy must create 1.5 million jobs. Of the 30 million active workers, 20 million worked in the agricultural sector. The absorption capacity of this sector was de facto obstructed. The Vietnamese communist rule exported part of the country's work force to communist Eastern Europe. Some 200,000 workers were sent abroad in the 1980's under the so-called "cooperative socialist program." The task became increasingly difficult because of the political and economic crisis in those countries. This politics came again as exports of workers to West Europe. Because of the economic crisis in Vietnam, there were not enough jobs for these workers. The candidates considered themselves as "privileged" because the wage in West Germany was equivalent to more than 20 times that in Vietnam. However, the situation of the Vietnamese workers overseas never ceased to dilapidate. Five thousand of them, taking advantage of the opening of the Berlin Wall, evaded to the West. Thousands of them were repatriated in the past year, thus adding weight to persistent unemployment in the country.

 

   The new law on land grounded on the 1992 Constitution, as always, is aimed at transforming the peasants into "state farmers." It is additionally circumscribed by a lease that someday gave way to the manipulation by the government for political purpose, to suppress anti-socialism, for instance.  Deprived of the land to cultivate legally by the government, the peasants and their families could only live with difficulty. They suffered almost the same conditions as their compeers in the North had in the days of the bloody agrarian reforms of 1955-56. Although lowered, the taxation still remained high. The yield of crops in 1992, for example, was not sufficient enough to help them make ends meet due to the heavy costs of farming. Despite good harvests, quite a few peasants went bankrupt, because the selling price of rice in the market (averaging from 750 to 800 dong per kilogram --with one dollar equals 10,000 dong), was only equal to or lower than the cost of production. The peasants were thus no longer interested in implementing the yield of their land simply because it no longer belonged to them. The limit of three hectares per family truly deceived the old middle cultivators who had possessed more than three hectares. As a consequence, in the Mekong delta where the population was sparse and labor force was in want, the peasantry abandoned their land (Lam Thanh Liem, 1993: 4-5).  

 

      The open-door economic development 1985-1889 under the leadership of Secretary-general Nguyen Van Linh was still at the deadlock, Nguyen Cao Hach noted that “the communist administration declared that all doors should largely open to foreign investment, actually or soon to be invested, was estimated at approximately five billion dollars. We have to be taken with caution, however. Statistics published  by official sources, are generally arbitrary, and even when they come from competent authorities, they are rarely reliable. Official lies have often been made as a matter of justification for success of a policy. Take, for example, a statement on foreign investment in the “Development Program.” It ascertains that the "real GDP per capita" of the country is estimated at as much as U.S. $1,000 per capita for the period of 1985-1989. If such fact were true, the total GDP for the total population would be at as much as 65 billion dollars.  Is this a “real GDP per capita” for a country with small multifarious areas of arable land available that just got out of 30 years of warfare with poor means for construction of roads and bridges and destitute of machinery for redressing of industrial establishments? Furthermore, after decades of fata massive destruction, the country has still faced with economic failures due to ill-conceived plans seriously damaging the country’s productive geo-economic environment, making investment projects more inaccessible and investments difficult to realize (Nguyen Cao Hach. Viet Marketing and Report. 1993).  

 

       Lam Le Trinh pointed out that the “renovated” economic system following the hard times of 1996- 1992, is defined somewhat awkwardly. Typically, Article 12 of the 1992 Constitution defines it as an economic structure "with multiple sections and diverse forms of production and organization, based on a system of property, where the property of the people as a whole and the collective where the property of the people and collective property form the foundation of the system."  Such a definition would engender serious difficulties and problems to the operation of a market economy. In an interview with the daily Nguoi Viet (The Vietnamese People) in California, Nguyen Xuan Anh, the economic advisor to the Hanoi government, when asked about the chance of success of this hybrid system, said that the system is half-centralized and half free market: “I don't know. But, this is clear: Free market economy and communism do not mix (Lam Le Trinh. “The Rocky Road to Recnciliation,”1993: A5).

 

 Vo Tran Tri maintained that the communist administration had failed to control the financial resources of aid from overseas Vietnamese since foreign currencies were funneled into the hands of foreign traders in contraband. Another serious shortcoming was the skyrocketing unemployment: 20% of the working population is out of work. The problem was increasingly serious as there would be increase of 6 million in population growth annually, thus exerting heavy weight to the poor economy. As a result, Vietnam would not escape from poverty and misery.  The intelligentsia had to urge the Hanoi regime to carry out radical reforms to save the country from poverty and misery, Nguyen Hu Chung added  that, without a sound policy, Hanoi would not be able to save the lamentable economy but would only enrich a number of corrupt cadres and party members, instead (Thoi Luan. California. March 14, 1992).

 

 The shortcomings in redressing the national economy, according to Nguyen Van Tran, reside in misconception on the role of the leadership and the incompetence of the administration. Plans and programs are incomprehensive and local, focusing on the partial and immediate. The motional economic development requires unification in national administration the two regions of the country and thus the strategy for an integrated national economic development should be oriented towards unification, and not parochialism. The economic system is deviant and inefficient, worse still, it has not corresponded to the immediate economic demands, and not mentioning obstacles caused by insurmountable difficulties the country has faced in national construction. To this disadvantage, the system still encroaches on a burdensome administration with a superposition of layers of authority (Nguyen Van Tran. Viet Cho Me va Quoc Hoi, pp. 248-249).

OPEN-DOOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

"OPEN-DOOR" ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By Van Nguyen

In April 1988, the Vietnamese government legalized several aspects of free market trading and private property in such a hope that trade increase along with interaction with the international market. The Party’s “open-door policy” began as soon as Nguyen Van Linh came to power in 1986.  The core leadership Nguyen Van Linh, Pham Hung, Do Muoi, Vo Van Kiet, and Nguyen Co Thach realized the urgent need for more “open-door” was pressing and immediate. In his analysis “Vietnam the new Investment Frontier in Southeast Asia” (1992), Nguyen Xuan Oanh and Phillip Donald noted that there was a rather strong confidence in the economic renovation of the country: “The decades-long command economy is still in the process of being transformed into a market-oriented structure which encourages private initiative for personal gain pragmatic and far-sighted, the new leadership itself to economic renovation, providing its hard-working people with higher incomes, better working and living conditions, increased educational opportunities and more adequate health care and services.”  On the other hand, they pointed our negative reserves according to which” if these aspirations are to be fulfilled further reforms creating major structural changes in the economy will have to be undertaken  and, the longer  this process is delayed, the more difficult and costly it will be to achieve their ambitious their developmental goals.”

 Efforts were made to restructure the administrative autocracy, encouraging entrepreneurial spirit, and looking forward to the eventual lifting of the U.S. decade-long embargo. Along with other actions and aspirations, these efforts had given impetus for the economic reforms for the six years 1986-1992 to gather momentum. During the three years 1990-1992, the authors noted, more than three billion had been invested in the country by foreign enterprises and trading companies, most of which entered into joint ventures with State-owned enterprises and private firms. The country’s economy responded positively to the government’s reform measures. The rate of economic growth rose from three percent per annum in 1986 to almost twenty-five percent in the five following years. Private enterprises were concentrated on various service-type industries. Private firms were developed in the light industry sector. Joint-ventures with foreign partners were established to produce light industry goods for export.

Vietnam sought few markets for its products as well. Asian companies were in the forefront in this investment surge. In the context of the lifting of the trade embargo by the United Sates, the country would well be along on the path toward become the next “tiger” on the block in Asia by the year 2000. Nevertheless, the controversy over the policy within opposing factions in the Communist Party hindered much the progress towards economic renovation. It was not until 1991, the phraseology “market economy” was only used sparingly in the strategy project to stabilize and develop the economy and society. However, along the move from concentration economy to market economy, Vietnam’s GDP growth came up to 6’6% in 1992.

      In practice, during the period of economic development from 1986 to 1992, efforts were made in the process of transition from the concentration economy into a market-oriented structure were noticeable. Plans to restructure the administration was proceeded to create favorable conditions for investment and business transactions ahead of the lifting of the U.S. embargo. Achievements in these efforts by Premier Vo Van Kiet and his deputy Phan Van Khai were encouraging. For five years 1987-1992, some 350,000 small private firms emerged, and about seventy percent of all trade and service industries were in the hands of the private firms. Even more, during the three year 1989-1992, more than three billion dollars, most of which entered into joint ventures with State-owned enterprises and private firms, were invested in the country by foreign enterprises and business companies. The impact of such plans of reforms would create an impetus for competition in a concentration economy and thus a serious danger to the monopoly of power of the Communist Party and State. Ardent “conservatives’ in the Communist Party, right at the outset of “doi moi” (openness), consistently opposed the tendencies of market-oriented reforms, viewing them as “deviations,” and efforts to restructure the economies system of the existing regime a process of “peaceful evolution.” Premier Vo Van Kiet faced an ever growing opposition until 1994 when the rise gathered momentum in 1994. 

    Impediments were numerous. The laws on Investment, for example, were a hazardous hindrance. Melanie Beresford pointed out: “The passage of the 1987 law constitutes Vietnam's second attempt to attract foreign investors. The earlier law of 1977 failed to attract significant amounts of investment, mainly due to the poor state of the Vietnamese economy and official discouragement of Western investors by their governments as well as the law's more restrictive provisions. Despite more liberal conditions for foreign investors, however, I doubt that the law itself is primarily responsible for the rapid increase in investment over the last five years. In the first place, the expanding body of regulations is reportedly somewhat confusing, and, secondly, the authorities have been rather "flexible" in its application. The flow of investment was small due to uncertainty about moving into uncharted territory, poor infrastructure, and the generally low level economic activity. The main areas of interest were in oil exploration, tourism, and services, only the first of which was an area of priority identified by the Vietnamese government.  Moreover, foreign investment figures were artificially inflated since they referred to the value of projects rather than the amount actually spent in the country. In the case of oil, the majority of funds were spent in other countries; for other types of investment, there was a disappointingly low rate of project competition.

  ... As for private Vietnamese capital, it remains small. The problem here is not so much the scarcity favored in the explanations of orthodox development economists but the difficulty in mobilizing it. Vietnamese households do have a lot of savings, but they tend to be hoarded as gold or invested in private housing or in more speculative, short-term ventures (smuggling, for example).

  ... There is still a large state enterprise in Vietnam. It currently absorbs about 85 percent of the state investment and produces around one-third of the GDP. Most of the SOE stat remained in operation after the shakeout beginning in 1989 continued to receive support from the state in one form or another, even though direct subsidies were abolished. Between 1990 and 1992, subsidies were continued through the credit system, and the soft-budget constraints characteristic of the shortage economy were thus revived. While positive interest rates were restored in 1992, the social costs of closing non-performing enterprises could prove to be unacceptable in the medium term (Melanie Beresford, The Vietnamese Economy. 1993: 42-44)

   Corrupt practices were pervasive. Since 1986, the government had begun the market oriented economic reforms. Goods and services are more widely available in the cities. However, only the privileged groups of entrepreneurs who had connections with influential officials are free to engage in the industry and business enterprise. Investment fraud is extensively practiced. The party-run daily Nhan Dan (The People) carried, on its front page, an article by Nguyen Tien Pruco analyzing why investment projects in Ho Chi Minh City cannot be implemented. According to Nguyen, since the beginning of May 1986, there have been 171 projects approved by the State Committee for Cooperation and Investment. The Law on Investment came into existence. However, the number of projects put into practice is only 57 or 33.33 percent of the approved projects. There are 24 other projects that are facing difficulties. Nineteen (19) projects cannot be started. Twenty (20) projects forfeited their operating licenses. All of these projects account for 46 percent of the total projects. This situation is not a trivial matter. The cause of the situation is that many self-proclaimed investors are only high-class intermediaries when they apply for investment licenses. They apply for the license then sell it to other companies for a sumptuous commission. They do not care whether or not the projects are viable. The intermediaries exploit the lack of information, research, and dialogue in Vietnam and pretend to be big investors. Worse still, they also use licenses as fronts for illegal trading activities. They do not invest any money in production or business as stated in the licenses. They bring in tax-free commodities and then sell in the market instead of for foreign currencies as stipulated in their projects. An example of such commodities is Voice of Vietnam, Network in Vietnamese, June 22, 1992.

    Commenting on the economic situation of the "thoi mo cua" -the period of openness), the Thoi Bao Kinh Te (Economic Times) published in Saigon, in its issue of December 23-29, 1993, had this to say:          

 “At the time of First Secretary-general Le Duan, there was anxiety about the interest loans the Socialist Republic of Vietnam owed to the Soviet Union. As far as the interests are concerned, our comrades do not demand for interests. As for the term for reimbursement, we will only begin to reimburse the loans in 15 years, and during these 15 years, we will have already been in retirement, and our children and grandchildren will pay our debts.”

 

   According to the newspaper, the capitalist countries agreed, in principle, on a loan of U.S. $1.8 billion for Vietnam. Tran Bach Dang, a high dignitary of the regime, in a round table discussion organized by the said magazine said that the State accepted these loans, but it had to create beforehand conditions to receive them and administer them in such a way that the future generations would not be crushed with debts someday. Unfortunately, with preconditions, the entrepreneurs seemed to be beset with doubt. There were strictly economic preconditions such as the capability to administer with efficacy the loan on contract, to mobilize corresponding domestic savings, to consolidate and ameliorate the national monetary system. According to Huynh Buu Son, an economist, the money in the cities is the American dollar, and the Vietnamese dong is for the countryside. The newspaper stressed that the administration had to administer scientifically credits to reimburse regularly instead of taking recourse to expedients every yearend as it has usually conducted its affairs. Moreover, it had to serve a writ until it reached its purposes: to eliminate theft and peculation in all forms. Commenting on the Vietnamese Communist Party's approaches to policies, a longtime member in the Vietnamese Communist Central Party Committee said in bitter terms that, after the 1975 victory, there appeared ideas of an eccentric pride among the leadership of the Party, a Communist deceit. Even worse, trading and business transactions were virtually monopolized by state enterprises. The Company for Agricultural Commodities and Foods of Ho Chi Minh City directed by Nguyen Thi The (female), for instance, trampled underfoot laws and regulations, monopolizing the purchase of rice in the provinces.  On the other hand, private businesses were in disarray. Sean Kelly, an Australian businessman in Saigon, observed that "one can do anything as one wishes."  Indeed, imported goods were not regularized on social needs. Japanese cars and French wine, for instance, were imported to publicize the "freedom of trade." Worse still, contraband goods from Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Communist China inundated the streets of Saigon, creating an atmosphere of false prosperity.

CHANGING THE COURSE

CHANGING THE COURSE

By Van Nguyen

   In his observations on communism in Asia, Peter Gareth noted:  “The profound contradiction of contemporary communism in which it occurred is surely recognized by Chinese, Vietnamese, and other Communist leaders in Asia. They were still in power in such that it would not be at all surprising if the same kind and level of identity and systemic crises were to become evident in China in the 1980’s as in the USSR and Eastern Europe experienced. Given the unrest that has sometimes followed the death of a leader in the People’s Republic of China will trigger a process that result in China moving into post-communism. Vietnam may already have altered that phase by then; if not, and if its leaders manage to hold on to power partly by orienting their country from the Soviet Union and more towards their traditional enemy, China, the collapse of the latter, too, as a role-model would almost certainly an irreversible move in Vietnam in the direction of post-communism. The disintegration of the USSR raises new questions about the relationship of the domestic affairs, foreign policy, and political culture of the whole Southeast Asia region. It likewise calls for approaches to political language, international relations and foreign policy that might lead to a better understanding of the important developments taking place in this part of the world.”  (Porter Gareth. Vietnam: The Politics of Bureaucratic Socialism, 215).

Ecro Panujoki pointed out: “Ostensibly, the Marxist-Leninist doctrine persisted in Vietnam during the period of upheavals in the international system between 1975 and 1993. Vietnam’s commitment to the Marxist-Leninist vocabulary after the spring victory of 1975 was understandable, for the Vietnamese Communists proved the superiority of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The Sino-Soviet rift soon made evident the limits and world’s socialist system formally placed into doubt the justification of the Marxist-Leninist theory of internationalism relations. However, the fact that the political doctrine has survived the radical changes in both the international systems and Vietnamese society indicates that the Vietnamese Communists have managed, so far, to combine different elements in their doctrine without totally abandoning Marxism-Leninism.” (Ecro Panujoki, Vietnam and the World, Mc. Millan Press LMT.Houndhills Basintoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London. 1997:209).                            

The normalization of relations between Vietnam and China and the finding of a solution to the war in Kampuchea became a major issue raised by the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam in its Resolution 32/BCT21 of July 6, 1986. On July 28, 1986, Gorbachev announced at Vladivostok a new foreign policy according to which the Soviet Union would move closer to China to dismantle international conflicts among which were the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the ending of dispute at the Soviet-China borders, and the ending of the war in Kampuchea. Gorbachev asserted that a solution to the war in Kampuchea could not be reached at distant countries, including the United Nations but must be solved by China and Vietnam, which are both the two neighboring socialist countries. Nevertheless, it was not until May 1988, by the Resolution 13, that the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam affirmed that the normalization of relations with China was a difficult and complicated process that required time. Only after relentless efforts of diplomatic corps from various channels-- Vietnam and China, and other countries including Japan, Kampuchea, and Lao, could the deadlock be broken. On June 5, 1990, Party Secretary Nguyen Van Linh expressed his wish at the reception of the secretary party of the Communist Party of China to Hanoi that he was ready, together with genuine communists, to discuss about the supremacy of socialism. He was willing to meet with the highest leadership of the People’s Republic of China to restore the good friendship and relations between the two countries.   

     On August 29, 1990, Beijing invited Party Secretary-general Nguyen Vam Linh, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Do Muoi, and State Advisor Pham Van Dong to come to a summit conference on Kampuchea and the China-Vietnam diplomatic normalization at Zanto, the capital of Tse Zchuan Province scheduled on September 3, 1990. There was no joint communiqué after the close of the conference, but the two parties came up with a major principles according to which the two socialist countries unanimously intently flattened out difficulties and made void the imperialist’ vile schemes  aiming at erasing socialism.

The Zanto Conference played the key role in reopening the process of China-Vietnam post-war political normalization. It was the foundation on which peace between Kampuchea and Vietnam was restored and the friendship between China and Vietnam resumed, making the China-Vietnam borders the market boundaries. Beginning on September 3-4, 1990, it is noted, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam changed its course, gradually distancing itself from the Soviet Union and increasingly implemented close alliance with China. Do Muoi, Chairman of the Ministers Council and the key signatory to the Zanto Agreement, replaced Nguyen Van Linh and became Party Secretary-general, and General Le Duc Anh, another signatory to the agreement, was chosen to be the President of the State. The selection of the former defense minister, who had reportedly given the People’s Army battleships the order not to exchange fire against the Chinese warships when they launched fierce attacks, gunned down the Vietnamese battleships, and seized Vietnam’s Garma Island in the Spratly Islands in the East Sea in 1988, imperceptibly indicates a political subordination to an “all-powerful China” in the eyes of patriotic Vietnamese.

    The leaders of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam after the Zanto conference, for a time, showed perplexity as the Soviet ceased to be a mighty ally on whom they leaned on for support, both politically and economically. They then looked to China, again, for support as Ho Chi Minh had in the years of the Resistance War against the French. With all efforts that translate their will for change, they had not hesitated to coax the brother socialist country with praises and compliments on the “centuries-old Vietnam-China friendship.” The People’s Republic of China was no longer a threat to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and became, again, the mightiest stronghold country, taking the lead in the protection and preservation of socialism.

   Other striking changes mark this period of transition. In September 1992, the National Assembly adopted a new constitution, particularly transposing anti-Chinese sentiments of the Vietnamese people. Part of the statement in the preface of the 1980 Constriction that eulogized “the glorious victory in the two wars to protect the country against the invasion of the reactionary Kampuchea in the northwestern border and the transgression of Chinese hegemony in the northern frontiers” was suppressed. China was, again, a cause of glorious socialism, tangible friendship, and genuine alliance which Vietnam would ever cherish.  The Soviet Union and several other socialist countries were still mentioned in the preface of the new constitution, although they were no longer socialist. “In a way, Socialism still exits and it still develops,” as Lt. General Nguyen Minh Chau suggested.

Modeling on the USSR Constitution, the new constitution provides Article 4, reserving the right to the leadership of the people for the Communist Party. The single-party State rule is unified under the leadership of the Communist Party. The constitution professes no rule of law, and thus no separation of powers. The supremacy of leadership of the Communist Party is absolute. The legalization of the right to the leadership of the people the Communist Party practically manifests the monopoly of power of the Communist Party. The then National Assembly Chairman Le Quang Dao, in his address to the representatives at the People’s Assembly on February 1992, had admitted that in many places party organs “have established for themselves a State, even a “super State.”

 The  1992 Constitution, in addition, codifies many free market reforms, but significantly lacks progress in the area of civil and political rights, negating the rights to which the Vietnamese people are entitled as provided by the  1945 Constitution, namely, civic rights, universal suffrage, democratic freedoms (freedom of creed, freedom of opinion, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement), equal rights for the nationalities, and equal rights for men and women.

 The China-Vietnam friendship in the years following the Zanto Conference became increasingly attached. Hanoi had achieved full relations with the United State and sought diplomatic normalization. Nevertheless, until the present day, it still clings to the repressive policies of its one-party system in the civil and political spheres. Nowhere is the persistent intolerance of political rights more evident than in the repression of religion and conscience. Like Beijing, Hanoi has made market reforms, allowing the rights to start and own businesses, to enter into joint ventures, and to own property. Nonetheless, with its monopoly of political power and pervasive police apparatus intact,  it continues  to ban or restrict independent thought, speech, the press, association, union organizing, and civil society.